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Journal of Korean Religions, Volume 9, Number 1, April 2018, pp. 71-103 (Article)

Published by University of Hawai'i Press

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1353/jkr.2018.0003>

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Trans-Border Rituals for the Dead: Experiential Knowledge of Paternal Relatives after the Jeju 4.3 Incident

Sungman Koh

Abstract

The purpose of the paper is to examine how relatives of deceased massacre victims have been memorialized and ritualized by paternal family members who experienced the Jeju 4.3 Incident. In particular, the paper elucidates how bereaved families scattered throughout Jeju and Osaka documented and pacified the deceased relatives within a ritual space. In doing so, the paper focuses on experiential knowledge and practices within the private sphere, which have been mediated by political and social circumstances. More specifically, the paper analyzes the significance of the removal or alteration of information within documents, such as census records, grave inscriptions, and declaration of victimhood reports. This allows for the examination of the production and operational mechanisms of each respective recording medium. The study also introduces examples of cross-national and cross-generational practices of posthumous rituals and ancestral rites. Through this, it will focus on the rehabilitation of close relatives who have floated in between and within public and private spheres. In conclusion, this paper argues that the memorialization and ritualization of tragic death and violent experiences functions as a coping strategy by bereaved families to survive within an oppressive political system.

Keywords: Jeju 4.3 Incident, victims, Cheju, armed guerillas, after-death rituals (posthumous rituals), past settlement, ancestral rites

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Introduction

This paper reflects upon how the deaths of armed guerillas and their relatives who were murdered by agents of the South Korean state during the Jeju 4.3 Incident¹ have been processed and defined by the bereaved families. Living in an anticommunist society following the Jeju 4.3 Incident, how did they reestablish their devastated living spaces, and how did they overcome sharpened social conflicts and discord surrounding the status of the dead and the interpretation of those deaths? This study examines this particular issue by focusing on the bereaved families who have since been separated and scattered throughout Jeju and in Osaka, Japan, and their continuous practices of posthumous actions and rituals, and their efforts to bring their deceased kin into the public sphere. By reconstructing the post-massacre lives of the bereaved families, which have been articulated both transnationally and trans-regionally, this study places emphasis on experiential knowledge and the practices of those who have differentiated their interpretation and ascription of meaning to the death of their relatives. It also focuses on their reconstruction of past experiences to meet the changes in time and space.

The late 1980s democratic transition of South Korean society and the establishment of the Special Act of Investigation of the Jeju 4.3 Incident and Recovering the Honor of Victims (hereafter referred to as the Special Act) in January 2000 gradually uncovered the truth about the previously concealed and distorted Jeju 4.3 Incident. The reevaluation of the Jeju 4.3 Incident within the public sphere led to official apologies from then President Roh Moo-hyun in 2003 and 2006 to the bereaved families and the people of Jeju, respectively. It also paved the way towards elevating the annual memorial ceremony on April 3 into a national event. With the visible accomplishment of legal and institutional resolution, the “history of treason” or the “history of taboo” finally entered its transitional period through incorporation into the history of the Republic of Korea. However, within the transitional process of official recognition, there has been conflict and friction with the ideology of the nation-state in various contexts. Particularly, the experience of April 3 and the afterlives of

the armed guerillas confirm the unique characteristics of these deaths, which cannot be smoothly retrieved into the history of the nation-state.

To establish this, this study first examines how the bereaved families of the 4.3 Incident have ascribed meanings to and interpreted the deaths of their deceased close relatives through various mediums. They did this, first, through the process of reorganizing official copies of census records and family registers; second, through registering the deaths; third, through the construction and reconstruction of the grave/gravestones; and fourth, through ancestral rites, including visiting ancestral graves as part of posthumous actions that began after the death of their kin. The purpose of this is to focus on the processes of memorialization and ritualization of the deaths of close relatives during violent times across borders and generations.

Along with elucidating this process, this paper also compares and reviews the contents of the “declaration of victimhood reports” (*hoesaengja sin'gosŏ*), petitions that were completed and submitted by bereaved families as part of their participation in the so-called “settlement of the past” (*kwagŏ ch'ŏngsan*) history program sponsored by the South Korean government to investigate the truth and reestablish the honor and dignity of victims. Under this settlement of the past program, the process through which the descendants from various backgrounds of the Jeju 4.3 Incident could converge into “officially recognized victims” was premised upon self-application. Therefore, those who wanted their deceased close relatives to be recognized as “victims” were required to come up with an effective plan for ascribing meaning to the death of close relatives by considering not only empirical techniques but also legal and institutional understandings of the circumstances of their deaths. What were the practical strategies utilized by bereaved families to achieve the present purpose of reaching the status of “victim” through negotiating and compromising with the system? How have the memories of the dead and survivors been reorganized? To answer these questions, collected materials and interview records from fieldwork conducted on Jeju and in Osaka from April 2009 until the present shall be availed.

Complex Processing of Abnormal or Seditious Deaths

The Jeju 4.3 Incident began with organized uprisings by the Jeju population against the legitimacy of the Korean police force and the South Korean government. Under the auspices of the US military government, which technically occupied the recently emancipated South Korea, the South Korean government labeled the events on Jeju as “treason” and a “riot” and carried out a large-scale repression operation. This resulted in continuous massacres and violations of human rights up through 1954–1957, years after the incident. It is calculated that at least 30,000 islanders lost their lives.²

From the perspectives of both the South Korean government and the US military government, the significance of the armed uprisings and the anti-government struggle on Jeju was not limited to regional resistance against the legitimacy of the newly born Republic of Korea in the south. Rather, the incident was seen as a provocation that would disturb the US-led Cold War order in East Asia and a threat against the legitimacy of a newly emerging anticommunist system. Large-scale military and police forces, coupled with right-wing paramilitary youths from the mainland, were sent to Jeju for the repressive operation, which eventually led to multi-pronged and inhumane atrocities.

After South Korea’s April revolution of 1960 that overthrew the government of Syngman Rhee, the memory of the dead from the 4.3 Incident was briefly transformed from that of “red guerillas” and “rioters” to “innocent civilians” and “guiltless survivors.” However, the May 16, 1961 military coup that resulted in the installation of Park Chung-hee meant the discourse of “patriots, veterans, and martyrs” killed by “red guerillas” became dominant once more. This new situation prohibited most local Jeju residents from using the phrase “innocent deaths” in public (Park 2011, 96–97). The deaths of South Korean military and police forces in battle against the armed guerillas were dealt with solemnly and rapidly, in a similar fashion to that of war veterans. As expressions such as “anticommunist warriors,” “patriotic martyrs,” and “fallen patriots” demonstrate, they were considered heroes who had formed the foundation of an anticommunist nation. The commemoration ceremonies for their memorial services take place in numerous national service facilities across the nation on

a regular basis. Through such expression as “honorable warriors,” “lofty spirit of martyrdom,” and “glorious death for the people and the nation” that appear on their gravestones, it is possible to deduce a history of consensus between the anticommunist state, the community, and the individual (bereaved family).

