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  • Narratives and Counter-Narratives:Responding to Political Violence in the Philippines
  • Dennis Quilala (bio)

Political violence has defined Philippine politics for decades. It has been used by different agents in order to achieve their political goals. In local politics, bosses and warlords have included it as part of their repertoire to remain in power. Non-state actors like the communist New People's Army and the different Moro (Muslim Filipino) groups have used violence as leverage in peace negotiations. Terrorists and criminal groups also use violence to achieve material and non-material goals. The national government struggles to have a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in some areas, including Mindanao. The lack of resources also undermines the ability of national security forces to keep local warlords and non-state armed actors in check. As a result, groups that use political violence thrive in some areas of the Philippines.

It is important for the Philippine state to assert its monopoly of the use of legitimate violence to suppress armed non-state actors. This is well understood by the new Philippine president. In the first State of the Nation Address of Rodrigo Duterte, he promised to strengthen the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police. He also called for lifestyle checks among members of the security forces to ensure that they do not have corrupt members. These are prerequisites in Duterte's declaration of war against terrorism, criminality and illegal drugs. While the promise of this war on criminality, drugs and terrorism was [End Page 285] a reason for Duterte's successful election campaign, human rights groups and the international community have been critical of the government's implementation of the programme after more than seven thousand people have died in the process. An ensuing war against the communist party, which Duterte declared a terrorist group, will most likely increase the number of casualties.

Moreover, in the first year of the Duterte presidency, the use of political violence by terrorist groups in occupying the city of Marawi in the southern island of Mindanao has been touted by International Alert1 as a new form of vertical conflict (i.e., a conflict between the national government and a non-state armed actor). Marawi City was declared liberated from terrorist groups by Duterte in October 2017, after four months of fighting. According to the Philippine military, the conflict dragged on because they have yet to develop urban warfare capabilities and because the terrorist groups were well prepared. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of civilians have been displaced and a large part of the city of Marawi will be uninhabitable until it can be rehabilitated.

Terrorism in the Philippines and Southeast Asia is not something new. The Philippine Congress has passed legislation that aims to address the threat of terrorism. Engagement with regional and international actors has been incessant in order to improve the capabilities of the security forces. These efforts, however, have not been enough. Therefore, to argue that political violence waged by non-state armed groups could be dealt with by similar responses done in the past by the Philippine government would contribute to the narrative that political violence in itself is the solution to these problems. This chapter will argue that political violence, particularly terrorism and internal armed conflicts in Mindanao, have not been properly addressed in the Philippines. A counter-narrative is necessary. It is further argued that a strategy towards the prevention of extremism needs to be crafted, and that the involvement of the community is necessary to address terrorism in the Philippines. The peace strategy with the different armed groups should also be more inclusive. Narratives have to be adjusted and counter-narratives have to be asserted.

New Terrorism(?), Old Responses

Terrorism has been identified by the Philippine government as one of the major security threats in the Philippines. The Philippine National Security Policy 2011–2016 (NSP 2011–2016) under the Benigno Aquino administration and the Philippine National Security Policy 2017–2020 (NSP 2017–2020) under the Duterte administration see terrorism as a hindrance to the economic potential of [End Page 286] the Philippines. Moreover, the NSP 2011–2016 recognizes the international links of terrorist...

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