- China: Assimilation Nation
There are few places that have been as deeply affected by rapid demographic change as East Turkestan, which was incorporated into the People’s Republic of China as the “Xinjiang [End Page 4] Uyghur Autonomous Region” in 1955. Since then, a state-sponsored influx of Han Chinese has altered the territory to the point that we Uyghurs have become marginalized in our own homeland.
East Turkestan fell in and out of Chinese control in the 19th and 20th centuries, but for most of that time it did not have a large Han population. The Uyghurs, like other Central Asians, speak a Turkic language and practice Islam, which makes us ethnically and culturally distinct from the Chinese. In the 1950s, the Han made up only about 10 percent of the area’s population, but by 2010 the 22 million-person population was roughly 40 percent Han and 46 percent Uyghur.
One of the first waves of Han migration into East Turkestan was facilitated by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, a paramilitary agricultural organization started under Mao Zedong that established, and held jurisdiction over, Han settlements. Xinjiang functioned as a parallel authority in the region, tasked with promoting economic development. At the same time, the regional government also welcomed Han migration by making it easy for newcomers to register as locals (a process known as getting a hukou) regardless of education or skill level. Even today, Han are offered high wages if they move from northern cities to the Uyghur-dominated south to join the police or work as teachers. Eastern cities, by contrast, had and continue to have stricter education and income requirements for obtaining residency permits. It is difficult for Uyghurs to transfer their residential status to different cities in East Turkestan, let alone anywhere outside the region.
This state-sponsored development has created discontent among members of the Uyghur population, as we are denied the benefits of and the proceeds derived from the resources of our homeland. Discrimination is also common: Uyghurs are excluded from the highest-paying jobs and the most powerful political offices, which are overwhelmingly held by Han. In order to make Han migrants and investors feel secure, the government is turning East Turkestan into a high-tech police state that singles out Uyghurs through police checkpoints, house searches, and arbitrary detainment in reeducation centers.
The government also regularly undermines or directly attacks Uyghur language, religion, and rights. We face restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly, and movement that go well beyond those endured by Han. The Chinese state sees expressions of Uyghur identity as potentially subversive and separatist, and connected to religious extremism and violence. Their solution is to increase the pace of assimilationist policies, such as eliminating the use of the Uyghur language in so-called bilingual schools, which now operate only in Mandarin; deciding who is allowed to worship at state-approved mosques; and confiscating copies of the Quran and other religious items. These policies are intended to repress Uyghur identity, as well as cultivate suspicion within the Uyghur community and between us and other ethnic groups. But there is a fundamental contradiction at the heart of China’s policies: By singling out Uyghurs and labeling us as threats, the state further alienates us from our Han neighbors. This undermines the government’s claim that we are part of the Chinese nation, equal to the Han. The state cannot simultaneously assimilate and discriminate against Uyghurs. This is why, I believe, its policies are doomed to fail. [End Page 5]
OMER KANAT is a longtime Uyghur rights activist. He is currently the director of the Uyghur Human Rights Project.