Abstract

Abstract:

In Cambridge Pragmatism, Cheryl Misak shows that Peirce's work on truth and related topics influenced Ramsey in profound ways. Misak recognizes Peirce's realistic commitments, and in particular she sees that his characterzation of truth in terms of what would be believed at the end of investigation is realistic. But she nonetheless argues that he excludes a correspondence element from his philosophical account of truth. In these comments I argue, contra Misak, that there is an essential correspondence element in that account. In defending this interpretation, I explain aspects of Peirce's theory that might enable him to meet some of the challenges that Ramsey associated with a correspondence view of truth.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1558-9587
Print ISSN
0009-1774
Pages
pp. 395-408
Launched on MUSE
2019-01-09
Open Access
No
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