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Franklin D. Roosevelt and John Nance Garner campaigning in Peekskill, New York, August 14, 1932. Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library & Museum. Public domain image from Franklin: Access to the FDR Library's Digital Collections, <> [Accessed Sept. 26, 2017].

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John Nance Garner is well known to scholars of the New Deal era. Born in 1868 in a log cabin in Lamar County, Texas, he became a lawyer and moved to Uvalde County, where he began a life in politics by serving as county judge (1893–1896) and as a member of the Texas state legislature (1898–1902). He was elected to the United States Congress in 1902 and remained there continuously for fifteen terms until March 4, 1933. During his last term he served as the Speaker of the House. In 1932, he began the first of two terms as vice president under Franklin Roosevelt. Surprisingly his career has received limited scholarly attention. In part this is due to a lack of personal papers, which he destroyed after leaving office. Much of what has been written on Garner, with a few exceptions, has come from journalists or contemporaries.1

Despite his critical role in passing legislation in the early New Deal and transforming, in the words of some scholars, the modern-day vice presidency, [End Page 255] many historians portray Garner negatively as a conservative Democrat who opposed much of the New Deal and Roosevelt's desire to forge a more liberal Democratic Party. They highlight his break with Roosevelt in the second term over budget issues, sit-down strikes, and the controversial "court-packing" plan. Journalist Joseph Lash, for example, noted that by 1939 Garner "had given way to a conservatism that placed him at the head of the anti-New Deal, anti-Roosevelt forces in Washington." Historian Otis Graham assessed Garner harshly as a "mediocre and unimaginative politician." The notion that Garner was an obstacle to Roosevelt may be a factor in why scholars have been less interested in studying his career. Lionel Patenaude, in his account of Texans and New Deal politics, stated, "Garner's role during the New Deal has been underplayed by most historians. Whether this results from a favorable bias to Roosevelt or a lack of standard types of evidence is debatable."2

A closer examination of Garner's role indicates that while his conservativism and commitment to party regularity were important, other issues were equally significant in bringing about his break with FDR. Differences in temperament and personality, differing perceptions about his role as a legislative leader, concerns about the direction of the Democratic Party, particularly the influence of organized labor, as well as personal ambition all contributed to his disenchantment with the president. These issues were intertwined. No one disagreement or issue caused the break, but collectively they were instrumental in shaping, at least from Garner's perspective, the notion that his advice, experience, and leadership were being ignored. Roosevelt's use of executive authority, his desire to broaden the base of the party, and the unprecedented scope of the New Deal, which expanded the role of the federal government in the economy, all challenged Garner's long-standing ideals about government and how politics worked. He would later state that his decision to challenge Roosevelt for the Democratic nomination in 1940 was based on opposition to a president standing for a third term; yet, a case can be made that numerous personal and political differences were paramount in his decision.

Of special importance in assessing Garner are his many letters to his friend and Democratic National Committee chairman James A. (Jim) [End Page 256] Farley, who served as Roosevelt's postmaster general from 1933 to 1940. Farley, like Garner, held similar beliefs about the party and its direction. Their candid letters, coupled with Farley's numerous personal memos, shed further light on the relationship between Garner and Roosevelt, the issues that divided them, and the many changes occurring within the Democratic Party. They confirm that both men believed their role in the party was being supplanted by liberal Democrats who were unappreciative of their contributions and more committed to ideology, policy, and the president than they were to the party.

Garner's association with FDR began with the longtime Texas congressman setting aside any aspirations he may have had for the presidency for the good of the Democratic Party. In December 1931, following his election as Speaker of the House of Representatives, Garner's fellow Texans initiated a movement to nominate him for president. Although Garner dismissed the notion and did nothing to promote himself, his candidacy gained credibility when newspaper editor William Randolph Hearst, Garner's former congressional colleague, endorsed him. Supported by Texans as a favorite son and by others such as Al Smith, the former New York governor and 1928 Democratic presidential nominee who wanted to stop the favorite, Franklin Roosevelt, Garner surprised many in the party and the nation by defeating Roosevelt in the California primary.3

Despite the setback, Roosevelt entered the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in July 1932 as the front runner, although he was short of the two-thirds majority of delegates needed for the nomination. After three ballots, he still led other challengers, including Garner and Smith, but the Roosevelt forces were worried that the convention might turn to a compromise candidate if he failed to gain significant votes on the fourth ballot. His advisors focused on obtaining Garner's ninety votes. One individual involved in the negotiations was Jim Farley, Roosevelt's campaign manager. Farley did not talk directly to Garner, but he did consult extensively with Sam Rayburn, head of the Texas delegation. Determining who was primarily responsible for arranging the shift of the Texas delegation is still a matter of historical debate. Ultimately, Garner gave his approval to release his delegates to Roosevelt in return for a spot on the ticket as the vice-presidential nominee. His nomination began a close friendship with Farley, who would soon become Democratic National Committee chairman.4 [End Page 257]

Garner said little publicly about his decision to release his delegates. Shortly after the convention he issued a brief statement, which noted that he authorized the shift of delegates for the "good of the party and the welfare of the nation." Years later, Farley asked him for further details about the convention in preparation for his autobiography. Despite what had become a close friendship Garner remained evasive. He replied "I do not live in the past very much Jim. My thoughts are usually in the present and the future." His good friend Bascom Timmons stated that Garner confided to him that he had agreed to the arrangement because the Texans would not release their delegates to Roosevelt unless he took a place on the ticket. Garner did not want a deadlocked convention and stated, "I'll do anything to see the Democrats win one more election."5

Garner's decision was a political one based on the interests of the party, and his decision was critical to Roosevelt. It cannot be known with any certainty how Roosevelt's prospects would have fared if he had not achieved the nomination on the fourth ballot, but the decision spared him the potential of a deadlock and a compromise candidate being selected. Thus, Garner agreed to run for vice president, a position he never wanted. He could not foresee the future scope of the New Deal or Roosevelt's decision to realign the Democratic Party on a more liberal basis. He would prove far less willing to accommodate these things than he was in releasing his delegates.

For Roosevelt, the decision was likewise political, one born out of political necessity. It is likely Roosevelt knew of Garner's background and temperament given his long tenure in Congress, but any reservations he may have had were secondary to achieving the nomination. The future president could not predict how these differences would grow and become so divisive. The ticket made sense politically, but in terms of background, temperament and personality, a vision of the party, and interpretations of what constituted government's role in shaping economic and social policy, the two men were vastly different. These contrasts would color their relationship throughout the 1930s.

The seeds of discontent between FDR and Garner were planted early and began with what would become a chronic issue—Garner's reluctance to campaign. Here the contrast in personality manifested itself even [End Page 258] before the election was held. Roosevelt loved to campaign, meet large crowds, and deliver speeches. One biographer notes that "Roosevelt radiated charm, fun, eagerness, vitalizing energy." Another described his 1932 campaign across American as "unsurpassed showmanship." He was a charismatic speaker and an avid campaigner.6

Garner was FDR's virtual political opposite. Throughout his congressional career, he and his wife lived what has been described as a "quiet life" in Washington, and they "mingled in Washington society only to the extent his office required." He seemed to communicate best in "convivial groups of white male politicians who knew the rules of the game," and he did not change as vice president. Time magazine noted rather critically that Garner's lifestyle "did not fit the public concept of an able politician." Garner appeared uncomfortable giving speeches, which may have stemmed largely from his lack of experience and shyness. He was not known as a gifted orator on the floor of Congress. He came from a safe congressional district in Texas where extensive campaigning every two years was unnecessary. He was never forced to work to maintain his seat. Harold Ickes, who would become Roosevelt's secretary of the interior, noted that "Garner makes a terrible impression on the platform." Farley may have summed it up best when he noted that Garner was "very shy."7

Whatever the cause of his reluctance, Garner resisted the idea of active involvement in the 1932 campaign. He left after the convention for his ranch in Uvalde, a cherished place that he retreated to often during his vice presidency. His prolonged absence worried Roosevelt, Farley, and others who felt it might be perceived that he was being silenced or was somehow disenchanted with Roosevelt. In the words of Democratic publicity chief Charles Michelson, Garner's extended vacation rendered him "invisible and unreachable when it suited him." When asked by party leaders to participate he typically stated, "The Captain is going to be elected and doesn't need me on the stump." He reportedly told FDR that "all you have to do is stay alive until election day" and added, "Hoover is making speeches and that is enough for us."8

With much persuasion from Roosevelt and others Garner did meet with party leaders in mid-August. Michelson recorded that Garner came to his office and asked tersely, "Whose idea is it to get me here?" Michelson [End Page 259] prepared a major speech for him, but Garner disliked it and reportedly "threw the whole thing over his shoulders." He eventually delivered a second draft of the address over the radio, his one main speech of the campaign. Concerns with keeping in touch with Garner and making sure he did not say something damaging led to a decision to have Charles Hand, a former New York journalist and secretary for former New York mayor Jimmy Walker, "shadow" Garner and help with publicity. The decision came after Garner's support of a million-dollar public works bill, which led Republicans to portray him as a radical. Garner disliked the idea of a shadow claiming "he knew what he wanted to say and had been fairly successful in his 30 years of service without ever having a press agent." Although he and Hand would eventually become good friends, further attempts to get him to participate proved fruitless. Michelson noted that Garner responded to such pleas with salty comments such as "in his country when you had a steer roped and branded there is no sense in lassoing it some more."9

