Abstract

Abstract:

Epistemic injustice is the idea that social power ensures that the knowledge of some groups is excluded from the collective epistemic resources. In this paper, I argue that there are distinctive features of disabled life that, because they shape the processes through which knowledge is gathered, evaluated, judged, and disseminated, also influence the ways in which epistemic injustice is experienced by disabled people. These features include the ascription of a global epistemic incapacity to people affected by impairment. Against a background of contemporary political shifts and biotechnology innovation, the implications of epistemic injustice for disabled people are serious.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1937-4577
Print ISSN
1937-4585
Pages
pp. 106-124
Launched on MUSE
2018-03-08
Open Access
No
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