Creatures of Possibility: The Theological Basis of Human Freedom by Ingolf U. Dalferth (review)

Despite the subtitle, this slim book is not a direct treatment of the theme of human freedom. It is instead a series of studies developing what Dalferth takes to be the surprising basis of such freedom: humanity's fundamental passivity coram Deo. Far from conceiving this passivity negatively, as if it were simply identifiable with deficiency, it stands as "the center of creativity from which all humans live" (6). Humans are thus conceived as beings of possibility, becoming passively what is strictly impossible under their own power. Proceeding from this thematic center, Dalferth engages a series of philosophical and theological positions.

Chapter one gives a very brief philosophical introduction to the topic. This discussion is deepened in chapter two as Kant and Luther, especially the latter's 1536 Disputatio de homine, are employed to distinguish between philosophical and theological accounts. Here Luther's definition of the human as justified by faith is given central place in Dalferth's project: humans "become what they are through what happens to them. And they understand what happens to them as what God does to them and for them" (42).

Subsequent chapters can be read as stand-alone essays, though they have significant thematic links. Chapter three engages further with Luther, ranging over many of his works to examine the theme of passivity in relation to the concept of gift, and touching on the difference between the old and new creatures, the nature of the will, and ontology. While distinguishing carefully between creation, justification, and sanctification, Dalferth sets them in a common creation-theological framework: "Being and being Christian are thus understood … as divine acts of creation ex nihilo" (53–54).

The fourth chapter takes up the concept of gift again, this time beginning with the phenomenological analyses of Derrida, that nothing is gift, and Marion, that all is gift. Against these, Dalferth shifts from a phenomenological to a hermeneutical analysis, focusing on the necessity of the gift as "for me," and so on the gift as passively determining its recipient. This allows him to take up the character of Christian faith as the interruption of the unknown and unlooked-for gift that, echoing thesis 28 of the Heidelberg Disputation, "creates its own mode of reception" (114) in excess of any humanly perceived need.

Chapters five through seven follow a similar structure, each setting out from a philosophical problem toward a theological discussion. Thus, in chapter five, Derrida on sacrifice is a springboard toward provocative analyses of Abraham and Isaac, and of the crucifixion of Jesus, as divine love. Chapter six engages Hans Blumenberg on the question of the incarnation, from there returning to the relation between philosophy and theology. Chapter seven takes up a variety of voices, principally Nietzsche, to discuss human creativity and finally the image of God.

The book has some limitations. A reader unfamiliar with the framing philosophical conversations may struggle to make use of certain chapters, and the author's style often requires inferring connections well beyond his explicit citations. Furthermore, there remains risk that theology is determined negatively by that philosophical framing, as when the crucifixion is described in terms calibrated to evade Derrida's critique of sacrifice. Moreover, the author tends to articulate the passivity of faith in abstract terms, neglecting to draw a more concrete connection to those divine words by which faith is bestowed, and so which constitute that passivity.

Even so, this volume offers creative and insightful reformulations of Lutheran theology in close relation to its central theme. Scholars interested in theological anthropology or in the relation between philosophy and theology have much to gain from this book.