Garner's refusal to campaign continued throughout his tenure as vice president. During the 1934 congressional campaign, Roosevelt pleaded with him to become more involved. In September, he wrote Garner and inquired humorously if Mrs. Garner would "like to get a little holiday and not see you for about a week." He asked Garner to come to Washington and noted, "I would like to have the slant on the situation as you see it." When asked by reporters at his ranch why he was not taking a more active role in the elections Garner stated simply, "if I don't say anything I won't have anything to explain." During the 1936 reelection campaign similar problems arose. Farley noted that Garner eventually heeded pleas he come north and take a more significant role in the campaign, but said that it was a "mistake" to have him making campaign speeches. He offered to do anything helpful but did not want to "make any mistakes." Garner reluctantly delivered one address written by Frank Walker, a Roosevelt advisor, that Farley claimed was well received. When Roosevelt suggested Garner make at least one nonpolitical speech in the second term he deferred. During his tenure as vice president he accepted honorary degrees from Baylor University and John Marshall Law School in New Jersey, but refused to speak on those occasions.10

Issues relating to temperament and personality were also significant in shaping the relationship between Roosevelt and Garner. Both men were [End Page 260] vastly different in how they communicated and negotiated with people and how they dealt with issues. Roosevelt was often purposively evasive and kept his true feelings to himself. Biographer James MacGregor Burns, stated "that he was a man infinitely complex and almost incomprehensible." He added that Roosevelt "took particular delight in mystifying people by keeping something up his sleeve." Arthur Schlesinger Jr. described Roosevelt's decision making process as "protraction," which was "often wildly irritating to his subordinates." Roosevelt would allow all viewpoints and arguments to be discussed, "listening amiably to all sides, watching the opposing views undergo the test of practice." It would eventually lead to a decision, but the process was a prolonged one that left supporters and opponents alike wondering where Roosevelt stood.11

Garner, on the other hand, was outspoken and straightforward. Farley described him as "one of the frankest men I have ever been privileged to know. He talks freely and frankly." Harold Ickes also found him to be outspoken and frank in his comments. Garner himself noted that he was "no diplomat," and at times he had "to go at things in a rough and uncouth way." This contrasted sharply with Roosevelt's more pensive deliberation. Garner also found Roosevelt a difficult man to have an understanding with. Like many others in the administration, he said Roosevelt would often "deviate from the understanding."12

These differences frequently manifested themselves at cabinet and personal meetings. Roosevelt reportedly regretted his decision to invite Garner to cabinet meetings, claiming he leaked information, but his outspokenness may have been a factor as well. Farley noted in a memo that "Garner does not mince any words" or "hesitate to tell the President what is on his mind." He also noted that the vice president was not afraid to "disagree with the President when in his judgement his views are not in accord with those of the President." At one meeting with Roosevelt reportedly told Garner, "you tend to your office and I'll tend to mine" after Garner argued a point when FDR had already made his decision. Garner, Farley claimed, could be temperamental, as well, especially if he had been slighted or overlooked. His belief that Roosevelt should consult him more often reinforced such notions. He once told Farley, "I think they could talk to us a little more about policy." Garner's sometimes cavalier attitude about cabinet meetings was also a factor. He stated that Roosevelt "talks [End Page 261] more than he listens," and the fact he walked out of many cabinet meetings did nothing to assure the president he had Garner's loyalty.13

Whatever differences Garner and Roosevelt had, it was evident early in the presidency that Garner and Farley were becoming good friends. Although they came from different backgrounds and regions of the country, the two shared much in common. Farley, an Irish-Catholic from Rockland County, New York, had little experience in elected office, but like Garner he had spent most of his adult life working for the Democratic Party. Both Garner and Farley were businessmen. Garner owned several banks in Texas and Farley owned a builder's supply company. Most importantly, they shared a devotion to the Democratic Party and believed strongly in party loyalty and regularity, precepts that formed the cornerstone of their relationship. On more than one occasion they would use the terms "the best interests of the party" or "for the good of the party."14

Garner referred to Farley as a "master mechanic in politics" and an able public servant. He added that Farley was doing the "best job in the Post Office of anyone he had known." Farley was even more complimentary of Garner. He called him a man of "exceedingly fine character," who was "intensely patriotic." Farley appreciated his frankness and candor, especially regarding appointments and legislative matters and noted that "I feel free to speak more frankly with him than any other member of the Administration." By the end of the first term Farley wrote "in Garner I have a real friend." He added, "I have grown to be intensely fond of the fellow." When Farley published his first autobiography in 1938 he referred to him "as one of the truly great public men of this generation."15

Farley's most important political task early in the New deal was overseeing federal appointments, and in Texas he relied heavily upon Garner's advice. Texas provided Farley a significant challenge. A traditionally Democratic state, the party was nonetheless divided into factions, and the contest over patronage highlighted these divisions.

In October 1933, Farley journeyed to Texas to deal with complaints from some Democrats that they were being passed over for appointments. Miriam Ferguson, the current governor and her husband, Jim, the former governor and still national committeeman, claimed they were under a [End Page 262] ban on federal patronage and wanted Farley to do something about it. Jim Ferguson's scandal-plagued administration ended with his impeachment and removal from office in 1917, and many Democrats, including Attorney General James Allred (who was soon to be governor), opposed the continued influence of the Fergusons. Other Democrats charged too many appointments were being given to disloyal party members who supported Herbert Hoover and the Eighteenth Amendment (prohibition).16

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Vice President John Nance Garner (center) is pictured here with James Farley (right) and an unidentified man and boy, c. 1934. Harris and Ewing Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Factionalism was common in many states, but it put Farley in a more difficult predicament in Texas given his deference to Garner. He stated in one memo "Garner wanted to be consulted on everything in Texas," but "he has no use for the Fergusons and would not be for anything they would want." He added this was a bad situation because "Mrs. Ferguson is entitled to some consideration which would be given the chief executive of the state." Farley concluded, "The Vice President just can't see it in the case of the Fergusons." Farley's October 1933 trip was termed a goodwill [End Page 263] tour to make Texas a truly "liberal state." Journalists, noting Garner's long absences from Washington and preference for staying in Texas, also hinted it was also an effort to get Garner "out of hiding" on his Uvalde ranch.17

Farley's visit drew large crowds in Fort Worth, Dallas, and Houston. Garner accompanied him on the visit, and Farley took great pleasure in introducing him as "my friend John." He managed to keep all factions happy, including the Fergusons by stating, "Texas is to be complimented in using such excellent judgement in choosing such an excellent governor." Humorist Will Rogers spoke at the large banquet in Dallas given on Farley's behalf and downplayed any "ill will" between the large number of Texas Democrats in attendance.18

The trip was successful from a public relations perspective, but did not resolve all the issues regarding appointments. Farley alleviated some of the discord over the Fergusons a year later, when he convinced Jim Ferguson to step down as the state's national committeeman and have Garner assume his position. Garner was reluctant, calling the position a "nuisance" and telling Farley that his sole ambition was to help the "Chief [FDR]." He said he did not need the extra job. Farley appreciated Garner's willingness to accept the responsibility and told him he understood. "Like yourself," he stated, "I am of course primarily interested in doing what is best for the party." After much persuasion from Farley and other Democrats such as Governor James Allred and Senator Tom Connally, Garner agreed to take the position.19

The problems with patronage would not be resolved so easily. Both Garner and Farley believed appointments should be given to good and loyal Democrats. Partisanship, in their eyes, assured loyalty. This notion clashed with many young, liberal advisors Roosevelt brought in to oversee the wide number of New Deal agencies. Many of them were nonpartisan. Garner reportedly told a group of New Dealers at a party at the Sulgrave Club in Washington, D.C., that they should "settle down and mind their manners." He further stated that he was not used to handing "'the top cards' to boys who had never worked a precinct."20

Garner told Farley he wanted to be consulted on "everything in Texas," [End Page 264] but convincing agency heads to consult with Garner before making appointments proved difficult. Farley directed Harry Hopkins, director of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, and other agency heads to request Garner's approval for all appointments in Texas. But Hopkins, Harold Ickes, and others often ignored such requests and resisted Farley's efforts "toward staffing their agencies." Garner faced other challenges as well. Protocol dictated that congressional Democrats also receive consideration when it came to appointments. When Garner sought control of postmaster appointments in three newly reorganized congressional districts in Texas, some Texas Democrats, led by Wright Patman and Richard Kleberg, revolted. After much controversy and protest Garner, relinquished control over postal appointments. He wrote Farley stating he did not want friction in the party and asked that he be relieved of "saying anything about the qualifications of postmasters in the state."21

Still, Garner did what he could to oversee the Democratic politics in the state and promote Texas Democrats at the federal level. When a political controversy in the U.S. Virgin Islands forced the reassignment of Federal judge T. Webber Wilson and the appointment of a new judge, Albert Levitt, Garner wrote Farley stating that appointing a "colored man" would surely result in repercussions in certain states. He lobbied for a Texas appointee, W. K. Hopkins, a state senator. Farley assured Garner that Levitt's appointment was only temporary and corrected Garner's mistaken assumption concerning Levitt, stating that "he is not a colored fellow." Little went on in Texas that Garner did not know about. Following the election of James Allred as governor in 1934 he wrote his good friend and fellow Texan Jesse Jones stating he would like Jones, Senator Tom Connally and others to attend the Democratic state convention in Galveston to "mix and mingle" with our friends and "look after especially the federal end of it."22

The conflicting views over patronage and partisanship between regular Democrats such as Garner and liberal New Deal advisors portended the significant changes occurring within the administration and the party. The recruitment of liberal Republicans and others who cared more about policy and less about party regularity underscored Roosevelt's desire to broaden the base of the party and attract those with a vested interest in [End Page 265] the New Deal. These changes would come to the forefront in the 1936 campaign. By the time Roosevelt and Garner stood for reelection in 1936, additional and growing differences between the two were becoming more pronounced. Garner's lack of support for and opposition to New Deal policies and diverging views on how to best work with Congress were paramount. These matters, along with Garner's growing disenchantment with Roosevelt's support for organized labor, would further erode their relationship.

