Abstract

abstract:

Some claim that Kant's commitment to the explanatory priority of judgments over concepts is one of his most important contributions to the philosophy of mind. There is, however, extensive disagreement over the nature and extent of this commitment. Existing interpretations ignore a substantial body of textual evidence and offer no account of the origins of Kant's view. This paper corrects for these deficiencies. I explain, first, the relevant accounts of concept possession Kant encountered in the writings of his predecessors; and, second, how within this context he first expressed a commitment to the view that conceptual content is explanatorily dependent on acts of judgment. I then argue that Kant endorsed a second form of discursive primacy, namely, the view that every use of a concept in conscious thought about an object has the form of a judgment.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1538-4586
Print ISSN
0022-5053
Pages
pp. 281-312
Launched on MUSE
2019-04-04
Open Access
No
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