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  • Ch'oehu ŭi Ch'ŏnjo: Mo T'aektong, Kim Ilsŏng sidae ŭi Chungguk kwa Pukhan by Syŏn Chŭhwa
  • Dongwon Lee
Ch'oehu ŭi Ch'ŏnjo: Mo T'aektong, Kim Ilsŏng sidae ŭi Chungguk kwa Pukhan [The last Celestial Empire: China and North Korea in the era of Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung] by Syŏn Chŭhwa [Shen Zhihua], tr. Kim Tonggil, Kim Minch'ŏl, and Kim Kyubŏm. Seoul: Sŏnin, 2017. 908 pp.

Critique of the "blood alliance" myth in Sino-North Korea relations

The Last Celestial Empire by Shen Zhihua gives a narrative account of Sino-North Korean relations between 1945 to 1976 under the communist leaders Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung and reveals the historical particularities of this era. It critiques the myth of Sino-North Korea relations in the Mao-Kim era, which are often described as that of "blood allies" or an "intimately interdependent" and perdurable "fraternity" that "shared the pleasures and pains of life."

In the preface, Shen Zhihua discusses the historical origins of the Chinese and North Korean communist parties between 1919 and 1945. Relations between the two were formed in the anti-Japanese movement. While the opposition to fascism provided a basis for cooperation, relations were also conflictive. According to the author, among North Korean communists, the Yanan faction maintained close ties with the Chinese communists as companions of the international united front but the anti-Japanese guerrilla faction from the Northeast region grew distant from the Chinese communists while under Soviet control. The remainder of the book is organized into six chapters covering the period from 1945 to 1976.

Chapter 1, "So close and yet so distant" ("卽若卽离," 1945–1949), examines [End Page 129] the founding period of the two communist regimes. Although China and North Korea exchanged aid and support, the two remained "close yet distant" under Soviet influence. This was because North Korea, the geopolitical gateway for Soviet security in the Far East, was an exception in Stalin's strategy for control, in which he had agreed to give Mao full charge of the Asian revolution. Much as in the past, the Soviet factor had an enormous effect. Within the larger framework of the history of Sino-North Korea relations, there was always lurking the history of the tripartite Sino-Soviet-North Korean relations.

Chapter 2, "The Korean War" (1949–1953), illustrates how China seized the initiative on the Korean peninsula with a military dispatch to assist in the "anti-American war." The Chinese and North Korean leadership experienced constant conflict over the actual conduct of war. Eventually the dispute reached a resolution according to the final decisions from Moscow. For Kim, Stalin's unwavering support for Mao left a scar; he had a strong desire for national independence. As a result, true fraternity in Sino-North Korea relations did not materialize.

In Chapter 3, "Overture of Chuch'e" (1953–1956), the author describes events after the cease-fire, as Kim Il Sung initiated postwar recovery, eliminated the opposition faction in North Korea, and propounded the Chuch'e ideology. Yet North Korea fell into crisis when the Chinese and Soviets tried to intervene in its domestic affairs through the "August Faction Incident" of 1956. Although in the name of its mission as "Celestial Empire" Mao had offered aid beyond China's capacity to North Korea for postwar recuperation, Kim grew closer to the Soviets than the Chinese after the Sino-Soviet intervention.

In Chapter 4, "Appeasement Policy" (1956–1960), the author asserts that, acknowledging the errors of the Sino-Soviet intervention in late 1957 and considering the political upheaval in Poland and Hungary in October 1956, Mao actively sought to withdraw the Chinese People's Volunteer Army from North Korea to appease Kim. Although Mao did not intend to replace Kim with someone from the Yan'an faction, the presence of hundreds of thousands of Chinese forces unsettled Kim. Only after the withdrawal of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army did Kim reach the peak of his power in North Korea.

In Chapter 5, "Sino-Soviet Split" (1960–1966), the author describes how Kim Il Sung managed to expand diplomatic ties...

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