An African Volk: The Apartheid Regime and Its Search for Survival by Jamie Miller (review)

Jamie Miller's An African Volk: The Apartheid Regime and Its Search for Survivalis an ambitious project that integrates aspects of South Africa's social, economic, political, domestic, and foreign policy histories. Miller places his work "at the nexus of African, decolonization, and Cold War history" (p. 1). Drawing on primary source materials from fifteen archives and five countries, it is a comprehensively researched book.

Miller does an exemplary job of blending discussion of South Africa's international relations with the domestic political situation facing the government of John Vorster. The domestic angle, and in particular Miller's focus on the personal and ideological rivalries within the South African government, provides much needed nuance to historiography. One of the greatest strengths of An African Volkis its masterful explanation of the dynamics between various segments of Afrikaner society, including Afrikaans- and English-speaking segments of the population and the power struggle and personal rivalries among the various branches of the South African government (such as the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Defense Force, the Bureau of State Security, the police, and the prime minister's office) as well as among specific individuals within those departments.

Taking this approach helps readers better understand the seeming contradictions in South African foreign policy in the 1970s when, on the one hand, the "Vorster Doctrine" (advocated by Prime Minister Vorster and the Department of Foreign Affairs) sought détente with several countries in sub-Saharan Africa by offering aid in an attempt to build legitimacy through the logic that "self-interest would mandate embracing mutually advantageous cooperation rather than assuming a posture of futile confrontation" (p. 10). On the other hand, P. W. Botha and other "hawks" (primarily within the Defense Force) were firm believers in "total onslaught," the idea that African anti-apartheid hostility was mainly a tool of international Communism designed to overthrow the Vorster regime in order to "steal" South Africa's natural resources for international Communism. In response to this perceived threat, Botha promoted a policy of "total strategy" featuring increased spending on the military and covert (and sometimes overt) military action against several of South Africa's neighbors. Miller elucidates how these two competing paradigms of foreign policy were able to coexist simultaneously in an ebb-and-flow relationship in which each approach gained the upper hand at different points in the decade depending on changing international and domestic factors.

An African Volkalso persuasively weighs in on several of the more controversial questions in the historiography of Cold War-era southern Africa. Most prominent of these is the level of coordination between the United States and South Africa in their respective interventions into the Angolan civil war, as well as in their diplomatic approaches toward Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Contrary to widespread belief by observers at the time and by most historians in retrospect (albeit supported by no concrete evidence, only intuition), Miller does not view the policies of Washington and Pretoria as having been coordinated, nor does he see U.S. policy as having played a determinative role in South Africa's decision-making. Instead, he views U.S. involvement as allowing Vorster to justify to his cabinet and domestic audience actions that he already wanted to take regardless of U.S. pressure. Furthermore, when discussing South Africa's later claims of having been left in the lurch by the United States after its unsuccessful Angolan intervention, Miller views these claims not as evidence of the validity of Pretoria's assertion that the two countries had a coordinated policy, but as an attempt by the Vorster government to scapegoat Washington for its failures. Another point in which An African Volkconvincingly breaks from previous historiography is in its assessment that Vorster's support for Rhodesia was based more on strategic assessments than on racial affinity, and that Vorster and Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith were not as closely aligned as contemporary...