As the statistics of Jeju 4.3 Incident casualties demonstrate,³ the tragedies associated with losing one’s close relative are not limited to the bereaved families of the local residences or the armed guerillas. For those who have survived and whose family members were among the slaughtered victims, a more complicated coping has taken place. In explaining this, there are two different aspects to consider.

First, the abnormal deaths that cannot be easily assimilated into the bereaved families’ view of life and death, such as an early death, death in a foreign land, or the simultaneous deaths of multiple generations, caused considerable confusion for the intragroup order of genealogy and posthumous action towards the dead.⁴ It is not true to say that there is no correct response to this abnormal death in a shamanistic ceremony. According to Hyŏn Yongjun (1977, 256), a spirit of abnormal death suffers from difficulty passing to the otherworld and causes damage to the living by wandering about the living world and nursing lingering attachments to the close relatives. Even the spirit from a normal death would receive a shamanistic ceremony called *siwangmaji* (a shamanism service for reposing of the soul) through a request to a *simbang* (shaman).⁵ However, for those who barely survived the initial massacres, there are many difficulties associated with using this kind of shamanistic knowledge. There is no doubt that the local community was a unit, which shared a violent time and space. However, there are many cases where individual grudges and memories of terror are tangled and cannot be explained under the dichotomy of victims and perpetrators.

Second, under the anticommunist system, any effort to investigate the cause of deaths of the relatives of armed guerillas was considered a treasonous action, which threatened the legitimacy of the nation-state. Under the military dictatorship, those who were slaughtered and labeled as “Reds” or “rioters” were considered to be seditious decedents who “contaminated the identity of the

newborn anticommunist nation” (Kim Seongnae) 2005, 236). Under conditions of strict control and surveillance from above, the bereaved families who risked being stigmatized had to set clear boundaries between their relatives and the “rioters” who had been targets of repressive operations. This was to minimize the potential threats to their daily lives as they had been tainted by the “negative legacies.” More complicated and sensitive responses were required in order to realize the severance of the close relatives’ real-world death.

The commemoration and memorialization of the suppression forces from the Jeju 4.3 Incident through a systemized protocol based on anticommunism and patriotism serves to reflect the status of killed armed guerillas, which have been labeled as the subjects of that suppression. Even though the deaths of both armed guerrillas and suppression forces left irrecoverable scars on surviving loved ones, only the deaths of government forces have been guaranteed legitimacy in South Korean anticommunist society. Therefore, the experience of April 3 and the death of the armed guerillas and their relatives only compounds the difference between recognition by the nation on the one hand, and recognition by the individual on the other, while undermining the possibility of negotiation between them. It is therefore necessary for the bereaved families who have been stigmatized by Korean society to establish an appropriate strategy for posthumous action and to verbalize the experience of the 4.3 Incident. They have had to selectively incorporate a variety of discursive strategies, by comprehensively considering issues of political status, historical recognition, and public evaluation.

Here, the spatial destination of the dead, ancestral or heroic, was not important, but their liberation from the historical origin of death was. Transcendence, in this context, was immanent in the movement of corpses, not determined by the identity of the place where their movement ended. (Kwon Heonik 2006, 135)

As Kwon points out, “transcendence” may lay its meaning on the desire and practice for life, which aims exactly at the opposite side of death. However, continuous surveillance and repression of the relatives of armed guerrillas in

South Korea's anticommunist society have disrupted this process of transcendence. In this context, it was natural for the bereaved families to devise a unique alternative strategy for coping with these legacies.

Family Recordings after the Massacre

Overcoming the Past within Confucian Culture

Anthropologists, particularly participant observers who have studied the processes of recovery and reclamation that have occurred within local communities devastated by the Jeju 4.3 Incident, have focused on the microscopic practices of the surviving families. Some representative literature include case studies on the religious practices of women who have inherited tabooed past memories and wounded hearts of the dead through shamanistic ceremonies⁶ (Kim Seong Nae 2013), testimonies of women that reinterpret the violent experiences and agonizing memories under the context of familial life and economic activities (Yi Ch'ongju 2000; Yu Ch'ölin 2004), and a case study of that “*holomöng* (widow) network” who sought to reconstruct the community through new human networks (Yi Ch'ongju 1999; Kim Ŭnsil 2016).

The abovementioned works have been marginalized within the field of Jeju Incident research by patriarchal Confucian norms, conventional military history, political history, and a social movement history dominated by positivist narratives. However, in those fields where life-world and shamanistic ceremonies are practiced with women as principle agents, the possibilities of alternative historical recognition, which does not coincide with political interpretation or evaluation, have emerged and shed light upon a phenomenon that has sought the potential, as well as the restitution, of communities from the periphery. The aforementioned studies have provided creative perspectives and inspired the methodologies for the ideas of this paper.

A question lingers, however: Is the experience of overcoming the “negative legacies” from the 4.3 Incident confined to a small community on the periphery? Is it possible that the practices of bereaved families for overcoming the wounds

of abnormal and suspicious deaths of their close relatives is bound up in Confucian norms and customs—a phenomenon that previous literature has sought to relativize? This research question also provides a reason why this paper focuses on the unconventional management of posthumous actions and the recording medium of paternal relatives, who, faced with the crisis of genealogical rupture or extermination of family members, have searched for a way to possibly mend the rupture. This discussion of the memorialization and ritualization of death shall be deepened by contemplating how close relatives have responded to authoritarian repression.

Tools for Survival within Anticommunist Society

During the Jeju 4.3 Incident, 10 percent of the island's population was massacred. Seventy percent of these victims were in their 10s to 30s, and 80 percent were male (Jeju 4.3 Incident Committee 2003, 369–372). In 1949, when the massacre reached its peak, the population among 15 to 49 year-olds decreased remarkably (Yi Ch'anggi 1999, 80), completely changing the demographics of the island (Morris-Suzuki 2010, 75). In order to locate the disposed bodies of their deceased family members, the survivors depended upon all possible forms of information—even groundless rumor. They also sought various ways to overcome the crisis of extinction of their relatives by modifying how the dead were reported in family registrars, by reorganizing family roots, and through post-death marriage and adoption of the victims.

However, the process of overcoming the scars of the Jeju 4.3 Incident was far from easy. This was because the incident was defined as a riot or civil disturbance, which was agitated by North Korea for the purpose of fomenting communist rebellion and overthrowing the South Korean state. This definition fundamentally stymied efforts to access the exact truth of the deaths of family members. The bereaved families experienced the repressive role of the guilt-by-association system⁷ under the “era of extreme anticommunist ideology” (Kim Chongmin 1999, 373) that characterized South Korean society from about 1950 to the early 1980s, and have learned that they could “survive only by distancing themselves from the Jeju 4.3 Incident.”

