Abstract

Abstract:

Accidents involving large commercial trucks kill over 3,000 motorists every year in the United States. A substantial number of these accidents stem from truck drivers operating their trucks while excessively fatigued. This concern has resulted in regulatory agencies establishing hours-of-service (HOS) rules that carriers must ensure their drivers abide by. In this study we examine the relationship between carriers’ capability at monitoring their truck drivers using electronic technologies and carrier-level compliance with HOS rules. Drawing on principles from deterrence theory, we explain why this relationship should be sigmoidal (S-shaped) in nature such that motor carriers receive the greatest gains from investing in electronic monitoring capability when they have a moderate level of this capability. We subject our theorized prediction to empirical testing using a longitudinal research design that combines primary data on motor carriers’ electronic monitoring capability and secondary data from regulators regarding carrier-level compliance with HOS rules. Results from our econometric analysis corroborate the hypothesized sigmoidal relationship, which stands up to stringent robustness testing. These results hold important implications for theory and practice.

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