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Shorter Book Reviews 121 Walter LaFeber, at the same time that it provides a desirable corrective to the more positive literature on the foreign policies of the Roosevelt and Wilson years by Arthur Link, John Blum and John M. Cooper, Jr. The "arrogant diplomacy'' which, Lael argues, was pursued by a succession of U.S. administrations toward Colombia and Latin America during these years was premised on a strong sense of moral and racial superiority over the weaker nations with which the United States had diplomatic relations and which, as Roman Catholic, conservative and traditional societies, approached issues such as modernization, economic development and national honour from different perspectives than did the United States. The closest analogy one can offer (and it is not a very exact one) to the conduct of the Roosevelt administration in 1903, would be the situation had Great Britain decided in 1861, after the Confederate firing on Fort Sumter, that the South should be free from Northern tyranny, and had intervened to prevent Union troops from attempting to restore national control. There are minor exceptions which one could take to the study. The preoccupation with the Panama issue, understandable as it is, nonetheless prevents a fuller discussion of United States-Colombian relations in these years, including the early oil explorations, the development of street railways, involvement in sugar production and more generally in agriculture; although Lael, building on his earlier publications in the area, compensates for those deficiencies by providing a thorough and important analysis of platinum extraction and controls during World War I. One would, nonetheless, like more evidence in order to be convinced that private business received little support from the U.S. government in these years. These are quibbles, however; this is a fine scholarly and readable account of the era. Stephen I. Randall Texaco & Lincoln-McKay Professor of American Studies University of Calgary John D. Martz, Ed. United States Policy in Latin America: A Quarter Century of Crisis and Challenge, 1961-1986. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988. xxi + 336 pp. The United States has been concerned with foreign intrusion into the Western Hemisphere since its foundation. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine specifically warned Europe to stay away, and the Doctrine and its various unilateral interpretations became a major part of United Sates foreign policy. It did so because until 1945 Latin America, and especially the Caribbean area, were strategically and commercially important. After 1945, the U.S. 122 Shorter Book Reviews had become the world power and its wider interests and activities reduced Latin America's importance. Benign neglect best describes U.S.-Latin American relations in the post-1945 period, except when Soviet-bloc influence appeared to threaten U.S. interests, especially when the Soviet Union's close relationship with Cuba forced the U.S. to pay more attention to Latin America. This book of sensible essays not only analyzes the period between 1961 and 1986but offers insights and advice worth serious consideration by U.S. policy-makers. John Martz's informative introduction puts the various chapters, written by recognized and influential specialists, into perspective. Part One looks at how presidential administrations approached Latin America. Federico Gil discusses Kennedy and Johnson, after providing a short, but important, historical summary of U.S. involvement. Henry Kissinger, who worked for Nixon and Ford, paid little attention to Latin America, which did not fit into his world view, but Michael Francis shows that he had to deal with the region. Robert Pastor, who served on the National Security Council as a regional specialist, discusses the Carter administration's approach from an ex-insider's viewpoint. Margaret Daly Hayes's analysis of Reagan's first term argues that rhetoric overshadowed reality. Part Two looks at specific issues. Michael Krynzanek discusses the role of the 1965Dominican crisis in the U.S. attempt to reassert itself in the Caribbean after "losing"Cuba. Paul Sigmund shows how the U.S. experience with Marxist Chile contributed to inhibiting future U.S. covert operations. Steve Ropp provides insights on how the U.S. and Panama achieved a canal treaty in 1978,while Jack Childs has a stimulating chapter on the U.S. and the Falklands/Malvinas crisis. Part Three...

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