Paradigms conflict with the dominant ideology when a tragic mass destruction is positioned within a society (Kwon Heonik 2006, 4–5). In the case of the Jeju 4.3 Incident, conflicts have emerged between the dominant state ideology and the memories of those who observed the actual deaths of relatives and have tried to insert these memories of violence into the narrative of state legitimacy as well as the public sphere. This tension politicizes the posthumous rituals by the bereaved families. Therefore, recording close relatives' deaths into their family reporting system and performing after-death rituals in order to appease the tragic memories of the dead have become intense political problems rather than problems of privacy and emotions.

However, as universal method, there are numerous limitations in efforts to trace back after-massacre experiences of the dead and the living through recording media. There are numerous cases where it is impossible to trace back after-massacre experiences. These include cases in which there was no report of birth and thus no name on the family registrar, the annihilation of an entire family, records of daughters or infants that could not be marked in the “genealogy” or “epitaph,” and missing people who lack graves or grave-stones. The performance of posthumous rituals—such as grave visitations, the recording and commemoration of deaths, and ancestral rites—is impossible without the survival of close relatives. Even if a family avoids total annihilation, it is not uncommon for adoption or after-death marriage to not proceed smoothly.⁸

The bereaved families were also forced to devise an unconventional method for dealing with the missing whose date of death could not be ascertained.⁹ In most cases, the date for bereaved families to honor their dead relatives is determined by the date of death. In addition, “the day on which the *simbang* visited the village” or “the day when the police took the deceased from prison to an airfield [where the massacre occurred]” have also been chosen as days to commemorate a death. Setting the death day for commemoration of the missing is very important because it gives an opportunity to console the soul by bringing it back home, and safely calling them into their ancestral genealogy (Koh Sungman 2015, 389).

Jeju 4.3 Incident and After for the D Family

Massacre and Separation

Figure 1: Family Tree of the D Family

Note: Triangles are male family members and circles female. The cross out ‘/’ signifies direct and indirect deaths resulting from the Jeju 4.3 Incident. Filled shapes signify families that were smuggled to Osaka because of the Jeju 4.3 Incident.

It was March 1947 when right-wing groups and police kept their eyes on D-4, a primary school teacher. D-7 can never forget her father (D-4) making Korean flags with mimeographed collages in his room. Since D-4 led numerous protests, strict surveillance from the police meant he was repeatedly jailed and freed. Feeling a sense of crisis towards this state of affairs, D-4 tried to smuggle himself to Japan, following his brothers (D-3, D-6) who had escaped to Osaka. But D-4’s plans did not go as anticipated, and instead of fleeing to Osaka, he was forced to find refuge in Jeju’s mountainous interior.¹⁰

Rumors soon spread that D-4 had gone to the mountains to join the activities of the Jeju Branch of the South Korean Labor Party. The police threatened and interrogated the remaining family members left behind in the village. D-7 recalls,

Nearly every night, the police and the [right-wing] youths [Northwest Korean Youth Association] came and ransacked the house. Since we could not really live in the house, my grandfather, grandmother, and mother always tried to hide the four of us. Then, my grandmother [D-2] was arrested and imprisoned for 15 days. They beat her so hard that we could not recognize her because of the black bruises all over her face.¹¹

The interrogations did not last long. Eventually, the parents of D-4 (D-1, D-2) were arrested and taken to a barley field in front of a primary school, where they were shot dead on January 5, 1949. Five days later, on January 10, his wife (D-5) was also shot dead in a field in front of a police station. The police made the villagers watch every step of the execution. D-7 will never forget the cold hand of her dead mother (D-5).

Those who saw my mom die told me later how it happened. Since my mother was still young, once she was shot, she rolled down to a field and they shot her again. It was like they cruelly killed her many times over and over again, instead of just once. I could not see any nails on her hands because my mom scratched the ground from the pain. My heart aches when I think of her dying at the age of 26.¹²

One day, a year after he had relocated to the mountains and separated from his family, D-4 returned to his village on June 19, 1949 to hear about his family. However, due to information provided by a fellow villager, the police found D-4 and shot him dead. His body was exhibited for three days in an open space in front of Kwandŏkchŏng pavilion in the center of Jeju City, then abandoned in a crematory. The bereaved family did not dare remove his body. One night, D-4's father-in-law snuck into the crematory and brought a handful of his son-in-law's ashes back to place in his daughter's (D-5) grave, thus combining their graves.

The children of D-4 and D-5, who experienced all the processes of their family members' deaths, became orphans because of the 4.3 Incident. The youngest (D-10), who was two-years-old at the time, died of malnutrition. The surviving three children (D-7, D-8, and D-9) were raised by their maternal grandparents. They cannot forget the disdain of those around them, who called them "rabble." They recall:

Back then, our school provided some rice for those who had lost their parents and who did not have much money. When I was in third grade, my homeroom teacher came, well he was also from my village, and said to me, "Since you are rabble, there is no rice for you." I pestered him two or

three times, but he did not listen to me. I remember that I sat on the road for a long time without returning home. My sister [D-7] saw me. It hurt her heart a lot.¹³

These things kept happening and the adults from my family told me, “You should go to Japan, if you stay here, you might not be treated as a human being.” That’s why I sent my two brothers [D-8, D-9] to Japan right after they graduated from middle school.¹⁴

For a month, we hid in a warehouse near the Busan port waiting for a ship and boarded a freighter. It was April 5 when we landed in Japan. I can never forget that day.¹⁵

These are the direct reasons why the two brothers were smuggled out of Korea with the assistance of a trusted uncle (D-3) and aunt (D-6) who had gone to Osaka before the massacre had become serious. However, life as an illegal immigrant was continuously tense and required as much from life as a “young rioter” did. On top of living in a foreign country where they were unable to communicate in the language even through writing, they spent most of their days hiding in a house out of fear of being questioned by the police and sent back to Korea with a huge fine. Since their aunt and uncle were also precarious in terms of their status in Japan, it was very difficult for them to take care of their two nephews.

In order to overcome the illegal and precarious identity, the brothers (D-8, D-9), through the introduction of a broker, were adopted by two Japanese who had no descendants. Through a very strict, four-year process of adoption, they succeeded in overcoming their illicit status to achieve Japanese nationality.¹⁶ Because of their Japanese naturalization, the male direct descendants of the D family (D-8, D-9) were excluded from the D family’s registrar. It was much later that their sister (D-7) in Jeju learned that these “rioters” who had been smuggled to Japan had transitioned from illegal immigrants to Japanese citizens. She missed her brothers, who were now legal strangers, but she also understood how much they must suffer living in a foreign country.

There are a lot of houses where there are no direct male descendants due to the Jeju 4.3 Incident. Well, our family eventually is the same, although our direct male descendants are not dead.¹⁷

The transcendent nationality of the Jeju 4.3 Incident is found in a post-massacre situation where the social positions of the bereaved family are respectively redefined within a different nation-state system. D-8 and D-9 were smuggled to Japan through the use of blood-tie networks in order to be freed from the forceful label of “rioters.” However, this also meant that they were reduced to the categories of stowaways and illegal immigrants by the Japanese post-war foreigner management policy. They were subjugated to each society’s regulation and control by being defined as “rioters” on Jeju (Korea), and as “stowaways” or “illegal immigrants” in Osaka (Japan). The history of the D family suggests that the majority of the two societies of Korea and Japan cannot and do not wish to see an uncomfortable truth. For D-7, obtaining Japanese citizenship was connected to the Jeju 4.3 Incident and the despair of being stigmatized as a “rioter” and “illegal.” This was also closely related to the relationship between Korea and Japan under American Occupation and with the Cold War situation on the Korean Peninsula.

