Abstract

abstract:

This paper addresses Ludwig Wittgenstein's discussion of solipsism in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It demonstrates that, throughout his early and middle periods, Wittgenstein's work on solipsism was focused on traditional solipsism, not semantic solipsism as is standardly supposed. It furthermore argues that the Tractatus's stated support for solipsism should be taken as a straightforward endorsement of the doctrine. In establishing this, it analyzes the connection between Wittgenstein's thought on solipsism and the metaphysical subject through the subjective-objective and subject-object distinctions, arguing that this holds the key to his comments on solipsism in the Tractatus.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1538-4586
Print ISSN
0022-5053
Pages
pp. 127-154
Launched on MUSE
2018-01-17
Open Access
No
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