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American NationalSecurityand theDefenseof theNorthernFrontier, 1945-1951 Lawrence R. Aronsen Formuch of American history the defense of the northern frontier extended onlyasfar as the 49th parallel. It was not until President Roosevelt's 1938"we willnot stand idly by" address at Kingston, Ontario, later codified in the Ogdensburg and Hyde Park Agreements of 1940and 1941respectively, that thedefense of Canada came to be viewed as relevant to American national security.1 Initially, American planners addressed the problems of formulating aworkable contingency war plan (ABC-22), but as the war progressed purely military matters became less important than the economic ones of coordinating North American defense production. After 1945 the situation was to be reversed, the problems associated with updating ABC-22 and revising preparedness measures coming to the forefront. The rapidly changing weapons technology and the geographic shift of the adversary from Japan and Germany to the Soviet Union required new theories and doctrines to correlate with the new conditions. It was here that the doctrine of containment and the theory of deterrence were to become the cornerstones of postwar defense policy.2 To bring the components of nationalsecurity policy into effect, it was necessary to have a clear conception of where they were to be applied and how countries within the American strategic sphere could be encouraged to cooperate. It was within this context that Canadian-American defense relations in the period from 1945to 1951 woulddevelop. Canadian Review of American Studies, Volume 14, Number 3, Fall 1983, 259-77 260 Lawrence R. Aronsen World War evolved into Cold War, raising fundamental questions about the geographic scope of national security policy and the appropriate strategy to be adopted. In the Far East, shortly after the successful Chinese Communist Revolution, the neighboring Korean peninsula was defined as beyond the perimeter of American defenses, thereby rendering unclear the proper response to a crisis such as the war that was to follow. Geographic proximity-or geographic contiguity, as in the case of Canada-brought greater clarity of purpose. This point was underscored in a State Department report on American postwar national security objectives which concluded that "Canada in a military sense must be considered as if it were an integral part of the United States. It is as important to our national security to protect Canada as it isto protect California:'3 In short, there was to be no equivocation about the defense of the northern frontier, a view not dissimilar to the Soviet attitude toward Eastern Europe. As the end of the Second World War approached, American policymakers recognized that the security of the northern frontier would require the good will and cooperation of the Canadian government, preferably through the continuation of the 1940 Ogdensburg continental defense agreement. It was to this end, noted Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson in a series of briefing memos to President Truman, that American diplomatic relations with Canada should receive the highest priority.4 Persistent diplomatic overtures combined with what has been described as the policy of "exemptionalism" did not initially produce concessions from Canada on the question of air bases, advance preparedness measures, and a workable Basic Security Plan.5 The rapidly changing international situation had a cumulative impact on Canadian policy-makers, however, and by 1951the first stage in the integration of the Dominion into the continental defense network had been completed. On the other hand, Canadian reluctance to participate in the implementation of a comprehensive defense plan for North America did not extend into the area of continental economic integration in general. In the period under study, an era characterized by rising nationalism and political instability throughout much of the world, Canada had the distinction of being the most secure and convenient area for American economic expansion. 6 By 1951the Dominion had attracted more American capital than any other foreign country and had become the largest trading partner of its southern neighbor.7 The beginning of the critical stockpiling program of 1946 followed by the passage of the Defense Production Act in 1950fueled the demand for a wide variety of materials at a time of rapid expansion in the civilian sector of the economy. To allocate scarce materials in a rational manner, coordinate defense...

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