Records and Rituals

When the massacre came to an end, the family registrars and census records were rewritten. The death report was filed en bloc for the four murdered members of D family in 1961 when D-3, who was smuggled to Osaka before the incident, visited Jeju. In the census records, the records of death can be observed according to the D family’s report of death lodged by D-3 on July 10, 1961. D-1 and D-2, who were shot dead on January 5, 1949, were recorded as having died at 5pm on December 7, 1957, and 8pm on March 20, 1958, respectively. D-5, who was shot dead five days after her parents-in-law, was recorded as having died at 3pm on July 18, 1958. D-4, who died in a village on June 10, five months after his wife, was recorded as having died at 4pm on May 14, 1958. The recorded place of death for all of them was their home address while alive.

It was quite recently that D-7 realized her two-year-old sister (D-10) had been excluded from the family registrars:

When I first examined our family registrars in order to submit a victim report, I found that the baby's [D-10] name was missing. Since she died before being recorded, she did not even exist. I remember that my mother's grandfather buried her properly, but I forget where it was because it was too long ago.¹⁸

Meanwhile, unlike in the census records, the days of their actual deaths are inscribed on their grave inscriptions that were erected in 2004: "January 5, 1949, age 55 [D-1]; January 5, 1949, age 56 [D-2]; June 10, 1949, age 30 [D-4]; and January 10, 1949, age 26 [D-5]."

The accurate death records as inscribed on the grave inscriptions provide an opportunity, through various after-death rituals such as ancestral rites, to remind the bereaved family of their close relatives who were murdered under false pretenses. D-5's father, who was responsible for the after-death rituals, took the body of his daughter to make her a grave and brought the ashes of his son-in-law (D-4) to join her. He has also performed the ancestral rites for ten years while taking care of his grandchildren.

When D-7 married in 1958, the ancestral rites for D-4 and D-5 were assumed by D-7, instead of her elderly grandparents. For ten years, until D-9 married a woman from the same village in Osaka, D-7 performed her parents' ancestral rites clandestinely (*kamaegi morūn sikke*, or "rites not even a crow would know about").¹⁹ Although the food offerings for the rites were rather humble, D-7 recalls that it was possible for her to perform the rite because her family-in-law was from the same village, and was familiar with the circumstances of her family.²⁰ The phrase *kamaegi morūn sikke* refers to an ancestral rite so clandestine (i.e., one that is compelled to be done in secret) that even a crow, which is the traditional emissary between the worlds of the living and dead, is unaware of it. Conceptually it was like a daughter-in-law clandestinely performing the ancestral rite for her family-in-law. However, as shown in D-9's case, in reality, it is difficult to claim that it deviated from ritual norms since it was conducted with the tacit understanding of living relatives. The distinct

situation after the Jeju 4.3 Incident, and the adopted wisdom to overcome these circumstances, have transformed the norms of ancestral rites.

I have thought a lot about whether my parents' rites would be performed in Japan. My brothers became Japanese [nationals]. I can't even adopt a son. But my sister-in-law [D-9's wife] asked me to perform the rite. Our second eldest brother [D-8] was not interested in performing the rite. The rite was observed in Japan only because of my sister-in-law.²¹

As the direct male descendants from the D family went through an unstable transitional period where they were identified as "rioters" and "illegal immigrants," the ancestral rites were able to be conducted through a period of *kamaegi morūn sikke*. This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of D-9's performing the ancestral rites for his parents (D-4, D-5) in Osaka. As their graves were combined, so were their ritual dates. It was decided that the date of the rite would be on the weekend before or after June 10 (the date of the father's death) so that the entire family of thirty could be gathered. Since 1990, when international travel was liberalized and life became more stable, the family of D-7 has also occasionally visited Osaka to perform the rites.

The graves of both her parents and grandparents are in D-7's orchard, which means that D-7 is in charge of their day to day management. However, D-7 always consults with her brother (D-9) when it comes to the problem of moving, reorganizing, or reconstructing the graves, as well as the organization of grave visits. This explains why D-9 comes to Jeju every August to visit the graves.

Application and Acknowledgement

According to Article 2 of the Special Act for the Jeju 4.3 Incident, "victims" (*hoesaengja*) refers to "civilians rendered deceased, missing, or with a post-event disorder by the Jeju 4.3 Incident, or imprisoned and designated as 'victims.'" However, even when these conditions are met by those casualties who suffered from events during the legally approved official period of the incident,²² not all such reported "victims" can be officially recognized as such

by the Jeju 4.3 Incident Committee. After the Special Act for the Jeju 4.3 Incident was enacted, conflicts between the discourse of “riot/rebellion” on the one hand, and that of “uprising/struggle” on the other, have resulted in a disputes over who are the *true* victims. In this way, the debates were a repeat of other conflicts concerning the “liquidation of the past” in South Korea. The critical question was whether an armed guerilla who participated in the uprising of April 3, 1948 against the government could be considered a “victim.”

Surrounding the issue of victimhood, the views and perspectives both inside and outside the Committee were in stark contrast. Various camps were in conflict. Finally, when the Constitutional Court suggested guidelines for “victims” in 2001, a space for compromise and negotiation was opened up. Regarding the constitutionality of the Special Act for the Jeju 4.3 Incident, the Constitutional Court ruled that the law was constitutional. However, the Court also provided the stipulation that certain groups, such as “key executive members of the Jeju Branch of the South Korean Labor Party” or “ringleaders of the armed guerillas” who were directly involved in the armed uprisings should be excluded from the category of “victims.”

Based upon the March 2002 Constitutional Court’s legal interpretation, the Jeju 4.3 Incident Committee formulated criteria guidelines for the “examination and judgement on victimhood,” and made a new provision called “exceptions to the range of victims”:

Those who were opposed to the basic order of liberal democracy: 1) the key executive members of the Jeju Branch of the South Korean Labor Party who were directly responsible for the outbreak of the Jeju 4.3 Incident, and 2) ringleaders of the armed guerillas who played a leading role in active resistance against the suppression forces and police, cannot be protected under our constitutional system, and thus must be excluded from the “victims.” In this case, concrete and clear evidence must be provided that can objectively prove such actions. (Jeju 4.3 Incident Committee 2008, 150)

Once the initial conflicts and confrontations within the public sphere surrounding who constituted a victim had concluded, the Jeju 4.3 Incident Committee began to select the “victims” in earnest. This helped many victims of the Jeju

4.3 Incident who had been abased as “Reds,” or “rioters” to be officially recognized as the victims of a long and oppressive authoritarian system.²³ However, because of the exception for the range of victim provisions, even if the casualties were caused by “the past mistakes of state power,”²⁴ armed guerillas were not included, especially if they were from the Jeju Branch of the South Korean Labor Party. In other words, both citizens and suppression forces have been recognized as “victims,” while the armed guerillas have been excluded from this designation (Koh Sungman 2011, 258).

