Current research on psychological trauma has provided key insight into the ways that individuals process and store traumatic experiences. Results coming out of psychology and neuroscience tell us that traumatic stress has a profound impact on our sensorimotor reactions—reactions that are best understood as non-cognitive. This contrast between a somatic or non-cognitive response to trauma, as distinct from a doxastic or cognitive one, has important clinical implications (hence the turn to sensorimotor psychotherapy). It also offers a clear path to dissolving some persistent philosophical puzzles. In this paper I look at one such puzzle, namely, the problem of epistemic akrasia. I argue that if philosophers were to help themselves to the literature on psychological trauma, in particular to the distinction between a somatic response and a doxastic one, we would have a robust explanation of the phenomenon in question and the problem of epistemic akrasia would fade away.


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pp. 337-346
Launched on MUSE
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