Abstract

abstract:

Some phenomenological accounts of intersubjectivity, from Husserl to Zahavi, argue that self-awareness precedes our understanding of others. The account of intersubjectivity developed by Jan Patočka embraces the opposite claim: it is through the other that self-awareness is possible. This essay deals with Patočka's reading of the Husserlian appresentation as appresentation of myself in the other. Having reconstructed the systematic background of Patočka's claim that our self-awareness passes through the other, I conclude by reconsidering the question of the primacy of self-awareness over intersubjectivity.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1527-9383
Print ISSN
0891-625X
Pages
pp. 512-526
Launched on MUSE
2019-09-06
Open Access
No
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