Loyalism, technology and Canada’s fate

Loyalism, technology and Canada's fate RAMSAY COOK "As has been the inevitable fate of the great prophets, his disciples have consistently neglected and misinterpreted those aspects of his thought which did not serve their purpose." George Grant, Philosophy in a Mass Age. "To think of the U.S. is to think of ourselves - almost." George Grant, "From Roosevelt to LBJ." During the 1960's two issues dominated Canadian public life: the French Canadian question and the American question. They were not new issues for, indeed, they have dominated the whole of Canadian history. They define our political life as they defined Canadian Confederation. The French Canadian presence, among other reasons, meant that Canada had to be a federal state. The American presence, among other reasons, meant that Canada had to be a highly centralized federal state. It might have been otherwise but the Fathers of Confederation certainly acted on these two conflicting propositions. Since Confederation our history has revolved around these centrifugal and centripetal tendencies. Almost every other issue of policy - foreign and domestic, economic and cultural - has been related to these two over-riding questions. Thus centralism and provincial rights, majorities and minorities , nationalism, imperialism and continentalism , have been the rallying slogans of our public life. By the beginning of the 1960's these two issues once again emerged, after two decades of apparently placid national growth. In Quebec the 50's had been a time of rapid social and intellectual changes. In those changes were nurtured the roots of what later became known as the "quiet revolution ." That revolution brought with it a fundamental questioning of the status of French Canada, and Quebec, in Confederation. By 1965 Confederation was on the verge of dissolution . So, too, the 50's was a period of accelerated economic growth throughout much of Canada. Behind that growth was a powerful injection of American direct investment , and therefore control, over the 50 Canadian economy. Canada's economic independence was thus seriously challenged. In these same years the central government was virtually paralyzed because of the chaos of politics. Most obviously that chaos manifested itself in five years of minority governments, governments forced to place temporary survival ahead of long-term policy. These governments, led by John Diefenbaker and Lester Pearson, enacted easy policies, but avoided the tough issues relating to Quebec and the United States. Two men perhaps symbolized the period: Walter Gordon and Maurice Lamontagne. Each had policy ideas for coming to grips with the two major problems. Each suffered defeat in the treacherous political waters of minority government . They may not have had the right solutions but at least they identified the problems. Each got a "study" as compensation. Mr. Lamontagne fathered the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism; Mr. Gordon initiated the task force on Foreign Ownership and Structure of Canadian Industry. Neither is yet fully implemented. It is no accident that the phrase "quiet diplomacy" reached its apex in the 1960's. Governments, insecure in their parliamentary support, harassed by day-to-day in-fighting, lacked anything but ad hoe policies - though they could offer the moon at election time. Where policy was absent "quiet diplomacy" was obviously preferable to public discussion . Messrs. Heaney and Merchant offered the formula for Canadian-American relations, though the Canadian public rejected it. The federal government would doubtless have been pleased to have applied a similar formula to federal-provincial relations (and sometimes did}, but the Quebec public was unprepared , for the most part, to accept it. The consequence of this chaos and uncertainty was a vigorous public debate about the oldest of Canadian problems: the country 's survival. Some devoted themselves to asking what Quebec wanted. Others brandished slogans designed to halt the flood of "Americanization." Some were simply pessimistic . Perhaps the key date in that era was 1965. After floundering and mishap, not unconnected with Mr. Walter Gordon and Mr. Maurice Lamontagne, Mr. Pearson found three important Quebeckers, Trudeau, Marchand and Pelletier, to shore up his FrenchCanadian side by providing him, at the eleventh hour, with a consistent approach to the French-English duality within the ConfederaRevue d'etudes canadiennes tion. He found no similar solution to his "American problem...