After hearing the news of the enactment of the Special Act in January 2000, D-7 and her brother in Osaka submitted a victim report for her four family members, including her grandparents and parents, to the Jeju 4.3 Incident Committee on September 20, 2000. Even though the familial relationship had no legal standing for the direct male descendants of the D family (D-8, D-9) due to their naturalization as Japanese citizens, the attached census records (excluding family registrars) written before the naturalization of D-8 and D-9 caused no issues in identifying them as legal members of D family. On the other hand, D-9 considered his baby sister (D-10) to also be a victim of Jeju 4.3 Incident because he thought the baby had died as an indirect result of the death of her mother. However, since the baby’s birth was not reported in the family registry and her burial place was uncertain, D-9 had no choice but to give up the claim for her little sister.

Two years after they submitted their report, the siblings (D-7, D-8, D-9) were notified that their grandparents (D-1, D-2) and their mother (D-5) had been recognized as victims, which in turn made them recognized as “bereaved.” However, there was no response about their father (D-4). D-7 re-read the report for her father thoroughly, and thought there would be no problem with its account of his death:

He had hid in the mountains for a year from 1948 to 1949 because the army and police wanted him. On May 14,²⁵ while he was waiting next to barley field number OO in order to find out how his family was doing, he was shot dead because of a report from an old woman who worked right next door to him. (D-7, first declaration of victimhood for D-4 submitted to the Jeju 4.3 Committee)

One day in June 2006, four years after the notification of victim status for her grandparents and mother (D-1, D-2, and D-5), D-7 received a phone call from a Jeju 4.3 Incident Committee member. The young man told her to withdraw the decision regarding her father (D-4). The committee member's main point was that, "unless you withdraw the declaration, there is a high possibility the victim evaluation will rule it to be 'unconfirmed' and this will dishonor your father. I believe that it would be better if you withdrew the declaration before the screening process goes further and then re-apply when the situation improves." This same person from the committee subsequently visited D-7 a number of times and persuaded her to withdraw the report. She thought the idea was "not reasonable but persuasive." Eventually, she decided to withdraw the declaration of victimhood for her father. As D-7 related, "I didn't know what it meant to withdraw the declaration. I thought the problem would be solved naturally after some time had passed."²⁶

One year later, on the morning of April 3, 2007, D-7 went to the 4.3 Peace Park in order to participate in the 4.3 memorial service and went to a room of mortuary tables in honor of the dead. However, her father's (D-4) mortuary table, which was there a year ago, had been replaced with a vacant table. D-7 could not hold back her tears from the immense shock and immediately went home.

The day that she confirmed that her father's mortuary table had disappeared was the day that she also decided to re-submit the declaration for her father to the 4.3 Incident Committee. D-7 thought it would be natural to rewrite and resubmit the declaration because her "uneducated and careless thoughts" had led her to withdraw the preexisting declaration. It did not take long for the 4.3 Incident Committee to extend the registration period for the declaration of victimhood. D-7 went to a village office of her domicile and resubmitted the declaration for her father. The contents of the declaration were almost same as the contents of the September 2000 declaration (quoted above).

However, her petition was not accepted. In January, 2011, four-years after she had resubmitted the declaration, D-7 received a document entitled, "Notification of rejection regarding the declaration of victimhood and bereaved families of the Jeju 4.3 Incident." The document stated that her father's status

conformed to the exception range for victims, and that a declaration for reconsideration could be submitted within thirty days. D-7 could not accept the reality that only her father (D-4) was excluded from the status of victim. When the second declaration was rejected, D-7 talked with her brother in Osaka and submitted a declaration for reconsideration in February to the Jeju 4.3 Incident Committee that included the following:

There is no objective evidence that his activities as a member of the South Korean Labor Party in Jeju from the fall 1948 until June 10, 1949, when he was murdered by the police, are directly related to antigovernment action. [...] It is illogical to be rejected by the deliberation and decision process of victimhood without specific evidence that his actions benefitted the enemy when he only had the status of membership [in the Jeju Chapter of the South Korean Labor Party]. (son of D-7, second declaration of victimhood for D-4 submitted to the Jeju 4.3 Committee)

After two months came the judgment:

The request for recognition as a victim of the Jeju 4.3 Incident is disapproved. If there is any objection to the committee's decision, in accordance with article 13 of the same law, a lawsuit can be filed within 60 days after the notification is received.

However, the bereaved families in Jeju and Osaka decided not to file an objection with the Jeju 4.3 Incident Committee. Recalling the series of events surrounding the declaration of victimhood over the previous decade, D-9 and his wife now believed the "Korean government could no longer be trusted."²⁷

Transcendence through Death Rituals

Nominal Politics of the Contrived

For those who survived the Jeju 4.3 Incident, the meaning of family registrars (*hojök*) and census records (*chejök*) is not limited their status as official records.

A clear memory still remains of the military and police obtaining such family registrars in order to dig out the families of the guerillas.²⁸ For these families, family registrars were the equivalent of a black list. After the 4.3 Incident's closure in September of 1954, action on behalf of the victims became possible. Through reporting of deaths by surviving relatives, family registrars and census records were also reorganized. How are the scars of the Jeju 4.3 Incident inscribed within them?

First, it is worth noting that the dates of death in the census records are written as though the deaths were unrelated to the Jeju 4.3 Incident. Although the majority of deaths in the D family happened during early 1949, when the organized suppression operations by punitive forces were unfolding, according to the census records, they died 3–4 years after 1954.

Strategies for disguising the deaths as unrelated to the Jeju Incident can also be observed in the recorded places of death. Most of the places are recorded as being the residences in which the victims had resided. Instead of recording the actual place of the murder, such as “a barley field in front of the primary school,” or “a field in front of the police station,” the places of death were recorded en bloc as “died at home.” During the Jeju 4.3 Incident, massacres did not happen in certain limited spaces. In order to isolate the armed guerillas from local residents, the suppression forces changed the traditional order of village spaces. Massacres happened in fields and open spaces where villagers spent their daily lives. Further, the corpses of numerous victims were concealed for a long time in cave fortresses, at airfields, in isolated valleys, and in the coastal waters off the port of Jeju. However, in public records, the places of death were not specified.

This does not mean that there were no victim deaths in homes. In the case of the D family, for instance, all the murdered family members were killed outside their home. In the case of the census records of those who were killed in their homes by government forces, their places of death were recorded as such (Koh Sungman 2015, 388). However, in these cases another alteration was made for the date of death. A random date, different from the actual death date, was recorded in an intentional effort to show the death in question was unrelated to the Jeju 4.3 Incident.

