Ideological Extremism in Armed Conflict

To the Editors (Max Abrahms writes):

In "The Extremist's Advantage in Civil Wars," Barbara Walter seeks to explain the rise of radical Islamist groups in civil wars since 2003, especially Salafist groups.¹ She claims that ideologically extreme groups have an organizational edge and thus outperform more moderate groups. This thesis is unpersuasive, however, because of its shaky empirical basis.

Walter's core assumption is that an extreme ideology helps groups attract support. Her definition of ideology encompasses their political preferences and the tactics used to achieve them. As she states, ideology is "a set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved" (p. 15). Walter expresses skepticism, though, in rating the extremeness of groups based on their conduct, perhaps because of the mounting empirical research showing that moderate groups attract disproportionate support.² Indeed, a common way for groups to end is by acting too extreme, as doing so dries up support.³ Examples include extreme Salafist groups such as the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria, Egypt's al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, al-Qaida in Iraq, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

Walter offers two explanations to support her argument that extremists elicit more support. First, moderate groups are less likely to achieve their political goals. Yet, large-n empirical studies show that groups hinder bargaining success when they adopt more extreme means, ends, or both.⁴ Second, Muslims turn to Salafi jihadist groups because they offer higher-quality governance. As Salman Rushdie notes, however, "Everywhere that this phenomenon has actually taken power, it's very quickly become hated."⁵ Survivors agree that "the people hated" ISIS's rule.⁶ Relatively moderate rivals such as the Free Syrian Army, Ahrar al-Sham, and even Jabhat al-Nusra were always more popular among Syrians and external backers, particularly Sunni Gulf states and Turkey. Although ISIS attracted more foreign fighters, its attrition rate quickly exceeded the recruitment rate, as the international community assembled the largest counterterrorist coalition in history to target it.⁷ Walter argues incorrectly that Salafi jihadists "remained militarily relevant much longer than [its] moderate rivals" in Syria (p. 31). At the time of this writing, however, Afrin is teeming with Free Syrian Army members, and Idlib is dominated by the Nusra-led Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham umbrella group, while ISIS has been expunged from its Raqqa stronghold.

Walter claims that leaders such as Islamic State's Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi feign extremeness to appeal to ideologically pure members of the rank and file. Yet, Baghdadi was far more ideological than most of his supporters.⁸ As with other militant groups, ISIS's leadership has been more ideologically devoted and knowledgeable than its foot soldiers.⁹ Across militant groups, ideological fluency is a common prerequisite for rising to the top.¹⁰

Walter struggles to show how adopting an extreme ideology helps leaders overcome organizational challenges. She maintains that Salafi jihadism enables leaders to screen out less capable, ideologically vacillating recruits. ISIS is notorious, however, for its weak vetting standards and became a repository for mentally unstable fighters with a poor grasp of Islam who ended up defecting in droves.¹¹ Poor vetting is a hallmark of Salafism. Like praying, jihad is an individualized act independent of a centralized hierarchy.¹² For jihadists, there is no authority other than Allah.

Walter argues that extreme ideologies have been rising in civil wars since 2003 for instrumental reasons rather than ideological appeal. The rise of religious extremism is hardly limited to recent civil wars, however. Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, militants have gravitated to religious extremism inside and outside of civil wars.¹³ Salafism is the fastest-growing Islamic movement around the world from Azerbaijan to China, India, Indonesia, and Singapore—and even in the West. Regionalists attribute its growing popularity to one main factor—Saudi backing of Wahhabi missionaries and mosques.¹⁴ Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman recently committed Saudi Arabia to combating Islamist extremism not because it helps Islamist groups, but because the extremeness risks...