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  • Astride Two Worlds: Technology and the American Civil War ed. by Barton C. Hacker
  • Robert G. Angevine (bio)
Astride Two Worlds: Technology and the American Civil War. Edited by Barton C. Hacker. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Scholarly Press, 2016. Pp. 288. $37.95.

Over the last twenty-five years, historians and strategists have sought to understand the sources and effects of fundamental transformations in the technological character of war. Although the concept of such military-technical revolutions originated in Soviet military writings, the American Civil War is often cited as an example of just such a dramatic change. In Astride Two Worlds, however, editor Barton C. Hacker and eight contributors caution against focusing narrowly on the technologies and techniques first used extensively for military purposes during the Civil War, such as mass production of clothing and small arms, supply and movement of armies by railroad, rifled small arms and artillery, submarines, and steam-powered warships. The Civil War, they argue, was a transitional conflict. It was both the last great preindustrial war and the first major war of the industrial age. Railroads and steamships were important, but horse-drawn wagons and pack animals bore much of the logistical burden. Breech-loading small arms and rifled artillery were used, but muzzle-loading small arms and smoothbore artillery predominated on the battlefields. Similarly, seamstresses outnumbered sewing machine operators.

The volume is the product of a 2012 symposium sponsored by the [End Page 1081] National Museum of American History and the Smithsonian Institution to mark the sesquicentennial of the Civil War. Following Hacker's brief but comprehensive bibliographical overview of technology in the war, the book's eight topical chapters are divided into two sections. The first section, entitled "Technological Realities," examines technologies that existed prior to the conflict. It includes chapters on the small arms industry in the North, the transformation of heavy artillery, the information flows and associated technologies necessary to command and control field armies, and veterinary care in the Union cavalry. Collectively, the chapters in this section suggest that the technologies that most affected the course and conduct of the war, such as the mass production of small arms and development of rifled heavy artillery, were the result of systematic empiricism over long periods of time. Merritt Roe Smith details the development of a system of interchangeable manufacturing at the United States Armory in Springfield, Massachusetts during the antebellum era and the creation of a tightly controlled administrative structure emphasizing order and uniformity to implement it. Steven A. Walton recounts the intense experimentation with artillery design and manufacture during the period from 1830 to 1860. Seymour E. Goodman notes that most of the technologies used to command and control field armies at the tactical level had Napoleonic precedents. Although new technologies such as telegraphy had a greater impact at the strategic level, some of the most effective means used at that level were still just modifications of Napoleonic processes, such as paper maps and couriers, rather than more recent technological products. David J. Gerleman demonstrates that in areas where only minimal effort was invested before the war, such as veterinary care, little or no progress was made.

The second section of the book, labeled "Technological Dreams," considers new technologies explored, typically with little success, during the war. It includes chapters on spar torpedo boats, personal body armor, observation balloons, and heavier-than-air flight. The chapters in this section highlight one of the key themes of the book—technological failures were more common than successes. Jorit Wintjes demonstrates that Confederate spar torpedo boats were rarely successful during the war and had a negligible impact on the conflict. The Confederacy lacked the industrial capacity to produce small, powerful engines to power the boats, the technically qualified personnel to operate them, and the tactical understanding to employ them effectively. Sarah Jones Weicksel describes how technical shortcomings and prevailing conceptions of manliness limited soldiers' willingness to wear personal body armor. John A. Macaulay relates how Confederate deception negated any intelligence advantage the Union might have gained from its observation balloons during the Peninsula Campaign. Tom D. Crouch details the numerous schemes for flying machines considered during the war.

Astride Two...

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