- Pragmatism, Common Sense, and Metaphilosophy: A Skeptical Rejoinder
- Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy
- Indiana University Press
- Volume 54, Number 2, Spring 2018
- pp. 231-248
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- Additional Information
The pragmatist use of common sense philosophy has not only been a source for first-order philosophical work but also for metaphilosophical orientation. The primary motive for both of these lines of thought has been that of anti-skepticism. This essay shows, using William James and G.E. Moore as primary examples, that skeptical challenges may be posed from within the common sense and pragmatist common sense programs. From this result, a case for skeptical pragmatism, one that manages the contraries arising from common sense and the programs that critique it, is made.