Evidence of differences between Roosevelt and Garner over policy and how to legislate developed early in the presidency. Prior to Roosevelt's inauguration, when Garner was still speaker of the House, he backed outgoing President Herbert Hoover's proposal for a controversial manufacturer's sales tax under the mistaken notion that Roosevelt supported it. Garner was forced to apologize to Hoover and noted that it was the first time he could not "carry out an agreement," although some believe Garner backed the measure without consulting Roosevelt. The two reportedly disagreed as well over who would succeed Garner as Speaker. Garner initially backed a longtime friend and more conservative Democrat, John McDuffie of Alabama, whom FDR viewed critically due to McDuffie's ties to corporate utility interests. Stories that Roosevelt was interfering in the selection led to complaints by Joseph Byrns of Tennessee, among others. Eventually Henry Rainey of Illinois was selected Speaker and Byrns was chosen as floor leader.23

Disagreements continued throughout the first term. Garner's remark that he was "an independent cuss" who had his "own thoughts and views" would characterize some of the actions and statements he made. In addition, he saw himself as more of a neutral presider in the Senate, telling senators upon assuming his duties that he wanted "to be helpful" and "do the best I can to help you conduct proceedings of the Senate. His description of the vice presidency as a "no man's land somewhere between the legislative and executive branch" was an indication that he perceived his role in the Senate as more than just Roosevelt's advisor or legislative liaison. Contemporaries and some scholars have claimed Garner's vice presidency "was a watershed in the evolution of the office," and that Garner "literally transformed the office with his ability "to influence and actively work for the passage of important legislation." How this influenced Roosevelt's perception of him cannot be known, but Farley claimed that Roosevelt [End Page 266] resented the attention Garner received, noting that the president "did not like to see the trees grow too tall around him."24

Garner's independent attitude was born out in his approach to legislation. He received praise from many in the administration, including Farley, for helping pass important New Deal legislation in the first hundred days, including the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Federal Emergency Relief Act, and the National Industrial Recovery Act, but he did not always follow the president's wishes. Early in the administration he cast a decisive vote to pass a veteran's bonus bill that Roosevelt wanted defeated. Garner stated, perhaps correctly, that had he not done so a more rebellious Senate might have challenged other administration measures. He successfully pushed for the inclusion of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the Banking Act of 1933 (also known as the Glass-Steagall Act), despite a disagreement with Roosevelt, who claimed it would not work. On another occasion FDR wrote presidential secretary Stephen Early upset over Garner's lack of effort to block the Frazier-Lemke Farm Bankruptcy Act, which he wanted defeated. When Roosevelt proposed the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1933, Garner vehemently opposed him, telling the president "the United States will gain nothing by recognizing them and may lose a lot." Garner supported some legislation that he was not enthusiastic about, such as the National Industrial Recovery Act, but he was not averse to rendering a negative opinion: "it was a moony adventure and I don't think it will work, but I am willing to see it tried."25

If Roosevelt was frustrated with Garner's handling of legislation during his first term, he did not publicly state it. He continued to consult with the vice president and talked of him in a positive light. He referred to Garner favorably as "Mr. Common Sense." Garner confided to Bascom Timmons on the eve of the 1936 campaign that despite "his faults and his errors, Roosevelt has been a good President for the country. He did add, however, "he's got too much power," a remark that indicated concern with Roosevelt's use of his executive authority. By Roosevelt's second inauguration [End Page 267] in January 1937, the differences between the two would be more publicized, and there would be little doubt as to how disgruntled Garner had become with the New Deal.26

As early as November 1935, Roosevelt told his cabinet that "we will win easily next year, but we are going to make it a crusade." He decided to wage a broad campaign to attract a broad coalition of voters who had a vested interest in his New Deal programs, many of whom were more non-partisan and owed their loyalty more to the president than the party. The campaign eschewed partisanship and reached out to African Americans, liberal Republicans, women, farmers, workers, urban ethnic groups, and young voters, all of whom had benefitted in some way from the vast scope of New Deal policies. For Garner and Farley, men who believed strongly in party loyalty and partisanship, this type of campaign was disconcerting.27

Garner deplored the idea of a New Deal party. As his confidant Bascom Timmons noted, he "never thought of the term new deal in capitalized form" and became annoyed when "officeholders, some of them political castoffs from other parties, began to refer to the New Deal party." Throughout his career he was consistent in his belief in party regularity. In his farewell speech in the House before assuming his duties as vice president, he noted "I believe in partisanship. I believe in party organization." Most troubling to Garner was the recruitment of organized labor. Unions played a major role in the 1936 campaign. Unions affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) formed Labor's Non-Partisan League to support the president's reelection and raised over $770,000 for the effort. In New York, labor leaders formed the American Labor Party to attract socialists and other left-wing union members who supported Roosevelt but not necessarily the Democratic Party.28

Garner did not support the Wagner Labor Relations Act in 1935, claiming it was "unnecessary" and made "government a partisan of labor." He felt the law could be administered to make the Democratic Party "the organized labor party." He was especially weary of labor unions. He typically utilized cheap, non-union labor in his business enterprises in Texas, and it was common knowledge around Uvalde that Garner did not use union labor. When several sit-down strikes in the automobile industry disrupted production in late 1936, Garner became upset at what he termed the "lawlessness" of such action and the unwillingness of the president to [End Page 268] do anything about it. At one cabinet meeting he reportedly shouted at Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins until she became visibly upset. Roosevelt abruptly ended the meeting. On another occasion he and Roosevelt engaged in such a heated argument over the issue that Senate Majority Leader Joseph Robinson had to intervene. In the aftermath of the election he lobbied for a congressional investigation of the CIO and expressed concern that Communists had infiltrated labor unions. Labor, on the other hand, viewed him as part of a conservative group of Democrats who "hated everything about the CIO and represented a 'counterrevolution' against worker rights. United Mine Workers President and CIO leader John L. Lewis would later characterize Garner as a "poker playing, whisky drinking, evil old man who would destroy labor."29

Farley, too, clashed with the president. Like Garner he was a staunch party regular who saw loyalty as the cornerstone of the party. This led many in the Roosevelt camp to recommend his duties during the campaign be curtailed. Farley also had issues with the CIO, although they were more political than ideological. He distrusted groups such as the American Labor Party because they operated outside the control of the Democratic National Committee. He preferred instead to support Daniel J. Tobin of the American Federation of Labor, who headed the Labor Division within the Democratic National Committee.30

Roosevelt's landslide victory in 1936 affirmed the broad reach of the New Deal and the coalition campaign he waged. FDR carried forty-six of the forty-eight states, a landslide Farley predicted as early as April 1936, and he won the popular vote by over 11 million votes. The results indicated that many groups, including organized labor, turned out in large numbers to support him. In the months following the election, the Gallup opinion poll asked voters who they thought would be the Democratic nominee in 1940 if Roosevelt did not run for reelection. In February 1937, Farley's named topped the list with Garner fourth. By March 1939, such polls indicated Garner was a clear favorite with Farley in the running. Their mutual concerns about the direction of the Democratic Party brought Garner and Farley even closer during Roosevelt's second term. [End Page 269] Their revealing correspondence during this time provides a further look at the issues and changes within the party.31

The Gallup polls in February 1937 coincided with the beginning of the most controversial political battle the Roosevelt administration would undertake—a plan to reorganize the United States Supreme Court. Roosevelt's decision to promote a bill that would allow him to appoint up to six new justices was motivated by his frustration with Supreme Court decisions in his first term. The court had overturned key portions of his program, including the Agricultural Adjustment Act, National Industrial Recovery Act, and Guffey Coal Act. Four of the justices were staunch conservatives and voted consistently against the New Deal. Enlarging the court provided the president the ability to appoint liberal justices more favorable to the New Deal. The press referred to it as the court-packing plan.32

