Abstract

Abstract:

This article critiques Fröding and Peterson’s (2011) account of friendship developed in their article “Animal Ethics Based on Friendship.” I deny their central claim that friendship between a farmer qua farmer and her cow is even possible. Further, I argue that even if such a relationship were possible, the lack of such a relation on our part in the case of free-living animals does not, contrary to their claim, give us moral license to eat them. I suggest that even though Fröding and Peterson’s friendship differential does not do the work it is intended to do, virtue ethics has other resources to help us discover a more virtuous relationship with animals.

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Additional Information

ISSN
2160-1267
Print ISSN
2156-5414
Pages
pp. 1-5
Launched on MUSE
2019-04-10
Open Access
No
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