Theater of a Separate War: The Civil War West of the Mississippi River by Thomas W. Cutrer (review)

Thomas W. Cutrer, emeritus professor of history at the University of Arizona, has at last completed his magnum opus, a military history of the trans-Mississippi theater of the U.S. Civil War. His stated purpose is to "establish the foundation and build the framework" on which future historians might build more detailed studies exploring the economic, political, and social aspects of the war in the region(p. xii). The potential of the trans-Mississippi region to contribute to Confederate victory was vast. Grain, livestock, and additional recruits for the army promised to add substantially to the cause. These recruits notably also included the Native Americans of the Indian Territory, many of whom legitimately supported the Confederate cause, and others who were pressured to do so by dint of proximity. Texas offered the only international border and a potential alliance via the French puppet emperor Maximilian in Mexico, while a brisk trade in cotton was conducted across the Rio Grande. Beyond Texas and seemingly ripe for the taking, New Mexico and California offered the prospect of precious metals and an outlet to the Pacific trade.

Unfortunately for the Confederacy, the potential of the trans-Mississippi region went unrealized. The southern dream of creating a transcontinental empire was snuffed out early on with the Union victory over General Henry Hopkins Sibley's Army of New Mexico, and the region as a whole was beset by a host of problems. A shortage of war materiel left Confederate forces destitute, poor infrastructure hindered military operations for both sides, and the Mississippi proved an almost impassable barrier for Confederates. For most Confederate soldiers in the trans-Mississippi region, this was perfectly agreeable as they were adamantly opposed to fighting in the far-flung reaches of Virginia.

With the fall of Vicksburg, timely communication with Richmond ceased. The region became, as the title of the book suggests, a theater of a separate war. Edmund Kirby Smith assumed the role of de facto dictator, forced to act as magistrate and general, and more successful in the former role than the latter. Smith in fact was par for the course in the theater. It was, as Cutrer asserts, too often a dumping ground for the less talented and incompetent who, for various political or familial reasons, could not be outright dismissed. Political infighting between commanders hampered operations, as did the lack of a clear strategic vision for the territory on either side. General Ulysses S. Grant thought operations in the region a waste of manpower, particularly the disastrous Red River Campaign in Louisiana, and Confederate president Jefferson Davis saw it mostly as a resource to be exploited for operations in the east. In the end, Confederates held the territory by forfeit, and even won the last battle of the war in Texas.

The modest scale of military operations in the theater belied the brutality that attended them, as a pronounced viciousness defined this separate war. Endemic guerrilla warfare, especially in Missouri, resulted in a scale of civilian suffering that had no counterpart in the east, while the strong presence of African American Union troops guaranteed racial atrocities on the part of Confederates. Nor did the ongoing clash between whites and Native Americans cease, as the great Dakota uprising of 1862 in Minnesota and continuing hostilities with the Native peoples in the Southwest attested. For all Indians, the consequences of the war in the West would prove disastrous.

Cutrer set out to write a comprehensive military history of the trans-Mississippi theatre, and in this he has succeeded admirably. His work is the first general treatment since Alvin Josephy's excellent The Civil War in the American West more than twenty-five years ago, and joins an increasing number of studies on this heretofore neglected but important facet of the conflict.