Abstract

Abstract:

The pragmatist use of common sense philosophy has not only been a source for first-order philosophical work but also for metaphilosophical orientation. The primary motive for both of these lines of thought has been that of anti-skepticism. This essay shows, using William James and G.E. Moore as primary examples, that skeptical challenges may be posed from within the common sense and pragmatist common sense programs. From this result, a case for skeptical pragmatism, one that manages the contraries arising from common sense and the programs that critique it, is made.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1558-9587
Print ISSN
0009-1774
Pages
pp. 231-248
Launched on MUSE
2018-10-02
Open Access
No
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