Abstract

abstract:

I present a reading of Eudemian Ethics V.12/Nicomachean Ethics VI.12 according to which Aristotle argues for an executive account of φρόνησις (practical wisdom) to show why it is useful to possess this virtue. On this account, the practically wise person’s actions are expressive of his knowledge of the fine, a knowledge that only the practically wise person has. This is why he must not only be a good deliberator, but also δεινότης (cunning), able to execute his actions well. An important consequence of this reading is that the debate about whether Aristotle holds a Humean account of practical reason presupposes assumptions about the scope of rationality that Aristotle rejects.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1538-4586
Print ISSN
0022-5053
Pages
pp. 391-417
Launched on MUSE
2019-07-09
Open Access
No
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