Roosevelt's announcement of the bill in February 1937 surprised Garner. He was not consulted beforehand and was conspicuously absent from the strategy committee FDR assembled to secure passage. Garner reportedly supported the idea of a constitutional amendment to change the court, but his ongoing issues with the president, particularly over the sit-down strikes in 1936, did little to convince the administration he would back the measure. Still, Roosevelt expected him to work to pass it. Farley joined the fight, but Garner, on the other hand, made no pretense of supporting the measure. He reportedly "loathed" the plan and walked from the Senate rostrum holding his nose while gesturing thumbs down to colleagues as the bill was read.33

Both Garner and Farley saw the court bill as potentially divisive to party harmony. A week after the announcement Farley asked Roosevelt directly why he had not advised senators in advance about the plan. The president replied that "on more than one occasion" when he had talked to groups from Congress, accounts of those meetings were leaked to the press within forty-eight hours. Farley, ever concerned for the political fallout, counseled [End Page 270] the president that in the future "it was something that should be watched carefully, because they feel they should be consulted." Garner, too, worried about the impact on party harmony. He did not believe that the bill, as written, had a chance of passing. Meeting with Roosevelt and party leaders shortly after the announcement, he suggested a compromise on the measure to better enhance the bill's chance for passage. Roosevelt, confident that compromise was not necessary, reportedly laughed at such a proposal. This irritated Garner, who thought that his advice was not being taken seriously.34

The court fight also signaled the ascendancy of New Deal advisors over traditional party regulars. The strategy board included advisor Thomas (Tommy) Corcoran, Attorney General Homer Cummings, Cummings's aide Joseph Keenan, Assistant Attorney General Robert Jackson and White House liaison to the House of Representatives Charles West. Only Eddie Roddan and Charles Michelson of the Democratic National Committee represented the regular party organization. Farley was resentful of Corcoran's influence, presence, and especially his intervention in party affairs. Although Farley lobbied members of Congress and argued that Democrats should support the bill out of party loyalty, drawing criticism from some Democratic senators, Corcoran and others on the committee believed he was not 100 percent behind the bill and was not doing all he could to convince fellow Democrats such as Garner to vote for the measure.35

During the Senate debate on the court bill Garner left for a vacation in Uvalde, a move that two journalists covering the court affair stated signaled "the terrible breach" between New Dealers and the more conservative members of the party. Roosevelt was upset by Garner's actions and confided his frustration in a meeting with Farley on June 18. Farley described Roosevelt as fuming through a cloud of cigarette smoke as he complained about Garner "jumping ship" at such a critical time. When FDR asked Farley, "What's eating him?" Farley defended his friend by saying "Jack just went on a vacation and dropped off to see his son, Tulley." Farley added that he was sure "Jack isn't peeved," but did reference the fact Garner was upset over the fact a friend, Dick Tullis, was not reinstated in the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) because he had campaigned against Texas congressman Maury Maverick. (Tullis actually worked at the Federal Housing Administration.) Roosevelt instructed Farley to "send for Maverick" and try to work it out. Farley convinced the president to allow Garner a couple of weeks in Uvalde before asking him [End Page 271] to come back. The tone of Farley's memo indicates Roosevelt may have been upset over his defense of Garner.36

Farley wrote Garner detailing the issues and Roosevelt's feelings, and the vice president responded on July 1 in a candid letter that summed up well their relationship to that point. He told Farley that it "peeves me" to see articles claiming "that there is a break between the 'Boss' and myself," and stated, "there isn't any truth in it." He said, "I have almost gotten to love Roosevelt from a personal standpoint," but he did add that he thought the president had "over-reached in some things" and arrived at what he considered faulty conclusions. Garner made specific reference to the "sit down strikes and mass lawlessness," which he found intolerable. He also mentioned that more should be done to reduce government expenditures, and he noted that he had gone along on many of the president's policies "whole-heartedly" even though he was not always in agreement. Garner specifically referenced Henry Wallace's agricultural policy, which he felt was "fundamentally unsound." He further added that he had announced back in March he would be going on vacation in June and at that time everyone thought the session would be through. He saw no reason to change his plans. He concluded by saying, "I plead for his unlimited confidence since he has mine."37

Garner did not mention the firing of his friend Dick Tullis or Maury Maverick in his note, but by 1937, Maverick symbolized for Garner everything that was wrong about the New Deal and the direction of the Democratic Party. Following Maverick's election to Congress in 1934, Garner and Maverick enjoyed a good relationship. Garner invited him to his office for drinks and offered him a large glass of bourbon, a sign he was in the vice president's good graces. By 1936, however, Maverick had become an ardent liberal and impassioned proponent of the New Deal. He supported organized labor and was sympathetic to the sit-down strikes. Some considered him a radical, and in the words of his biographer "his office became a sort of informal headquarters and sometime clearing house for various liberal causes." He became one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the court-packing plan.38

On the surface, relations between the two appeared good. At Roosevelt's request, Garner arranged for the financing of Maverick's reelection campaign in 1936, and Maverick attended a testimonial for Garner in Texas in August. Maverick's unabashed liberalism and the Tullis incident, [End Page 272] however, were indicative of the vast differences between the two. Tullis was a friend of Garner's who was mistakenly referred to in the press as Garner's nephew. He was employed in the San Antonio division of the Federal Housing Administration. Tullis was outspoken in his opposition to Maverick's reelection and at least one newspaper account indicates that Garner tried to get Tullis to back off his opposition. Maverick contacted Tommy Corcoran, with whom he enjoyed a close relationship, and asked that Tullis be fired from his position. Three weeks later Tullis resigned, presumably under pressure from Corcoran.39

Farley replied to Garner's letter of July 1 with an equally straightforward letter of his own. He stated that the president knew of Garner's vacation plans, but noted the stories spreading about his break with Roosevelt were not doing the country any good. He suggested Garner "come back sometime before the end of July." That way he could still achieve a good rest, but be back for the remainder of the session. He further updated Garner on the "bitter debate" in the Senate. Roosevelt also wrote Garner requesting he come back. His note tried to smooth over their differences over labor issues. The president explained his decision not to make a statement concerning the sit-down strikes, arguing that it allowed the public to form their own opinions and get a "pretty sound view of the situation." As a result, they are "pretty sick" of the "extremists in both the C.I.O and some of the A.F.L."40

On July 14, the administration's chances of passing the highly controversial court bill suffered a severe blow when Senate Majority Leader Joseph Robinson of Arkansas, a key supporter of the bill, died suddenly of a heart attack. Before returning to Washington, Garner met Robinson's funeral train in Little Rock. With the bill stalled and the possibility of passage slim, Roosevelt asked Garner to negotiate a compromise with Senator Burton K. Wheeler, one of the bill's staunchest opponents. Garner reportedly told Wheeler to "name his own ticket," but for the "sake of our party be reasonable." Wheeler wanted the bill recommitted, and Garner maneuvered a compromise plan through the Senate one week later. The new bill dealt with the lower courts and made no mention of the Supreme Court. Considered a defeat for the president, New Dealers placed much of the blame on Garner for not doing more or negotiating more forcefully with Wheeler. Corcoran claimed that the vice president "betrayed the President," while Farley recalled, "I don't think the President ever forgave Garner."41 [End Page 273]

Garner's concern for the court bill centered as much on the divisive impact for the Democratic Party as it did for the merits of the bill itself. One year later his frustration was compounded when Roosevelt announced his intention to actively campaign in the 1938 primaries against several incumbent Democrats. Referred to as "the purge," it was FDR's attempt to rid the party of more conservative Democrats whom he believed responsible for opposing his programs, including the court bill. These included Senators Josiah Bailey of North Carolina, Ellison Smith of South Carolina, Millard Tydings of Maryland, Walter George of Georgia, and Representative John O'Connor of New York, among others. The decision to violate the time-honored tradition of neutrality left Farley in an embarrassing position as national Democratic Party chairman and further fueled both Garner's and his frustration with the president.42

The purge, like the court-packing plan, affirmed the preeminence of New Dealers in party affairs. Roosevelt relied on more liberal advisors such as Tommy Corcoran, Harry Hopkins, Harold Ickes, Ben Cohen, and Joseph Keenan, who were dubbed an "elimination committee." Garner and Farley met several times during this period. At one such meeting Garner urged him to "publicly take exception to the attitude of the President," but Farley felt he could not do so unless he resigned from the cabinet and as Democratic chairman. Both worried about the impact on the party. When Garner asked him at another of their meetings if he were a Democrat, Farley said yes and "that after my country, my family and my church, the Democratic Party came next." Garner told him that was "the way he felt about it," and added he thought the president was making a mistake.43

Garner's attitude toward the purge and the president manifested itself directly when Roosevelt journeyed to Texas to campaign in the primaries. Roosevelt arrived on July 10 in Fort Worth. Garner, who was vacationing in Uvalde, made no effort to join Roosevelt, telling the president "it is too far to walk." Roosevelt reportedly replied, "Hope the fishing is good and not too strenuous." One report commenting on Garner spending so much time in Uvalde referred to him as "the political hermit of Texas." Roosevelt's trip to Texas further highlighted the deteriorating relationship between the president and vice president, which mirrored the growing divisions within the Democratic Party. One reporter noted that FDR's visit was timed to rally New Deal supporters and "thwart a projected Garner coup in 1940."44 [End Page 274]

