Knowing Moral Truth: A Theory of Metaethics and Moral Knowledge by Christopher Kulp (review)

Knowing Moral Truth by Christopher Kulp takes a new approach in arguing for an intuitionist moral realism. His starting points are familiar to us all. Where his theorizing ends up is somewhat familiar to those working in ethics. What is most distinctive in this book is how Kulp connects his starting points to the end results.

Kulp's starting points are extremely striking moral scenarios. He begins his book by detailing the carnage of the Sandy Hook shooting brought about by Adam Lanza in 2012. He lists the names of the victims, providing a complete body count for the reader. Another scenario plays a central role in Knowing Moral Truth: It is morally wrong for anyone to walk into my office and shoot me to death as I sit here writing this book. He challenges us to see whether we can genuinely deny that these are wrong acts. Out of such striking scenarios he builds his theoretical edifice.

Everyone is likely to agree with Kulp that murdering twenty children and shooting him while writing are both extremely wrong. It is what he does with these scenarios that is likely to invite disagreement. Moral skeptics are likely to agree that we will respond to such scenarios with utter revulsion, but that making the situations so immediate and emotionally charged will likely bias our theoretical responses. Intuitionists have traditionally started at the opposite end of the matter, focusing on abstract general moral propositions. Moreover, W. D. Ross, the main moral intuitionist, holds that we do not know what is right or wrong in a single particular case. So starting with particular vivid cases goes against the grain of intuitionist theorizing.

How does Kulp's theory work? Call his approach the paradigmatic approach. We start with the arresting moral scenario, such as the office shooting scenario. Then we consider what the world must be like for it to be true that such a shooting is wrong. In determining what the truth-maker is for such a proposition we have the makings of a moral realistic metaphysics. With that in place, we can determine what is required for one to know such a fact. And so on that basis we have a moral epistemology as well. As Kulp states, "When we have a firm grip on moral properties, moral facts, and moral truth, we are in a position to say some important things about moral knowledge." If we don't have moral facts, moral truth, and so on, he points out, it's difficult to argue that we have moral knowledge. "A central thesis of this book is that what appears to us at first blush is in the end, after rigorous analysis, quite correct: Lanza's behavior is a paradigm case of moral wrongness." That means that the metaphysics and epistemology that are erected around such cases must preserve in some way our original judgment of them.

The best work Kulp does with his approach is in moral metaphysics. His analysis of moral facts is quite thorough and excellent. He begins with physical facts, provides an analysis of them, then moves step-by-step to moral facts. By providing a thorough analysis of physical facts, Kulp reveals that our grasp of the metaphysical details of them is not as surefooted as we might have thought. Physical facts, when their metaphysical details emerge, seem to be less familiar than the everyday physical facts with which we are in constant contact. That provides room for an account of moral facts that itself includes elements that are unfamiliar. He argues that moral properties are sui generis moral universals. The detailed treatment of moral universals he provides is quite welcome in the current discussion, for many ethicists who style themselves "robust realists" shy away from positing and explaining any robust entities. However, I think few would agree that Kulp has shown there are moral universals. Instead, we would agree that his account of moral properties...