For the bereaved families, post-Jeju Incident South Korea was far from a society with a merit-based system. Even though the guilt-by-association system was officially abolished in August 1980, the relevance of their families' death and the Jeju 4.3 Incident was continuously raised both officially and unofficially. The abnormal deaths of their close relatives unilaterally regulated the present and future of the bereaved families. For the bereaved D family, the guilt-by-association system was a political system that continuously reminded them of the relationship between the Jeju 4.3 Incident and a violent memory that connected the time and space of their family members' deaths and the survivors' daily life-world. Thus, the problem of how to record the murdered relatives in official records is a very complicated matter, which requires comprehensive consideration of the circumstances surrounding the bereaved family.

Regardless of the time and space, the census records, which disguised the death as unrelated to the Jeju 4.3 Incident, are indicative of the frailty of the survivors who were forced to submit to the power of the oppressive anti-communist system that silenced the survivors and covered up the incident. However, separating the relatives from the direct cause of death, even if it is "false" rather than the controversial "truth," considers not only the survivors' situation post-massacre, but also the future of their descendants: the politics of disguise. Through the contrived reports of death and falsified records, the bereaved families were finally able to escape guilt-by-association. For the bereaved families, the census records were written under the constraints of the guilt-by-association system. It was thus not considered to be a medium with high reliability by relatives of the deceased victims. Bereaved families have adjusted to the reality of being "commies or rioters," regardless of the reason and have contrived ways to sever themselves and their dead kin from the Jeju 4.3 Incident.

In the meantime, since D-3 passed away in Osaka in 1980, his account of his visit to Jeju in 1961 to report the death of his parents (D-1, D-2), brother (D-4), and sister-in-law (D-5) cannot be heard. However, his falsified information separating his family from the Jeju 4.3 Incident would not have been possible without the tacit understanding of the local community. Regarding the fact that the census records are distorted, D-7's husband remarked: "If you reflect upon it, yes, they contain false information. It is illegal and it's a

criminal act. However, back then, such things were very common in town. We turned a blind eye to each other.”²⁹

When D-7 first viewed her parents’ and grandparents’ census records in 2000 in order to submit it as an attached file for a declaration of victimhood, she did not feel any sense of incompatibility. The convenient and imaginary records of death in the census records represent a technique designed for the murdered relatives and the bereaved families to survive the repressive aftermath of the massacre. It seems that these census records have lost their credibility among both those who survived the 4.3 Jeju Incident and among succeeding generations.

Reading the Age

This is not to say every record of death that was left by the bereaved was falsified. With grave inscriptions, which were relatively free from the laws and norms of anticommunist society, people could record a family genealogy in a way they could not do in the census records.

In Confucian culture, which emphasizes the value of paternal blood ties, the grave inscription is regarded as a prestigious medium because it is a created, shared, and inherited family record. This is not only due to the fact that the genealogy of the whole family is condensed within this comprehensive medium. Unlike census records, which cannot be ritualized, grave inscriptions are located at the gravesite, contain the date of the memorial service, or are places where the ancestral body is engraved to reenact the memories of the dead in a ritual space. This is something the bereaved families intentionally did not write in the census records.

Unlike the census records, which utilized random dates of death that were far removed from the Jeju 4.3 Incident, grave inscriptions reflect the experiences and memories at the scene of the massacre. The recorded deaths on the grave inscriptions are exactly the same as the dates for the ancestral rites, which were performed by the survivors for ten years after the incident on both Jeju and in Osaka. In the post-massacre chaos, this is the most reliable information the survivors obtained, and to this day it has been passed on to remind the family of the days of death of their kin.³⁰

The role and function of grave inscriptions as a means for transmitting memories in the private sphere have also been sensitive towards the diverse perspectives of South Korea's democratization and the Jeju 4.3 Incident. As the graves of victims were renovated, and with the change in generations, there has been an increase in efforts to revise the epitaphs to determine the specific cause of death. This is in contrast to the falsified census records, which have remained uncorrected. In particular, it is notable that the grave inscriptions were written with more detail from the late 1990s when the reassessment of the Jeju 4.3 Incident through legal and systematical processes transpired.

In Donggwang-ri, Andeok-myeon, a village in southwestern Jeju, there is a story of a bereaved family whose murdered relative's (male, born in 1926) body could not be retrieved but whose death could be memorialized through a grave and grave inscription. After discovering that 13 of his relatives had been shot by soldiers and dumped in the sea, the bereaved family made a *hōtmyo* (fake grave) as a last resort for the dead whose bodies could not be located.³¹ To this day, in order to appease the soul of each of their relatives, a *simbang* has accompanied the family to the beach that is believed to be the spot where the bodies were dumped. This experience has left a deep impression on the bereaved. They were also advised to put personal items such as the clothes and rubber shoes of the deceased into the grave, but no such items survived as the entire village with all of its homes had been destroyed by fire.

According to the bereaved, the first grave inscriptions were inscribed only with the name of the deceased and the date of their disappearance. The genealogical table (*chokpo*) for this family compiled in October of 1988 also contains only the date they went missing and the location of the grave (*hōtmyo*). When the grave inscriptions were replaced in 1999 and 2001, additional factual details, such as "murdered at the Seoguipo Jeongbang Waterfall during Jeju 4.3 Incident," and other instances of tragic death were inscribed. The transitional period towards a democratic system and the movement to diversify historical awareness of the Jeju 4.3 Incident has resulted in a more specific description of the causes of death of victims, which until then had been very complex and ambiguous. This has also added more specific inscriptions within the private sphere to accommodate the social reevaluation of the Jeju Incident and the recognition of their relatives' deaths.

On the other hand, there is a limit to the D family's changes of the grave inscriptions in accordance with the times. Because of the changed social atmosphere regarding the Jeju 4.3 Incident, when she replaced the graves of her parents, D-7 wanted to inscribe that they had died during the incident. However, due to strong opposition from her younger brother (D-9), only the grave-stones were replaced while the inscriptions were engraved with the same contents as before.³² D-7 told her younger brother (D-9) that the situation had changed, and the South Korean president had already apologized to the bereaved. Even so, her brother did not want the exact cause of death engraved on his parents' gravestone, saying "My children and I will never go back to Jeju, but no one knows if the situation in Korea may change again."³³ Even though D-9 chose to live in Osaka, disconnected from the legal and institutional ties of his family, he did not give up his duties and rights as a member of the family. Likewise, he had not been freed from his traumatic memory of being called a rioter.

According to Yi Uk (2011), the Confucian ritual has the characteristic of settling the dead spirit as an ancestor of the family. It is also an important medium for forming and transmitting the family's experiences through the ritualization of memory. Separation and naturalization, chosen by the bereaved families from D family who had lost their parents to the Jeju 4.3 Incident, successfully disconnected legal relations with the family, thus emancipating them from their precarious position as "rioters" or "illegals." At the same time, the relationship, which cannot be explained in terms of nationality or the family registry, has been maintained and developed, thus strengthening the ties of the paternal relatives. Through the practice of calling upon the dead, the meaning of the family transcends that of a basic segment of society (Yi Uk 2011, 487). In this way, the story of the siblings who go to Jeju to visit the graves and to Osaka to serve ancestral rites, is significant.

