Abstract

Abstract:

In post-Dignāga Buddhist epistemology, non-conceptual cognition (nirvikalpajñāna) comes to be construed as a sort of pre-reflective and self-intimating feature of all states of cognition. In earlier Buddhist Ābhidharmika exegesis, however, the closest candidate for non-conceptual cognition is the notion that the five sense consciousnesses apprehend their object-supports directly, as opposed to the sixth consciousness—mind consciousness (manovij ñāna)—which alone has the capacity for conceptual discrimination. In an oft -repeated example, visual consciousness is said to know "blue" but not "this is blue"; it is mind consciousness that knows "this is blue." This article explores the diffi culties that early Buddhist exegetes encountered as they tried to make sense of immediate, non-conceptual cognition.

pdf

Additional Information

ISSN
1529-1898
Print ISSN
0031-8221
Pages
pp. 826-870
Launched on MUSE
2018-08-08
Open Access
No
Back To Top

This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.