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  • Ethics and the Orator: The Ciceronian Tradition of Political Morality by Gary A. Remer
  • Andrew R. Dyck
Gary A. Remer. Ethics and the Orator: The Ciceronian Tradition of Political Morality. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2017. Pp. xii, 292. $55.00. ISBN 978-0-226-43916-7.

In the book under review Gary Remer develops the interest in classical rhetoric first evident in his Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 1996) and adds a concern with ethics. As in his earlier book, Remer, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane, does not shy away from current issues of morality and public policy. I will focus on points of probable interest to readers of this journal.

As the subtitle suggests, Remer wants to establish a special "Ciceronian tradition" of political morality. Though Cicero's achievements should receive all due recognition, such a "Ciceronian tradition" extending to the present day is hard to credit. If there ever was such a tradition, it surely died out soon after the founding of the American Republic. After that, the influence of classical antiquity in general, and Cicero in particular, went into steep decline. What Remer identifies as components of this tradition—what one might call a pragmatic, non-rules-bound approach to governance, especially in crises—might be more plausibly attributed to the independent application of commonsense approaches than specific Ciceronian influence (as Remer implicitly acknowledges, 201–203).

In chapter 1, Remer compares the contemporary relevance of the Aristotelian and Ciceronian versions of rhetoric. "Contemporary relevance" can, however, quickly become subjective and reductive. In practice, Remer's primary concern is with emotional appeals, but he fails to supply sufficient background to enable the reader to understand the differences that emerge. Aristotle wrote his Art of Rhetoric in opposition to the rhetorical handbooks of his day. As the systematizer of logic, he sought to emphasize a more rational approach to persuasion but could not abandon the emotional appeals promoted by his competitors, since they were effective in court. Hence rationalism dominates the beginning of Book 1 but is supplemented with a detailed analysis of the emotions in Book 2. Cicero, however, as a practicing orator/politician, knew at first hand the strength of emotional appeals. His failure to provide a general definition of emotion is of a piece with the aristocratic ethos he wants to impart to the speakers in De oratore. If Cicero's version of rhetoric is more usable by contemporary speakers and politicians, it is surely because his aims and methods are more similar. Remer's [End Page 105] preference for Cicero rests above all on his development of decorum as a general constraint on the orator in De officiis and his picture of moderate oratory in De legibus. But in spite of the importance of decorum for Remer, he misunderstands the basic point of how this fits into the system of virtues of De officiis (it is not derived from justice; see 221 n. 29). On the other hand, Remer brackets out Aristotle's ethical treatises, since they do not deal with the orator in particular. The result is thus to some extent a comparison of apples and oranges.

Some fundamental differences between the two systems should have been addressed. Thus, in interpreting Antonius' remark about winning over goodwill for oneself and one's client (De orat. 2.182), Remer (219 n. 8) correctly remarks that this refers to judicial oratory but fails to point out that this is different from the Athenian system assumed by Aristotle, in which the defendant speaks in his own defense (even if he has to resort to a ghost writer).

There are unfortunate omissions and misunderstandings. Thus, failing to explain the circumstances of the trial of Norbanus described in detail in De oratore 2, Remer arrives at the false conclusion that "Antonius … employed arguments to mislead" that were "not germane to the question at hand" (40). In fact, the anger that prevailed against the general Caepio for the massacre of a Roman army was very relevant as a mitigating factor when Norbanus was on trial for presiding over a disorderly public meeting.

Remer, then...

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