Constraints Within the Principle of Application

Legal and institutional solutions for the Jeju 4.3 Incident through the "settlement of the past" commenced with the specification and officialization of the "victim." This was recognized as "the most important role" of the Jeju 4.3 Incident Committee, the primary agent in this settlement of the past. This is

because, by specifying the “victims,” the scope, content, and subject of the settlement of the past could also be specified (Jeju 4.3 Incident Committee 2008, 130).

However, the process for authenticating “victims” in the public sphere, as determined by the “criteria for the examination and judgment on victimhood,” is a means of reorganizing the nature of deaths within a series of complex relationships, such as perpetrators-victims, neglectors, or snitches. It is also a way of officially creating a dichotomy between the “victims” (local civilians and suppression forces) and those “excluded from victimhood” (the armed guerillas). As shown in key provisions of the law, such as that of “national unity” (Article 4 of the Special Act on the Jeju 4.3 Incident) or “the national identity of the Republic of Korea” (criteria for examination and judgment on victimhood), the status of “victim,” which was created to effectively achieve the “settlement of the past” program after 2000, is closely aligned with maintaining and strengthening the nation-state ideology.

As noted earlier, the administrative criteria for the recognition or rejection of victimhood status are based upon the principles governing applications. Therefore, the bereaved families must go through a process of recording and reorganizing their experiences into a document called a “declaration of victimhood,” a process based upon personal information regarding the deaths of their family members over a half-century ago. However, the experiences described in the declarations are often reconstructed to conform to the “criteria for the examination and judgment on victimhood,” and are therefore often far removed from the actual circumstances of death. In particular, in cases of armed guerillas who were rejected as “victims,” declarations submitted by the bereaved families to the Jeju 4.3 Incident Committee show an overwhelming number of incidents stating that the deaths of their families were unjust (Ko Sŏngman 2011, 264).

Just like D-4’s original declaration of victimhood, the story of reorganized experience and death is characterized by the excluded career of an armed guerilla coupled with the sufferings of an innocent victim. Out of fear of being stigmatized by the fact that the deceased was an armed guerilla, the dead person was portrayed as a “victim,” consciously distanced from ideological impurity and violence. This can also be found in the portrayal of the causes for D-4’s decision to move into the mountain and participate in the activities of armed

guerillas. In other words, the writing emphasized that the reason for his hiding in the mountains was because the military and the police had called him a Red and tried to arrest him. This reemphasized that the victim was forced to flee in order to avoid such unfair treatment.

As such, the declaration of victimhood is influenced by the evaluation criteria for “hostile forces” or “antisocial forces” that were constructed under the oppressive system prior to democratization. Further, in order to eradicate the “Red” or “rioter” label, the declaration focuses on the direct cause of death. The act of completing and submitting the declaration was also an active strategy geared towards the transfer of the dead relatives into the territory of victimhood, itself enabled by the process of “settling the past.” The bereaved families who had to live with the “Red complex” within an anticommunist society continuously sought to distinguish themselves from the “rioters” by making use of sacrificial narrations of suffering in order to include their dead relatives within the category of victim during the period of settlement of the past.

While actively participating in the settlement of the past programs, the bereaved families must continuously recognize and minimize the friction and conflicts between the actual causes of death and publicly encouraged norms for meeting the criteria of a victim. The career of one’s relatives is omitted, and a personal reinterpretation of the death happens. However, as can be seen in the second submission by D-7 regarding the death of her father, the act of reconfiguring the experience entered a new phrase when the process of declaring-reviewing-approving and notifying did not go as smoothly as the bereaved family originally expected.

When their father’s (D-4) declaration of victimhood, which the D family had submitted to the Jeju 4.3 Committee in 2000, was withdrawn in 2006, the D family had to resubmit a new declaration with similar information. This was rejected in 2011. In defiance of the measure, the bereaved families decided to file a petition in the same year and came up with a declaration of victimhood that was different than the one written eleven years previous. During the process, phrases such as “participated as a member of the Jeju South Korean Labor Party in the mountains” or “it is illogical to be rejected by the deliberation and decision process of victimhood without specific evidence that his

actions benefitted the enemy when he only had the status of membership” were added to the contents. As opposed to the first petition, which largely focuses on the sufferings and pains of the dead, the second submission transparently presents his career as an armed guerilla. Regarding why a different declaration of victimhood was completed, D-7’s husband remarked:

My son wrote the later one [in 2011]. I think he was very sad watching his mother [D-7] crying over the problem of her father [D-4]. My brother-in-law [D-9] in Osaka was very negative about writing a new report saying, “What difference would it make now even if you were recognized through the petition?” My wife also almost gave up, but my son insisted. When I saw what my son had written, I was concerned, but there was nothing wrong with it [the contents of the declaration]. That was how it happened. So I submitted it.

In situations where the actual death observed at the site of the massacre and the conditions for recognition as a “victim” were not the same, the appearance of the second generation of bereaved family members who never experienced the incident but who speak for the dead and reorganize the experience, have opened new aspects on the interpretation and evaluation of seditious deaths of close relatives that go beyond generations.

The declaration of victimhood is a story of what happened to their relatives during the Jeju 4.3 Incident. It is a report that the bereaved submit to an official institution under a social atmosphere created by a Korean political system that differed from the oppressive system of the 1960s when “census records” were the only medium whereby deaths from the Jeju 4.3 Incident were reported. However, to the bereaved, it was important to achieve the status of “victim” in order to be freed from the guilt-by-association system. In pursuance of this purpose, the private memories accessed through the relatives and the death from the massacre were selectively written and edited. By participating in the “settlement of the past” program and working within the dominant system, while observing the specific direction of “national harmony” and “reconciliation and coexistence” offered by the settlement of the past, the bereaved families achieve plural meanings for the death of their kin.

Conclusion

The memorialization and ritualization of deceased close relatives within the life-world of paternal relatives who experienced the Jeju 4.3 Incident have been performed under an acute awareness of external political and social transformations and are also based upon a tight internal relationship within the family. The bereaved have found ways to overcome various scars from violence by utilizing the “convenience, necessity, and utility of the untransmitted survivor” (Matsuda 2009, 172), rather than by unilaterally resisting or succumbing to the power from above, or by responding to preexisting norms and customs. Those who could not escape the position as others after the massacre, demonstrated the capacity to overcome this crisis and achieved the possibility of rehabilitating their destroyed relatives.

Likewise, the ascription of meaning to the death and the practice of rituals, which have been respectively practiced within the public and private spheres as survival strategies, have enabled the bereaved families to live within a repressive political system. How these practices for coming to terms with the Jeju 4.3 Incident might transcend borders and generations according to the international political situation in East Asia is a question for further research.

