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Zhuangzi's Knowing-How and Skepticism
- Philosophy East and West
- University of Hawai'i Press
- Volume 68, Number 4, October 2018
- pp. 1062-1084
- 10.1353/pew.2018.0097
- Article
- Additional Information
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Abstract:
A common interpretation of the Zhuangzi holds that the text is skeptical only about propositional knowledge and not practical knowledge. It is argued here that this interpretation is problematic, for two reasons. The first is that there is no motivation for Zhuangzi to criticize propositional knowledge, given some general pre-Qin epistemological assumptions. The second is that Zhuangzi explicitly criticizes a certain kind of practical knowledge. It is then explained how Zhuangzi's skepticism can co-exist with the idea of "great knowledge."