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  • Kill Jeff Davis: The Union Raid on Richmond, 1864 by Bruce M. Ventner
  • Daniel Cone
Kill Jeff Davis: The Union Raid on Richmond, 1864. Bruce M. Ventner. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016. ISBN 978-0-8061-5153-5. 384pp., cloth, $29.95.

In the late winter of 1864, Union general Judson Kilpatrick led a cavalry raid behind the lines in northern Virginia, against the Confederate capital at Richmond. Bold and self-promoting, Kilpatrick envisioned an ambitious military coup de main: he would seize the lightly defended city, wreck its industries and infrastructure, liberate thousands of Union prisoners of war, and capture Confederate leaders. Regrettably for Kilpatrick and the POWs, the raid came up short; Richmond would not fall until April 1865. Moreover, in the raid’s aftermath, orders to sack Richmond and murder Confederate president Jefferson Davis were taken from the dead body of Kilpatrick’s subordinate, Col. Ulrich Dahlgren and published, to the great embarrassment of Union leaders. It was this disturbing disclosure of government-sanctioned “black-flag” warfare that gave the Kilpatrick Raid particular notoriety.

Bruce M. Ventner has written the first modern book-length treatment of the raid. Informed by several previously untapped primary sources, Ventner explores the egos and ambitions of Kilpatrick and Dahlgren and details the sharp little engagements that characterized their foray against Richmond. As Ventner portrays it, the Kilpatrick Raid was typical of Civil War cavalry operations, promising far more than it could have realistically delivered.

Anxious to match the raids of Confederates such as J. E. B. Stuart and John Mosby, and perhaps seeking to assuage personal grief, Kilpatrick believed he could capture Richmond with an ad-hoc cavalry force, provided that other Union troops in Virginia occupied Confederate attentions. According to Ventner, Kilpatrick’s plan was “too ambitious . . . reflecting as it [End Page 328] did [his] tangential grasp of reality” (263). Even if the diversions had been more successful than they were, Kilpatrick still had to fight his way through Richmond’s garrison, which proved to be a fair match for his thirty-five hundred horsemen. Contrary to intelligence estimates, the men of the Local Defense Troops were not outnumbered (they totaled more than five thousand, by Ventner’s careful tabulation), and their stiff resistance behind fortifications, plus the Confederate cavalry’s harassment of Kilpatrick’s rear, forced Kilpatrick to break off his attack on the city.

What really undermined Kilpatrick’s chances of success, however, were loose lips. Venter demonstrates that the raid was an open secret in Virginia before it was even launched. He lays this breach of military security at the feet of Kilpatrick, overly gabby with his Washington allies and brother officers. However, Ventner argues, the numbers involved on both sides and the Confederates’ knowledge about the raid absolve Kilpatrick of earlier historians’ charges that he failed due to indecisiveness or lack of nerve. No champion of Kilpatrick, Ventner determines, nonetheless, that the often-maligned general turned in a decent performance.

If Kilpatrick planned the raid, Ulrich Dahlgren was its lightning rod, and Ventner provides a full account of Dahlgren’s role. Son of an Abraham Lincoln confidante, short a leg lost in an earlier cavalry clash, Dahlgren was “brave and courageous,” and “at the same time reckless and careless” (85). Ventner notes Dahlgren’s incomplete recovery from his amputation and documents the doomed young colonel’s inability to follow the best marching routes or keep to the raid’s strict timetable. Dahlgren’s shortsighted decision to summarily execute his mixed-race guide—to which Ventner devotes a chapter—ensured that his column would fall behind schedule and become ambushed and practically wiped out. Dahlgren cannot be blamed for the outcome of the raid, although Ventner implies that he made the failure that much more costly. As for the controversial Dahlgren papers, reproduced in full in the appendix, Ventner briefly argues for their veracity: “Given [Dahlgren’s] acknowledged personality, it is feasible that he would take it upon himself to expand his orders to include murder and mayhem” (267).

Beyond biographical sketches and tactical snippets, Ventner’s work also addresses spying and scouting efforts. Intelligence operatives in Richmond and northern Virginia encouraged Kilpatrick...

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