There was growing conservative opposition to the New Deal in Texas, and with twenty-one congressmen and Senator Tom Connally up for reelection, Roosevelt downplayed the issue of the purge. He was selective in who he endorsed and how he worded his endorsements. Connally, who had opposed the court-packing plan, accompanied the president on the campaign train, but reporters noted Roosevelt was rather cool toward him. Maury Maverick was among others who joined the president. Roosevelt referred to him as "my friend," but Maverick was disappointed that FDR did not deliver a stronger endorsement, something he believed he had been promised.45

Maverick lost the primary by fewer than five hundred votes. Some attributed the defeat to Roosevelt's failure to deliver a stronger endorsement, AFL President William Green's reluctance to support him, his outspokenness on controversial issues such as the court plan, and the fact he hailed from a more conservative district. Maverick believed it was the result of the large financial backing given to his opponent, Paul Kilday, by conservative and reactionary elements at the bequest of Mayor C. K. Quin of San Antonio. Although he did not mention Garner, some reporters noted Garner's opposition and the fact that he wanted Maverick defeated. They, too, referred to big money interests who, at Garner's request, poured large sums into the campaign to defeat the incumbent. Garner gave no public indication whether he supported Kilday or Maverick, although his opposition to Maverick would not be surprising given Maverick's role in Dick Tullis's removal a year earlier and his avid support of liberal New Deal policies and organized labor. Personal issues may have also played a role. Press reports noted that Kilday's father and Garner were close friends years ago when the Kilday family lived in Uvalde.46

Maverick's loss was not the only election result that showed FDR's political instincts to be fallible. The purge proved to be a nationwide political setback for the president. All the major candidates he campaigned against won their primaries except John O'Connor of New York. Farley sent Garner a detailed, six-page analysis of the primaries and reiterated that he had done everything he could to prevent the purge and "predicted to the Boss" what would happen. He did his best to smooth over the damage once the primaries were over by sending letters of congratulations to [End Page 275] all the victorious candidates. He worried that when Congress reconvened there would be many dissatisfied members who would not be inclined to go along with the president's program. Throughout the fall of 1938, Farley and Garner shared commentary on the upcoming elections. They worried about the vulnerability of the Democratic Party's hold on the Senate and House; the prospects of candidates in key states such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts; and criticized Roosevelt and those close to him. "I think they could talk with us a little more about policy," Garner complained.47

The results of the fall 1938 elections exceeded their worst fears. Republicans gained eight seats in the Senate, eighty-one in the House, and twenty governorships. No incumbent Republican congressional candidate was defeated. Following the election, Roosevelt requested a meeting with Garner to get his judgment on a variety of policy issues. The two met on December 18, 1938, and had what has been described as a blunt discussion. Garner reminded the president that those Democrats who were successful in 1938 were conservatives and offered his counsel on how best to proceed with policy. Garner claimed the effort was "fruitless." Their relationship rapidly deteriorated. According to one scholar, Garner believed that Roosevelt's personal popularity was usurping the "traditional role of Congress" and that he was "using the media to communicate his objectives" while bypassing the vice president and Congress. He became more outspoken at cabinet meetings, often interrupting the president and speaking in what one observer described as a "unpleasant" manner as his opposition to New Deal policy increased. Roosevelt confided to Farley, "He seems to be pretty much against everything." All of this fueled the ire of New Deal advisors, who saw Garner as undermining Roosevelt, while some critical journalists portrayed him as a "prairie politician" with "archaic notions," and no imagination or convictions.48

Shortly after the election Garner wrote Farley, congratulating him on his "energy and technique" and stating that his efforts "deserved the thanks of all loyal Democrats." He expressed a desire to meet with Farley when he returned to Washington and added "we have got to approach the situation in 1940 in a very cautious, intelligent way or else—well it is just going to be too bad for the Party." The meeting took place in mid-December. [End Page 276] According to Farley's memo they discussed the 1940 election and the dissatisfaction within the party that they both attributed to the influence of John L. Lewis and the CIO. Garner expressed the opinion that if the next Democratic nominee was a CIO supporter "he would be defeated."49

Farley's account of the December meeting suggests that he and Garner were pondering the notion of running for the Democratic nomination in 1940. Although they later stated their opposition to Roosevelt (or any politician) serving a third term as president motivated their decision, their conversations and correspondence indicate personal ambition and concern for the future of the Democratic Party were equally decisive. Their hopes were fueled by public opinion polls that showed them as contenders if Roosevelt did not run, as well as by letters from other disenchanted, conservative Democrats. Texas supporters started a "Garner for President" movement as early as September 1938. Garner seemed flattered with the idea of running again for president. He told Farley in confidence he was not a candidate, "but that no man could refuse the honor of his Party to run." He further reiterated he would likely accept the nomination if tendered and would like to have Farley on the ticket with him, citing what his "organizational skills could do to put the ticket over successfully." He asked Farley if he thought that Roosevelt would oppose him if he ran. Farley did not think so, but thought the president might assume Garner was not interested because "of his age." (Garner would be seventy in November 1938.) Garner asked Farley to keep their conversation "executive."50

Farley, too, was considering the notion of running. He refrained from asking Garner directly "what his attitude would be toward me if I turned up with a lot of delegates." In another memo, early in 1939, Farley stated Garner would like to be nominated and have him as his running mate. Farley believed he would go to the convention with "two or three times" the delegates as Garner and he saw "no reason why I should go about bringing Garner votes when it should be reversed." Farley further reflected that he "would have the opportunity to get the Liberal vote more easily than Garner" and that Garner carried the handicap of his age. He surmised that if Roosevelt did not seek the nomination he would prefer to see "me nominated" as opposed to Garner or Secretary of State Cordell Hull.51

Despite their mutual ambitions, the two men remained close. Farley praised Garner for his efforts to help steer a revision of previous neutrality legislation that resulted in the Neutrality Act of 1939. Garner continued [End Page 277] to view Farley favorably, referring to him as the "greatest" organizer and dependable in all things. The two met again in October 1939. Like Garner, Farley too seemed taken by the possibility of running for president. He told Garner "I do not care about a place on the ticket" but added "I could not pass up anything which might come my way." Garner's supporters in the meantime were doing their best to convince Farley to consider a possible Garner-Farley ticket. Farley had two conversations with Silliman Evans, a former assistant postmaster general and close friend of Garner, who spoke with Farley following the Texas state Democratic convention. According to Farley, Evans told him that Garner was not a candidate, but was in a "receptive" mood and would accept the nomination if tendered. He added that Garner would want "someone on the ticket who could run the show" and he thought Farley was that person. Sam Rayburn also spoke with Farley. He thought that Roosevelt would run, but that if he did not, Garner, Farley, or Hull should be considered. Farley told Rayburn that his only thought was "the interest of the Democratic party and a program that would be for the best interests of the party."52

Garner's passive approach in pursuing the nomination echoed his actions in the 1932 primaries. He did nothing to actively seek the nomination while allowing supporters to promote his cause. In December 1939, he officially announced his candidacy in a terse, forty-four-word statement. He noted he would make no effort to control delegates at the national convention, and he did not mention his motives for running or opposition to a third term for Roosevelt. During the months leading up to the July 1940 Democratic National Convention and through the primaries, he did not campaign or make public speeches and allowed others to speak for him. Texas senator Morris Sheppard, for example, praised him in a radio address as the "ideal successor to the President in 1940," while highlighting his career and achievements. Wisconsin Democratic Party chairman William Carroll urged all Democrats in that state to vote Garner because he stood against "every un-American group and every radical scheme" out to "bore within the bulwarks of liberty and free government."53

Garner's approach in part reflected his personality and discomfort with giving speeches or campaigning. Another factor was the uncertainty over Roosevelt's intentions about the nomination. Garner had support within the party in every state, and he appealed especially to conservative [End Page 278] businessmen and other Democrats supplanted by New Dealers. In early January, Garner's supporters claimed they would gather more than four hundred votes on the first ballot. They based their assertion on Gallup opinion polls from around the country, but the polls featured a significant caveat: the support they measured for Garner and others was contingent on Roosevelt not seeking the nomination. Roosevelt remained evasive, refusing to answer statements directly about whether he would accept the nomination if drafted at the party convention, while his supporters worked to undermine potential rivals like Garner and Farley.54

Roosevelt's refusal to affirm his candidacy limited Garner's ability to attract support. The beginning of World War II in Europe in September 1939 also made the issue of experienced leadership more important. The percentage of those favoring a third term jumped dramatically from 40 percent in August 1939 to 57 percent in May 1940. As early as February 1940, Roy Miller, one of Garner's avid Texas supporters, stated that many who had told him they were "against a third term as a matter of principle seem to be rising above principle now." Garner's support eroded rapidly even from many Senate colleagues who had initially been enthusiastic. He learned quickly that despite concerns by many party regulars about the direction of the Democratic Party in the wake of the New Deal, many Democrats were reluctant to desert their popular and successful standard bearer. In the words of one historian, Democrats realized "that Roosevelt was the only candidate behind whom all of the diverse, conflicting elements of their Party would unite." Garner had little opportunity to overcome the negative opinions that he was too old, too conservative, and disloyal to the administration. One journalist, contrasting the vice president with the president, critically described Garner as a "Cactus Coolidge."55

