Johann Gottlieb Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre von 1812. Vermächtnis und Herausforderung des transzendentalen Idealismus ed. by Thomas S. Hoffmann

This new publication on Fichte is a collection of contributions that were originally presented at the 2012 Berlin conference celebrating the 200^th anniversary of the Doctrine of Science or Wissenschaftslehre 1812 as well as the 250^th anniversary of Fichte's birth. The book contains ten articles that reflect the lively tone characteristic of conference presentations enriched with additional developments and references. As the editor's preface emphasizes, all contributions were written in the spirit of Fichte's transcendental approach and with the acknowledged desire to pass on to the readers the "flame of the Wissenschaftslehre."

One of the most striking features of this collective work is the predominance of studies concerned with the concept of appearing (Erscheinen) and its reflective forms (Sich-Erscheinen der Erscheinung). They constitute central aspects of Fichte's phenomenology in 1812 as well as in its previous versions, notably after 1800. This also indicates that Fichte's position in 1812 is deepening the project of his Doctrine of Science rather than renewing it completely and radically.

T. S. Hoffmann's introductory contribution poses a decisive question—"Why Fichte?"—a question that the author answers through a general argument in favor of transcendental philosophy of which the 1812 Wissenschaftslehre is particularly emblematic. Fichte's approach not only allows a better understanding of Kant's oeuvre, but also enables us to expand the horizon of transcendental philosophy as such. What, then, are the main characteristics of Fichte's transcendental philosophy in 1812? First, it is the distinction between visibility and what is visible. This distinction is characteristic of the spirit of criticism as opposed to that of dogmatism, since for the latter the visible comprises, so to speak, in itself the conditions for its visibility. This first distinction implies a second one, which is even more fundamental, namely, that between image and being. Such is the originary transcendental disjunction stemming from the absolute, an absolute that is, however, not to be equated with the I, contrary to what a superficial interpretation based on Fichte's 1794 Grundlage would suggest. From the Fichtean standpoint in 1812, the I is "merely" the locus where visibility and seeing (Sehen) become themselves visible as self-appearing of appearing. In other words, it is the locus where light actualizes itself. Like its preceding versions, the 1812 Wissenschaftslehre remains nonetheless a philosophy of freedom: consciousness is capable of an act of freedom while elevating itself above its merely factual state (faktisches Bewusstsein).

Commenting on this reflective process, Honrath makes clear that the I surpasses its object character insofar as it brings to light the self-movement of life that animates it. But how can this life, which ultimately originates in God, be expressed? Such is the challenge faced by Fichte. As an image, however, the Kantian "I think" can be only the term of a process whose constitutive moments have to be discovered by the Wissenschaftslehre. For the human, that is, for finite consciousness understanding itself as a moment of this process, understanding amounts to freely acknowledging the absolute as something it fundamentally depends on. The vision of this dependence generates the self-limitation of the I, namely, what Fichte calls Selbstvernichtung (literally: self-annihilation), which is paradoxically the necessary condition to access one's individual vocation or Bestimmung.

The thesis affirming a "return to Kant" in Fichte's late transcendental phenomenology is, in turn, analyzed by Binkelmann. However, as the author highlights, it would be more than an oversimplification to reduce Fichte's middle period to a realist philosophy of life and being, while cataloguing his late period as a transcendental Besinnung inspired by Kant. One must acknowledge, on the contrary, that Fichte's philosophy has been, at least since the Jena period, in constant debate with that of Kant, while simultaneously trying to overcome the boundaries drawn by critical philosophy.

Marco Ivaldo's contribution moves toward a similar conclusion, as it stresses the genealogical character of Fichte's approach: far from being a mere description, it aims at seizing the genesis of appearing within the important context provided by the Wahrheits- und Vernunftlehre of the second 1804 Wissenschaftslehre.

As M. J. de Carvalho points out, the image is image of the absolute, that is, God's Dasein. Life is thus the activity that engenders the division proper to the manifold of images, which are, in turn, destined to be analyzed by the Wissenschaftslehre. As a result, the appearing as self-appearing, that is, the image of an image, is revealed not only as a process of division but also as the fundamental condition for appearing tout court.

The idea of the world as image is also the topic of J. R. de Rosales's study that comprises a particularly interesting discussion of Fichte's Spinoza reference in the 1812 Wissenschaftslehre. The famous "so Spinoza, so wir" means, indeed, that for Fichte being is absolute oneness. Not only is divine life impervious to change, it also has to be conceptualized as through itself, from itself, and in itself (durch sich, von sich, an sich). However, and here the difference with Spinoza is insurmountable, it is equally clear to him that we do not live in God but "through" God (an Gott), which means, in fine, that we are essentially in the mode of an image. This mode of being is necessarily one of knowing (Wissen).

The role of the Wissenschaftslehre as the reflection (enabled through reflexibility) on the self-appearing of appearing is confirmed by Kimura's article. The author takes into account Janke's important study of Fichte's phenomenology that concluded on the balance between phenomenology and ontology in Fichte: without being there can be no image (as da-seiend), and, without appearing, being could not be "there," that is, it would not manifest itself as da-seiend. Furthermore, Kimura accounts for the threefold schema of appearing in Fichte's 1812 Wissenschaftslehre. Schema I equates to the foundation of appearing as such (Erscheinung erscheint), schema II to factical knowing (faktisches Wissen, Erscheinung erscheint sich), and schema III to the Wissenschaftslehre itself as it reflects such factical self-appearing (Erscheinung erscheint sich als erscheinend).

The Wissenschaftslehre is, however, not limited to a theory of self-awareness, as Dieter Henrich's well-known thesis seems to imply. Richli highlights that the Wissenschaftslehre, in particular its 1812 version, in fact surpasses the concept of self-awareness in order to thematize appearing as the appearing of the absolute. For the late Fichte, therefore, there exists an immediate unity prior to self-awareness and that constitutes its transcendental condition.

The volume concludes with two comparative studies that go beyond the Fichte–Kant debate, thus enlarging the angle taken on the 1812 Wissenschaftslehre. The first, authored by Penolidis, engages in a comparison with Hegel's Science of Logic. As Penolidis points out, the Science of Logic shares a methodological concern with the Wissenschaftslehre 1812: to investigate and posit being in its "purity" means to lose track of the living movement of appearing and its subject–object division. Thus, a tension arises between the immediacy proper to the unity of being, on the one hand, and the logical form implying mediation, on the other. It is this tension that both Hegel and Fichte try to resolve.

The second comparison, by Girndt, further enlarges the debate to Indian and Asian thought in general (Vedanta, Buddhism), as it reminds us of the requisite of universality inherent to the philosophical project. Girndt also highlights Plato's influence on Fichte, while stressing the latter's original conceptualization of freedom.