The Future of ISIS: Regional and International Implications ed. by Feisal al-Istrabadi and Sumit Ganguly (review)

This edited volume is an important contribution to the growing body of work attempting to answer the following elusive questions about the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS): How did this happen, and how do we prevent it from happening again? Military planners, intelligence agencies, diplomats, scholars, and analysts at the time and since have been grappling with those questions. How is it possible for a small group of insurgents to become a dominating force controlling territory across two sovereign states, spreading to other territories across the globe, and inspiring lone-wolf attacks in the West. How did this happen? How do we ensure it does not happen again?

In the Introduction, editors Feisal al-Istrabadi and Sumit Ganguly tell us:

As the United States withdrew its forces from Iraq at the end of 2011, many in the Sunni community were seething with anger at [then-Prime Minister Nuri al-]Maliki, and a genuine sense of Sunni disenfranchisement began to take root. This sense of disenfranchisement became the vehicle of the initially slow infiltration of ISIS from across the across the Syrian frontier back into Iraq, especially in Anbar Governate, as Maliki sent troops violently to disperse what had largely been peaceable demonstrations. It was this infiltration that set the groundwork for the dramatic rise of ISIS from Mosul southward in June 2014

(p. 4).

This disenfranchisement and its reaction by Maliki highlight the core of the argument. "Even if the particulars of ISIS's rise might not have been precisely predictable, that there would be a palpable and significant response to provocation of the Sunnis was eminently predictable" (p. 4). In short, the rise of ISIS should not have surprised US policy-makers. Grievances, the harsh crackdown by Maliki, the sense of having been disenfranchised, and the ability of ISIS to capitalize on these factors is what gave its rise to power momentum and predictability. To the editors this is important because "This volume fills a niche not hitherto occupied by other publications on ISIS: the lessons learned and the pitfalls to be avoided in the future" (p. 4). The value here, especially as it relates to "the pitfalls to be avoided in the future," lies in being able to identify these dynamics and then counter them with smart policies. This is the volume's great contribution and its weakness.

Chapter One sets the table by establishing the nomenclature, the problem set, and the approaches taken by the contributors. The book has five sections, each consisting of two chapters. The first section covers the introduction and ideology; the second, intelligence failures; the third, "local" actors focusing on Syria and Afghanistan, although Iraq would have been much more appropriate; the fourth assesses the divergent agendas of the various states fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria; and the fifth section concludes by examining US interests in the fight against ISIS. The five sections cover a broad range of topics that move somewhat awkwardly from the specific and applicable to the abstract. Each chapter is well written and informative. However, on the whole, readers would have been better served with a deeper dive on the ideological and intelligence failures sections found in the earlier part of the book. The regional-strategic analysis in the third and fourth sections is solid but does not add much to the central thesis of the book or the solutions proffered.

The underlying belief supporting the recommended solutions is that grievances can be met before groups like ISIS can take advantage of them to radicalize populations and mobilize forces effectively. Putting aside the question of whether ISIS had any popularity where it ruled, this central idea, which I agree with, the book does not address directly the issue of resources. In June 2014 ISIS overran Mosul and in so doing captured billions of dollars in US currency from the city's central bank. With this cash...