Abstract

Abstract:

In this comment on Misak's Cambridge Pragmatism, I examine a case study—debate about the existence of free will—in order to explore residual tensions between Misak's 'truth-affirming,' Peircean pragmatism, and mainstream analytic philosophy. I suggest that Misak's Peirce makes a metaphysical commitment to the existence of rational self-control, and thereby to the existence of free will. I also suggest, however, that her 'analytic pragmatism' thus far offers few clues about how we should defend such a commitment from skeptical arguments emerging from contemporary analytic metaphysics. I conclude that analytic pragmatists have more work to do in explaining pragmatism's complex relationship with metaphysics, and defending its core commitments from skeptical threats.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1558-9587
Print ISSN
0009-1774
Pages
pp. 378-394
Launched on MUSE
2019-01-09
Open Access
No
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