Garner faced an additional challenge of distinguishing himself from other Democrats such as Farley, Cordell Hull, Millard Tydings, and Paul McNutt who also sought the nomination. His best hope was to unite the opposition to a third term for FDR. He again turned to Farley. Shortly after he officially announced his candidacy, Ralph Morrison, one of Garner's [End Page 279] backers, met with Farley to sound out his possible support for Garner. Farley told him it was not proper "to get in a working agreement with a candidate or candidates." He said that when the time came he would "do whatever is best for the party." Morrison broached the idea of a Garner-Farley ticket, which he argued would put Farley in a good position to be the presidential nominee in 1944, but Farley declined to commit.56

Garner entered selected primaries and had support in many states, but Roosevelt's popularity and the extensive organizing by FDR supporters diminished the vice president's chances. He did not win a primary and had little success in states choosing delegates via state conventions. Even in Texas he was forced to accept a compromise after shrewd maneuvering on FDR's behalf by a young Lyndon Johnson and a contentious state convention that led to fistfights between the Garner and Roosevelt factions. The agreement reached gave one third of the delegates to Roosevelt supporters, one third to Garner, and one third to moderates who did not feel strongly either way. The arrangement guaranteed Garner would receive all the votes as a favorite son on the first ballot only. Roosevelt strategists skillfully undermined any potential challenger. Garner and Farley met several times in early 1940. At one meeting in May, Garner asked Farley if he knew Roosevelt's intentions, to which Farley replied, "Your guess is as good as mine." Garner admitted that the president had "fixed it so nobody else can run." Garner told Farley he intended to let his name be presented at the national convention regardless of what Roosevelt did.57

Garner and Farley allowed their names to be put into nomination when the convention met in Chicago in mid-July. Despite pressure from Roosevelt supporters, Farley insisted there would be a "roll call" of votes, noting there were "at least 125 delegates who wanted to be recorded against the third term." Roosevelt won easily on the first ballot with 946 ½ votes; Farley gathered 72 ½ and Garner 61, the most among other candidates. In total there were 149 votes against the third term for Roosevelt. Garner received 46 votes from Texas as a favorite son, 8 votes from Virginia, 3 from Wisconsin, 1 ½ votes from both Florida and Missouri, and 1 vote from California. After the votes were counted, Farley asked that the rules be suspended and Roosevelt be nominated by acclamation, a move that earned him high praise from fellow Democrats.58

Following the convention Farley resigned as national chairman of the [End Page 280] Democratic Party and postmaster general despite pleas that he remain as chairman through the campaign. Embittered, Farley noted that he had been "deprived a place on the party ticket, not by the Party, but by the man for whom I made stiff sacrifices." Garner made no public comment about the results. When asked by reporters he responded, "no statement," a response thought to mimic Roosevelt's similar comment prior to the convention when asked if he would be a candidate. He did not vote in the election and reportedly wore a button promoting Wendell Willkie, FDR's Republican opponent in 1940, on his lapel while in Uvalde. Unlike Farley, who remained on as state chairman for the Democratic Party in New York for several years and continued to enjoy a celebrity status at Democratic conventions into the 1970s, Garner retired from public life at the end of his term as vice president and returned to his beloved Uvalde.59

The results of the 1940 convention affirmed Roosevelt's continued personal popularity and support for him from within the Democratic Party. Given the vote totals, any qualms Democrats may have had about a president seeking a third term were secondary to maintaining a proven and immensely popular leader who was most likely to lead Democrats to victory in 1940. It affirmed as well that liberal New Deal Democrats, who helped engineer Roosevelt's nomination, had supplanted more conservative Democrats in the party's leadership.

Roosevelt's easy nomination and eventual election also illustrates that Garner had fallen out of step with his own party. He continually bemoaned the detrimental influence of organized labor, particularly the CIO, but in reality organized labor had become a cornerstone of the party and would remain so for decades to come. Although conservative opposition would remain a force, especially among many southern Democrats, the party had become a more broadly based coalition, something Garner opposed.

The 1940 convention was a bitter end to Garner's long political career. He never stated his true feelings publicly, but his silence, coming from someone noted for being frank and outspoken, was in itself a statement. Garner had been denied the presidential nomination two times by a party he devoted his public life to and to boost the fortunes of man he generally served loyally for eight years. Agreeing to run for the vice presidency in 1932 for the good of the party, he may reasonably have believed that 1940 was his time and that the president and the party owed him a legitimate chance for the nomination. Like Farley, he doubtlessly harbored some bitter feelings of personal resentment toward Roosevelt and liberal elements in the party for thwarting this opportunity.60 [End Page 281]

Garner eventually provided some brief insight on his break with Roosevelt in an interview with Bascom Timmons in 1947. "The Executive has too much power," he claimed. He added that Roosevelt needed a Speaker of the House like Joe Cannon, the Speaker during Theodore Roosevelt's presidency. "That would have been a check on him." He reflected, "I would have liked to have played that part in Franklin Roosevelt's administration." He said little or nothing about their differing temperaments, personalities, ways of dealing and communicating with people, or their diverse views on the direction of the Democratic Party, all of which shaped his relationship and ultimate break with the President.61

In the years following their retirement from Washington, Farley and Garner remained close and continued to correspond. Farley told Garner on his ninetieth birthday that "there is not one for whom I have ever had greater admiration and affection." He added that he told his children what Garner's father had told him: "Always be a gentleman and tell the truth." Their bitterness toward Roosevelt and what he had done to the party remained. When Democrats suffered setbacks in the 1942 congressional elections, Farley blamed the president for creating animosity within the party. In December 1943, he painted a dire portrait for Garner, claiming the political situation was in a "very bad way" and said the party was divided over Roosevelt seeking a fourth term. Garner shared Farley's concerns. He felt the worst thing that could happen to the party and the country was Roosevelt's reelection to a fourth term. When Farley visited Garner in Texas in June 1944, Garner urged him to allow Farley's name to go before the convention.62

Yet by 1944 many in the party perceived Garner and Farley as no longer politically relevant. Liberal Democrats viewed them as old, out-of-touch conservatives who could not accept change. Despite their many contributions to Roosevelt and the New Deal and admiration from more traditional Democrats, they had become in the words of one analyst, "part of the past." Farley's biographer put it succinctly, in words that could also apply to Garner, stating he was "fighting for the restoration of a dying form of politics."63 [End Page 282]

Thomas T. Spencer

Thomas T. Spencer is currently an adjunct professor in the history departments at Indiana University South Bend, and Holy Cross College, Notre Dame, Indiana. His principal area of research is the New Deal era. He has published numerous articles on the politics and personalities of the Roosevelt administration in the 1930s.


1. For works by journalists and contemporaries, see Bascom Timmons, Garner of Texas (New York: Harper, 1948); Marquis James, Mr. Garner of Texas (New York: Bobbs–Merrill, 1939); George Rothwell Brown, The Speaker of the House: The Romantic Story of John N. Garner (New York: Brewer, Warren and Putnam, 1932); O. C. Fisher, Cactus Jack (Waco: Texian Press, 1978). Garner has received some scholarly attention. See, for example, analysis of Garner's part in Texas politics of the period in Lionel Patenaude, Texans, Politics and the New Deal (New York: Garland, 1983), and Patenaude, "Garner, Sumner, and Connally: The Defeat of the Roosevelt Court Bill in 1937," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 74 (July 1970): 36–51. See, too, Patrick Cox, "John Nance Garner," in Profiles in Power: Twentieth Century Texans in Washington, ed. Kenneth E. Hendrickson Jr. and Michael L. Collins (Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 1993), 43–59; Norman Brown, "Garnering Votes for Cactus Jack: John Nance Garner, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 1932 Democratic Presidential Nomination," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 104 (July 2000): 149–186; and Anthony Champagne, "John Nance Garner," in Masters of the House: Congressional Leadership over Two Centuries, ed. Raymond Smock and Susan Hannah (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998).

2. Joseph Lash, Dealers and Dreamers: A New Look at the New Deal (New York: Doubleday, 1988), 374–375 (first quotation); Otis L. Graham Jr., "John Nance Garner," in Franklin D. Roosevelt, His Life and Times: An Encyclopedic View, ed. Otis L. Graham Jr. and Meghan Robinson Wander (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1985), 154 (second quotation); Patenaude, Texans, Politics and the New Deal, 51 (third quotation). Lash was a close friend of Eleanor Roosevelt. See, too, a critical assessment by contemporary journalist John Franklin Carter, An Unofficial Observer, The New Dealers (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1934), 271–281. Labor leaders such as John L. Lewis were also hostile toward Garner. See Marquis James, "Poker Playing, Drinking, Evil Old Man," Saturday Evening Post, September 9, 1939, p. 25. One Roosevelt biographer claims Roosevelt disliked Garner personally "as he did few men." See Kenneth S. Davis, FDR: Into the Storm, 1937–1940 (New York: Random House, 1993), 531–532.

