In this paper, I study Leibniz's approach to church-state relations. I show how Leibniz established a complex balance of authority and power between church and state by distinguishing between their domains of jurisdiction and the quality of the obedience they command, while still allowing them to keep each other in check. The aim is to give one prominent example of how Leibniz's political philosophy, contrary to what is often held, was not exclusively grounded in the metaphysical principles of universal jurisprudence, but that he realized how the application of divine principles of justice in the human sphere required recourse to other forms of reasoning; in particular, a juridical logic of presumptions. I thus show how Leibniz appealed to presumptive principles and so-called perplexing cases in the law in order to conceptualize a balance of powers between church and state.


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pp. 629-657
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