- Misak's Peirce and Pragmatism's Metaphysical Commitments
- Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy
- Indiana University Press
- Volume 54, Number 3, Summer 2018
- pp. 378-394
- View Citation
- Additional Information
In this comment on Misak's Cambridge Pragmatism, I examine a case study—debate about the existence of free will—in order to explore residual tensions between Misak's 'truth-affirming,' Peircean pragmatism, and mainstream analytic philosophy. I suggest that Misak's Peirce makes a metaphysical commitment to the existence of rational self-control, and thereby to the existence of free will. I also suggest, however, that her 'analytic pragmatism' thus far offers few clues about how we should defend such a commitment from skeptical arguments emerging from contemporary analytic metaphysics. I conclude that analytic pragmatists have more work to do in explaining pragmatism's complex relationship with metaphysics, and defending its core commitments from skeptical threats.