(Translated by Brendan Wright)

Notes

- 1 There are numerous Korean expressions for explaining or characterizing the Jeju 4.3 Incident. It has been referred to variously, according to the political and social milieu, historical perspective, and whether in the interest of the victims or perpetrators. as: “struggle” (*hangjaeng*), “uprising” (*bonggi*), “riot” (*p’oktong*), “state of affairs” (*sat’ae*), “rebellion” (*pannan*), “people’s sufferings” (*minjung sunan*), and “massacre” (*haksal*). There have also been strategic compromises, disputes, and conflicts, which selectively emphasize or exclude historical facts surrounding the “true ones.” A representative case is the division of the evaluation of the resistance of the Jeju people, and the Jeju Branch of the South Korean Labor Party, as either the discourse of a “riot” or the discourse of a “struggle.” The riot discourse takes the position that the armed uprisings and anti-government movement were ordered by

North Korea or the leadership of South Korean Labor Party, making it a communist rebellion. The struggle discourse focuses on the people's resistance and autonomy, arguing that the incident was a struggle against the repression of the US military and despotic newborn South Korean government, which threatened the local community. Meanwhile, Kim Seong Nae (1999, 253) points out that both discourses commonly recognize the inevitability of violence from the position of offenders, and thus do not pose a fundamental question about violence itself. Currently in Korean society, according to the Special Act for Investigation of the Jeju 4.3 Incident and Recovering the Honor of Victims, the term "incident" (*sagŏn*) is officially used.

- 2 Meanwhile, there are also cases where the residents were murdered by armed guerillas. They often plundered a town for food, clothing, and livestock when the resistance against punitive expeditions dragged on. With the continuous repression by government forces with their overwhelming power, those who had originally been favorable to the armed guerillas ceased being supportive.
- 3 According to statistics based upon the declarations of victimhood submitted to the Jeju 4.3 Incident Committee, there were 1,673 killed by armed guerillas (12.3% of total deaths), and 11,450 killed by punitive expeditions (84.4% of total deaths) (Jeju 4.3 Incident Committee 2008, 182).
- 4 Especially in regards to the missing, which assumes death even without the identification of the body, the bereaved required a different method from existing posthumous rituals. According to official statistics from the Jeju 4.3 Incident Committee, there were 3,429 missing person from the incident (25.3% of the total presumed deaths) (Jeju 4.3 Incident Committee 2008, 180).
- 5 A Korean shaman in Jeju dialect.
- 6 Kim Seong Nae (1999, 263–267) ascribes meaning to shamanistic practice (*kut*) as the true meaning of memorial representation. These shamanistic representations directly resist the public representation of national violence decorated by "forgiveness and harmony," and gain ideological effects. Furthermore, although it is not limited to women, Mun Mubyŏng (2011) focuses on the possibility of the *kut* in reconstructing people's stories and healing for those who faced death and trauma from the Jeju 4.3 Incident.
- 7 According to the Jeju 4.3 Incident Committee (2003, 500–508), negative consequence of guilt-by-association could include surveillance in daily life, various background check ups, disadvantages in promotion, and disadvantages in international travel and immigration processes.

- 8 According to Takeda (1990, 192–198), after-death marriage in Jeju was important not for the commemoration and pacification of a spirit, but rather for having descendants to carry on the family's name through adoption.
- 9 According to Mun Mubyŏng (2011, 60), the deaths of unnamed people during the Jeju 4.3 Incident are wrongful deaths. When the dead body cannot be found and buried, its spirit is called *kunbyŏng* or *chapkwi*. Since it is without a home to return, it is always suffering from hunger and wandering the afterlife, belonging nowhere.
- 10 D-7, interview by author, D-7's house, Jeju Island, February 1, 2011.
- 11 D-7, interview by author, D-7's house, Jeju Island, February 1, 2011.
- 12 D-7, interview by author, D-7's house, Jeju Island, February 1, 2011.
- 13 D-9, interview by author, D-9's house, Osaka, Japan, June 15, 2013.
- 14 D-7, interview by author, D-7's house, Jeju Island, September 22, 2011.
- 15 D-9, interview by author, D-9's house, Osaka, Japan, July 26, 2017.
- 16 In the first meeting with the author, D-9 introduced himself by his naturalized Japanese surname, Deraï 寺井.
- 17 D-7, interview by author, D-7's house, Jeju Island, August 12, 2017.
- 18 D-7, interview by author, D family cemetery, Jeju Island, September 13, 2012.
- 19 "*Sikge*" is Jeju dialect for ancestral rites. According to Chin Sŏnggi (1975, 129), it refers to clandestine ancestral rites that cannot be conducted legally. Meanwhile, Ch'oe Chaeŏk (1979, 278) broadly defines the word as "an ancestral rite served by close relatives such as parents or brothers in order to repose the spirit of unmarried dead with no home to return to."
- 20 D-7, interview by author, D-7's house, Jeju Island, August 12, 2017.
- 21 D-7, interview by author, D-7's house, Jeju Island, August 12, 2017.
- 22 Article 1 of the Special Act clarifies this as being from March 1, 1947 to September 21, 1954.
- 23 From June 2000 to February 2013, around 15,488 declarations of victimhood were made. Among these, 14,231 were officially recognized as victims. Those who suffered casualties at the hands of the punitive expeditions occupy over 80 percent of the total of such victims (Jeju 4.3 Incident Committee 2008, 182). According to Jeju Special Self-Governing Province (2014), among the 61,030 people who submitted the declaration of victimhood as "bereaved," 59,225 were officially recognized.
- 24 In October 2003, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun apologized to the people of Jeju and the bereaved families from the Jeju 4.3 Incident through the "Presidential Statement on the Jeju 4.3 Incident." The main point of the statement was the following; "As a president who is responsible for the government accepting the

- proposal from the committee, I sincerely want to give out the words of apology and of comfort against errors of the past to the bereaved families and people in Jeju” (Jeju 4.3 Incident Committee 2003, 543–544).
- 25 In the declaration of victimhood, the date of death is printed in the lunar calendar. May 14, 1949 corresponds to June 10, 1949 in the solar calendar.
 - 26 D-7, interview by author, D-7’s house, Jeju Island, February 1, 2011.
 - 27 D-9, interview by author, D-9’s house, Osaka, Japan, July 26, 2017.
 - 28 “Counter-insurgency forces. . .shot the families, labeling them as families of a fugitive, if there was no young person within the family. [. . .] They gathered all of the local residents to inquire into their identity with family registrars in order to track down the families of the fugitive” (Jeju 4.3 Incident Committee 2003, 391).
 - 29 D-7, interview by author, D family cemetery, Jeju Island, September 13, 2012.
 - 30 It also should be noted that in “census records,” a death outside the house was recorded as if the person had died within the house in order to disguise the true history of the deceased. However, grave inscriptions differ in that the place of death is not considered as significant as where the dead body is properly buried.
 - 31 Interview by author, family cemetery, Seoguipo, Jeju Island, September 23, 2009 and September 27, 2012.
 - 32 The wife of D-9 was from the same town, and knew of the sufferings of the D family, including the murder of her parents-in-law, from her childhood.
 - 33 D-9, interview by author, D-9’s house, Osaka, Japan, July 26, 2017.

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