3. Brown, "Garnering Votes for Cactus Jack," 159–182.

4. Much has been written on the 1932 convention. In addition to Brown, "Garnering Votes for Cactus Jack," see Steve Neal, Happy Days Are Here Again: The 1932 Democratic Convention, the Emergence of FDR and How America was Changed Forever (New York: William Morrow, 2004); Donald A. Ritchie, Electing FDR: The New Deal Campaign of 1932 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007). Further background can be found in the biographies of Roosevelt. See, for example, coverage in Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Triumph (Boston: Little Brown, 1956), and Kenneth S. Davis, FDR: The New York Years, 1928–1933 (New York: Random House, 1985); See, too, Patenaude, Texans, Politics and the New Deal, 15–25. Farley's account of his negotiations is discussed in Memo, Aug. 30, 1936, Box 40, James A. Farley Papers, 1790–1976 (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). Farley also discusses the convention in his two autobiographies, Behind the Ballots (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938), and Jim Farley's Story: The Roosevelt Years (New York: Whittlesey House, 1948).

5. Garner to Elizabeth A. Cummins, July 6, 1932 (first quotation), G–H Folder, Box 736, Democratic National Committee Records (FDR Presidential Library and Museum, Hyde Park, New York); Garner to Farley, Mar. 31, 1938 (second quotation), Box 6, Farley Papers; Timmons, Garner of Texas, 165–166 (third quotation).

6. Davis, FDR: The New York Years, 1928–1933, 56 (first quotation); Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Triumph, 359 (second quotation).

7. Brown, "Garnering Vote for Cactus Jack," 160–161 (first quotation); Cox, "John Nance Garner," 54 (second and third quotations); Harold Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes, Volume 1: The First Thousand Days, 1933–1936 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), 625–626 (fourth quotation); Memo, July 18, 1935 (fifth quotation), Box 38, Farley Papers.

8. Quotations from Charles Michelson, The Ghost Talks (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1944), 129. The Bonham Daily Favorite, July 19, 1932, noted that Garner started his vacation in mid-July in Uvalde with "characteristic gusto."

9. Carter Field, "Washington Letter," Valley Morning Star (Harlingen, Tex.), Aug. 25, 1932 (first quotation). The best account of trying to get Garner more involved in the campaign can be found in Michelson, The Ghost Talks, 128–131 (second quotation). See too, Farley, Behind the Ballots, 162–163.

10. FDR to Garner, Sept. 25, Nov. 13, 20, 1934, in FDR: His Personal Letters, 1928–1945, ed. Elliot Roosevelt (2 vols.; New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), I, 423, 430, 433 (first and second quotations); Port Arthur News, July 29, 1934 (third quotations); Farley, Behind the Ballots, 315–316 (fourth and fifth quotations); Timmons, Garner of Texas, 201–202.

11. James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956), 472–473 (first and second quotations); Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), 530 (third and fourth quotations).

12. Memo, Dec. 20, 1934 (first quotation), Box 38, Farley Papers; Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes, Volume 1, 313, 215; Champagne, "John Nance Garner," 154 (second and third quotation); Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), 559 (fourth quotation).

13. Memo, Oct. 15, 1933, Box 37, and Memo, Dec. 20, 1934 (third quotation), Box 38, and Memo, May 15, 1935 (first and second quotations), Box 38, Farley Papers; Garner to Farley, Oct. 27, 1938 (fifth quotation), Box 7, Farley Papers; Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal, 519, 530 (fourth quotation); Jonathan Alter, The Defining Moment: FDR's One Hundred Days and the Triumph of Hope (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 238 (sixth quotation).

14. Background on Farley's early career can be found in Farley's autobiography, Behind the Ballots, 3–57, and Daniel Scroop, Mr. Democrat: Jim Farley, The New Deal, and the Making of Modern American Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 1–52.

15. Timmons, Garner of Texas, 202 (first and second quotations); Memos, May 15 (fourth and fifth quotations), July 18, 1935 (third and seventh quotations), Box 38, and Mar. 24, 1936 (sixth quotation), Box 39, Farley Papers; Farley, Behind the Ballots, 91 (eighth quotation).

16. New York Times, Oct. 1, 1933.

17. Memo, Oct. 15, 1933 (first–fourth quotations) Box 37, Farley Papers; New York Times, Oct. 1, 1933 (fifth and sixth quotations).

18. New York Times, Oct. 20, 1933; Big Spring Daily Herald, Oct. 20, 1933 (all quotations).

19. New York Times, Sept. 11, 16, 1933; Abilene Reporter-News, Sept. 1, 1934; Garner to Farley, Sept. 10, 1934 (quotations from Garner); Farley to Garner, Sept.17, 1934 (quotations from Farley), Box 3, Farley Papers; Gloria Newquist, "James A. Farley and the Politics of Victory, 1928–1936" (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 1966), 383–389.

20. Bernard Sternsher, Rexford Tugwell and the New Deal (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964), 331 (all quotations); Scroop, Mr. Democrat, 86–88.

21. Memo, Oct. 15, 1933 (first quotation), Box 37, Farley Papers; Farley to Harry Hopkins, June 22, 1933, Confidential File, 1933–1938, Box 37, Hopkins Papers, FDR Library; Scroop, Mr. Democrat, 87–88 (second quotation); Corsicana Daily Sun, Jan. 6, 1934; Lubbock Morning Avalanche, Jan.17, 1934 (third quotation).

22. Garner to Farley, Sept. 6, 1935 (first quotation), and Farley to Garner, Oct. 1, 1935 (second quotation), Box 3, Farley Papers. See, too, Farley's memo in which FDR, Garner, and Farley discussed the Virgins Islands situation: Memo, July 13, 1935, Box 38, Farley Papers; Garner to Jesse Jones, Aug. 28, 1934 (third quotation), Garner folder, Box 10, Jesse Jones Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.).

23. The sales tax issue is covered in detail in Jordan Schwarz, "John Nance Garner and the Sales Tax Rebellion of 1932", Journal of Southern History 30 (May 1964): 162–180. See, too, Frank Freidel, FranklinD. Roosevelt: Launching the New Deal (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 52–54 (quotation). The discussion of Garner's successor can be found in Garner to Roosevelt, Dec. 9, 1932, FDR to Garner, Dec. 27, 1932, Joseph Byrns to FDR, Dec. 8, 1932, and FDR to Byrns, Dec. 27, 1932, Box 338, Democratic National Committee Records, FDR Library. Garner was reported to favor McDuffie according to the Cincinnati Enquirer, Nov.16, 1932.

24. Garner's quotation on being an "independent cuss" and his perception of his role of presider in the Senate can be found in Timmons, Garner of Texas, 176, 201. A detailed analysis of Garner's contributions as vice president and the praise he received for his effectiveness can be found in Patenaude, Texans, Politics and the New Deal, 34–43. The assessment of scholars on Garner transforming the vice presidency and Farley's quotation is in Cox, "John Nance Garner," 59, 63.

25. Background on Garner's legislative achievements and comments from Farley and others regarding his legislative successes can be found in Patenaude, Texans, Politics and the New Deal, 34–39. Garner and Roosevelt's disagreement over the Glass-Steagall Act is covered in Kenneth S. Davis, FDR: The New Deal Years, 1933–1937 (New York: Random House, 1986), 148–149. For FDR's frustrations with Garner see FDR to Stephen Early, Apr. 10, 1934, and Early to FDR, Apr. 9, 16, 1934, in FDR: His Personal Letters, Vol. I, 396–398. Garner's feelings regarding Soviet recognition and his quotation on the National Industrial Recovery Act can be found in Timmons, Garner of Texas, 185, 193–195.

26. Timmons, Garner of Texas, 201, 209.

27. Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox, 266 (quotation). A good concise analysis of the 1936 election and Democratic efforts to wage a broad, coalition campaign is found in Donald R. McCoy, "The Election of 1936," in Crucial American Elections (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1973), 55–73.

28. Timmons, Garner of Texas, 174, 205 (quotations). Background on Labor's Non–Partisan League and the American Labor Party and their role in the campaign can be found in Thomas T. Spencer, "Labor's Non–Partisan League, 1936–1944," Labor's Heritage (Spring–Summer, 2004), 34–37.

29. Timmons, Garner of Texas, 191, 215–216 (all quotations from Garner); Patenaude, Texans, Politics and the New Deal, 43–45. Background on Garner's feelings about unions and union labor can be found in Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power, 558–559. The story of Garner's anger over the sit-down strikes is mentioned in James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 135–136, as well as in George Martin, Madam Secretary: Frances Perkins (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), 401–40. The quotations regarding labor's view of Garner come from Steven Fraser, Labor Will Rule: Sidney Hillman and the Rise of American Labor (New York: Free Press, 1991), 401, 435.

30. Concerns about Farley's ability to lead a coalition campaign can be found in Joseph Lash, Eleanor and Franklin (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971), 579–580, and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Politics of Upheaval (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), 572–573, 575–576. Farley's reservations about the American Labor Party can be found in Scroop, Mr. Democrat, 118–119, and Fraser, Labor Will Rule, 363.

31. Analysis of the election results can be found in McCoy, "The Election of 1936," 70–74, and Sean Savage, Roosevelt: The Party Leader, 1932–1945 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1991), 103–128. The 1937 poll showing Farley and Garner as favorites can be found in the Oakland Tribune, Aug. 29, 1937. Garner's emergence as a front runner is noted in Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power, 568.

