Abstract

abstract:

“Transcendental empiricism” is a handy catchphrase for describing the philosophy of Deleuze. It places him in relation to and in opposition to Kant. As handy as it is, it is not without its difficulties. Chief among these difficulties is the precise nature of the “transcendental.” I take up the question of the transcendental, especially as it relates to Sartre’s “transcendental field.” I argue that the transcendental remains ineluctably haunted by a dative construction that makes immanence immanent to something. I propose that Deleuze has sufficient resources in his conception of intensity to have done with the transcendental.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1527-9383
Print ISSN
0891-625X
Pages
pp. 533-543
Launched on MUSE
2018-10-02
Open Access
No
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