Abstract

Abstract:

A common interpretation of the Zhuangzi holds that the text is skeptical only about propositional knowledge and not practical knowledge. It is argued here that this interpretation is problematic, for two reasons. The first is that there is no motivation for Zhuangzi to criticize propositional knowledge, given some general pre-Qin epistemological assumptions. The second is that Zhuangzi explicitly criticizes a certain kind of practical knowledge. It is then explained how Zhuangzi's skepticism can co-exist with the idea of "great knowledge."

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Additional Information

ISSN
1529-1898
Print ISSN
0031-8221
Pages
pp. 1062-1084
Launched on MUSE
2019-02-15
Open Access
No
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