Abstract

Abstract:

When rebel groups engage incumbent governments in war for control of thestate, questions of international recognition arise. International recognition determineswhich combatants can draw on state assets, receive overt militaryaid, and borrow as sovereigns—all of which can have profound consequencesfor the military balance during civil war. How do third-party states and internationalorganizations determine whom to treat as a state's ofªcial governmentduring civil war? Data from the sixty-one center-seeking wars initiatedfrom 1945 to 2014 indicate that military victory is not a prerequisite for recognition.Instead, states generally rely on a simple test: control of the capital city.Seizing the capital does not foreshadow military victory. Civil wars often continuefor many years after rebels take control and receive recognition. Whilegeopolitical and economic motives outweigh the capital control test in a smallnumber of important cases, combatants appear to anticipate that holding thecapital will be sufªcient for recognition. This expectation generates perverseincentives. In effect, the international community rewards combatants for capturingor holding, by any means necessary, an area with high concentrations ofcritical infrastructure and civilians. In the majority of cases where rebels contestthe capital, more than half of its infrastructure is damaged or the majorityof civilians are displaced (or both), likely fueling long-term state weakness.

pdf

Share