32. Much has been written on the court reorganization plan. See Lionel Patenaude, "Garner, Sumner, and Connally," 36–51. The best overall analysis is William Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 82–162. More recent accounts include Noah Feldman, Scorpions: The Battles and Triumphs of FDR's Great Supreme Court Justices (New York: Twelve, 2010), and James F. Simon, FDR and Chief Justice Hughes: The President, the Supreme Court and the Epic Battle over the New Deal (New York: Simon and Schuster 2012). Two contemporary accounts are Joseph Alsop and Turner Catledge, The 168 Days (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1938), and Michelson, The Ghost Talks, 165–186.

33. Farley's reluctance to make the Supreme Court an issue in the campaign can be found in Frances Perkins, "Reminiscences of Frances Perkins" (1955), pp. 110–111 (Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, New York, New York). Garner's support of a constitutional amendment is noted in Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn, 9. Garner's nose-holding reaction is noted in Patenaude, "Garner, Sumner, and Connally," 37. See also Michelson, The Ghost Talks, 152.

34. Memo, Feb. 11, 1937 (quotations), Box 41, Farley Papers; Patenaude, "Garner, Sumner, and Connally," 37.

35. New York Times, Feb. 13, 1937; Michelson, The Ghost Talks, 169–170. Further background on the dispute between Corcoran and Farley can be found in Alsop and Catledge, The 168 Days, 183, and Scroop, Mr. Democrat, 152–153.

36. Alsop and Catledge, The 168 Days, 236 (first quotation); Farley's account of his meeting with Roosevelt can be found in Memo, June 18, 1937, Box 41, Farley Papers, and James A. Farley, Jim Farley's Story (New York: McGraw–Hill, 1948), 83–84.

37. Garner to Farley, July 1, 1937, Box 5, Farley Papers.

38. Richard B. Henderson, Maury Maverick: A Political Biography (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970), 67, 68, 132–134, 203 (quotation); Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power, 558–559.

39. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power, 558; Corsicana Daily Sun, Aug. 5, 1936; Henderson, Maury Maverick, 118–119, 203; Big Spring Daily Herald, July 17, 1936.

40. Farley to Garner, July 10, 1937 (quotation from Farley), Box 5, Farley Papers; FDR to Garner, July 7, 1937 (quotations from FDR) in FDR: His Personal Letters, Vol. I, 692–693.

41. Memos, July 18, 21, 1937, Box 41, Farley Papers; Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power, 562 (quotation from Corcoran); Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal, 123–124 (quotations from Garner); Farley, Jim Farley's Story, 84 (quotation from Farley).

42. A good analysis of the "purge" can be found in Susan Dunn, Roosevelt's Purge: How FDR Fought to Change the Democratic Party (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010); See, too, Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal, 270–287.

43. Dunn, Roosevelt's Purge, 26; Memos, June 8 (first quotation), Sept. 8, 1938 (second and third quotation), Box 43, Farley Papers.

44. Memos, Feb. 10, 1938, Box 42, and Oct. 5, 1938, Box 43, Farley Papers. Farley's "walk out" on the purge was noted in Newsweek, September 5, 1938, p. 7. Garner's refusal to meet with Roosevelt and their comments can be found in Los Angeles Times, July 12, 1938: See, too, the reference to Garner as the "political hermit of Texas" in Amarillo Globe-Times, July 11, 1938. The quotation on the timing of FDR's visit is from Thomas Stokes, "F.D.R. Arouses Support in Texas to Thwart Garner Coup in 1940," El Paso Herald-Post, July 12, 1938.

45. Dunn, Roosevelt's Purge, 132–133; Henderson, Maury Maverick, 179 (quotation).

46. Henderson, Maury Maverick, 180–181. Maverick's comments at the time can be found in the Abilene Reporter-News, July 26, 1938. Stories regarding Garner's role in Maverick's defeat can be found in the Philadelphia Record, Aug. 2, 1938, and The New Republic, May 24, 1939, p. 7. Mention of Garner's relationship with Kilday's father is in the Corsicana Daily Sun, Aug. 5, 1938.

47. Farley to Garner, Sept. 27, 1938 (first quotation), Box 7, Farley Papers; Garner to Farley, Oct. 27, 1938 (second quotation), Box 7, Farley Papers; New York Times, Oct. 1, 1938. Analysis of the purge as a failure can be found in Dunn, Roosevelt's Purge, 214–215.

48. Analysis of the 1938 Congressional elections is found in Milton Plesur, "The Republican Congressional Comeback of 1938," The Review of Politics 24 (October 1962): 525–562. For Farley's candid feelings about the elections see Farley to Herbert Claiborne Pell, Jan. 19, 1939, Box 7, Farley Papers. See also Timmons, Garner of Texas, 239–240 (first quotation); Cox, "John Nance Garner," 58 (second and third quotations) FDR to Garner, Nov. 28, 1938, in FDR: His Personal Letters, Vol. II, 831–832; Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power, 564–566 (fourth, fifth, and sixth quotations).

49. Farley, Jim Farley's Story, 159; Garner to Farley, Nov. 3 (first quotation), Dec. 1, 1938 (second quotation), Box 7, Farley Papers; Farley Memo, Dec. 16, 1938 (third quotation), Box 43, Farley Papers.

50. Memo, Dec. 16, 1938, Box 43, Farley Papers.

51. Memos, Dec. 16, 1938 (Farley quotation on delegates), and Jan. 10, 1939 (all other quotations), Box 43, Farley Papers.

52. Garner's assessment of Farley is found in Timmons, Garner of Texas, 252 (first quotation). See also Farley to Garner, Nov. 8, 1939, and Garner to Farley, Nov. 14, Dec. 26, 1939 (second and third quotation), Box 8, Farley Papers; Memos, Dec. 7, 1938 (fourth and fifth quotations), Box 43, and Sept. 29 (sixth quotation), Oct. 20, 1939 (second and third quotations), Box 44, Farley Papers.

53. Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, Dec. 17, 1939; The Llano News, Apr. 4, 1940 (first quotation); Amarillo Daily News, Apr. 2, 1940 (second quotation). Garner's statement can be found in San Saba News, Dec. 21, 1939.

54. An analysis of Garner's support and difficulties can be found in Bernard Donahoe, Private Plans and Public Dangers: The Story of FDR's Third Nomination (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), 138–139. The Garner claim on delegates can be found in the Hondo Anvil Herald, Jan. 5, 1940. Evidence of Roosevelt working behind the scenes to undermine his rivals can be found in FDR to Stephen Early, Apr. 10, 1940, Box 8, Official File 300, FDR Library, and Rexford Tugwell Diary, Box 17, 11/17/1939–12/30/40 folder, Rexford Tugwell Papers, FDR Library. Farley's claim that the president lied to him is in Farley, Jim Farley's Story, 246–258. Roosevelt's interpretation of Farley's claim is noted in Diary of Homer Stille Cummings, July 12, 1940, p. 50 (University of Virginia Manuscripts Collections, Charlottesville, Virginia).

55. Roy Miller's quotation, public opinion polls on the third term, and the erosion of support for Garner can be found in Donahoe, Private Plans and Public Dangers, 139, 154. The quotation on Garner as a "Cactus Coolidge" came from writer Heywood Broun. See Donahoe, Private Plans and Public Dangers, 125. The quotation on factions uniting behind Roosevelt can be found in Savage, Roosevelt: The Party Leader, 171.

56. Memo, Jan. 2, 1940 (quotations) Box 44, Farley Papers. Texas newspapers talked of a possible Garner-Farley ticket. See El Paso Herald, Apr. 1, 1940, and Brownsville Herald, Apr. 6, 1940.

57. An analysis of Garner's challenges in the primaries can be found in Donahoe, Private Plans and Public Dangers, 143–154. Accounts of the numerous meetings between Farley and Garner were noted in the press. See, for example, Freeport (Ill.) Journal-Standard, Mar. 13, 1940; Emporia (Kans.) Gazette, May 3, 1940; Decatur (Ill.) Herald, Feb. 6, 1940; Garner's conversation with Farley in May and his quote can be found in Farley, Jim Farley's Story, 137–138.

58. Farley's insistence that a roll call of votes be taken is in Timmons, Garner of Texas, 274; Donahoe, Private Plans and Public Dangers, 173. The breakdown of Garner's vote total can be found in the Chicago Tribune, July 18, 1940.

59. Memo, June 28, 1940 (first quotation), Box 45, Farley Papers; Amarillo Daily News, July 25, 1940 (second quotation). Analysis of Farley's career after leaving the administration can be found in Scroop, Mr. Democrat, 191–229; Timmons, Garner of Texas, 276–278. The account of Garner wearing a Willkie button in Uvalde can be found in Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power, 600.

60. Farley's bitterness is reflected in Memo, May 12, 1940, Box 45, Farley Papers.

61. Timmons, Garner of Texas, 279, 291.

62. Farley to Garner, Nov. 20, 1958 (first and second quotations), Box 89, Ernest Cuneo Papers, FDR Library; Farley to Garner, Feb. 28, 1943 (third quotation), Dec. 17, 1943, Box 18, Farley Papers; Memo, Sept. 6, 1944, Box 45, Farley Papers.

63. Donahoe, Private Plans and Public Dangers, 178; Scroop, Mr. Democrat, 183 (quotations).

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