Iran's Strategic Thinking: The Evolution of Iran's Foreign Policy by Nikolay Kozhanov (review)

The Islamic Republic of Iran is celebrating its 40th birthday this year. With that, the publication of Nikolay Kozhanov's monograph on developments in Iran's foreign policy since the Iranian Revolution is timely. Providing an overview of foreign policy from Mohammad Reza Shah to President Hassan Rouhani, it may serve as a starting point for anyone interested in the evolution of Iranian foreign policy over the past four decades. However, despite some merits, the monograph's analytical contribution is limited. This is due to, first, the lack of use of primary sources fitted to the book's main thesis and, second, a heavy reliance on the labels of "pragmatic" versus "revolutionary."

Kozhanov accessed Russian-language sources on Iranian foreign policy and conducted interviews with multiple foreign policy experts in Russia as well as in Iran. Although we do not learn how many "multiple" is or who these experts are, it seems that the use of these sources contributes to a narrative based on concrete foreign policy, rather than fears and sentiments. The narrative builds on rationalist assumptions, presupposing that Iranian foreign policy has "preconditions" (p. 3) that "determine" (p. 2) its shape and direction. Khozanov insists that knowledge of these preconditions can help generate an "informed prognosis about Tehran's diplomatic moves" (p. 1). With this, the book offers a welcome counter-narrative to analyses that view Iranian foreign policy as unreliable and dangerous.

The preconditions that determine Iran's foreign policy, Kozhanov holds, were ideological immediately after the 1979 revolution but were replaced over time with pragmatic considerations. The author does not make explicit how he differentiates between pragmatic and ideological. The analysis suggests that the first refers to the pursuit of what in International Relations is called an objectively defined national interest. This includes state survival, the maximization of power and, arguably, economic gain. Ideological considerations seem to refer to Tehran's supposed revolutionary dogmas, such as the export of the Islamic revolution in the period immediately after 1979 and the goal of establishing international justice during the tenure of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad (2005–13). The problem with the use of these labels lies in the fact that the identification of Iran's foreign policy choices as either ideological or pragmatic takes place ex post facto.

Khozanov contends that Iranian foreign policy doctrine has undergone "a radical transformation" and is today all but free from ideology (p. 156). At the same time, he states that the ideals of national interest, domestic development, and increasing Iran's regional influence persist (p. 142). Khozanov ignores the fact that these ideals were embedded in the principles of the Iranian Revolution back in 1978/79. They are therefore as ideological as they are pragmatic. Similarly, in the final chapter of his book, Kozhanov summarizes the main goals of the Iranian regime during Ahmadinejad's tenure as president: the survival of the political regime and national security; the preservation of independence and national sovereignty; ensuring national development and strength; and strengthening Iran's position in the international arena.

From this list of priorities the author concludes that "the role of revolutionary dogmas in the formulation of foreign policy priorities was marginalized" (p. 116). However, the Iranian Revolution was about each of these four points, even to the extent that the preservation of independence can be considered its main objective. Moreover, all four points have been firmly embedded in Iran's (foreign) policy discourse not only during the Ahmadinejad era, but from Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to Rouhani. In other words, just because Kozhanov understands these four goals to be pragmatic, this does not mean they are any less revolutionary or ideological.

The reliance on the categories revolutionary and ideological in this book's analysis of Iranian strategic thinking is related to a second shortcoming. This is the lack of use of primary sources that inform the analysis of Iran's strategic thinking. Judging from the claim on the back cover...