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Minority Government Reconsidered LINDA GELLER-SCHWARTZ It is considered de rigueur in recent scholarly analyses of British and Canadian parliamentary institutions to dismiss the notion that the House of Commons is, or ever has been, a true ''legislature ,'' or that it has ever had anything more than an indirect and residual power in ''making'' or "unmaking" governments.I That view is condemned as a congressionalist approach to our government or as the product of an overly zealous preoccupation with that brief, uncharacteristic period in Britain between the Reform Bills of 1832 and 1867 and the periods immediately preceding and following Confederation in Canada. To many scholars the history of parliamentary government clearly demonstrates both the constancy and desirability of the dominance of the executive over the House of Commons. In modern times, this is achieved by means of a government, formed from a single party which obtained a majority of the seats in the House of Commons at the last election. The Cabinet may be influenced by the criticism and cajoling of the Opposition, but reinforced by a disciplined majority party, it is able to carry out its "popular mandate" until such time as it chooses to call an election. While the House of Commons may have various important "demo-;cratic functions" of a "teaching" or "expressive" nature,2 its primary role is to give the government the support it needs to govern as it sees fit, and not to dismiss the government or to frustrate its legislative programme. It is the electorate, not the House, which ultimately must control the governors of the nation. For better or worse, this is now the conventional doctrine of parliamentary government. These sweeping judgements of modem parliamentary government relegate to a footnote those unusual periods when an election fails to produce Journal ofCanadian Studies Vol. 14, No. 2 (Ete 1979 Summer) a clear majority for one party. It has been recognized that, at least in theory, this might affect the nature of the parliamentary game. Yet, since minority governments were assumed to be rare and, as Sir Ivor Jennings remarked, were "heading either for coalition or defeat,"3 the problems they posed to conventional theory were disposed of in a few brief sentences. Such occasional "aberrations " could not touch the fundamental theory of parliament. It might be convenient for Canadian political scientists to continue to ignore minority governments . This, however, is no longer possible. Over a decade has passed since Eugene Forsey destroyed the myth that minority governments are rare phenomena.4 Five of the last eight Parliaments in Canada have been minority governmentss and the federal elections of May 1979 has produced yet another (Conservative) minority government. Moreover there have been minority governments recently in Britain6 and in the province of Ontario.7 Far from being an aberration, minority governments have almost become the rule. Moreover , certain positive assumptions about the functioning and value of minority government have lately begun to take root in the Canadian political culture. Whereas in the late 1950s and early 60s, minority government was considered "unstable" and "bad" government, today it is not unusual to find the public and press in praise of minority government.8 Minority governments are assumed to be more responsive to the wishes of the House of Commons.9 Logic, history,10 and the experience of other countriesI I would appear to support the validity of such an assumption . However, it has not yet been tested against the recent Canadian experience of minority governments at the f~deral level. This article will provide a preliminary attempt to examine whether the legislative role of the House of Commons indeed has changed during minority governments in Canada and, specifically, whether the Cabinet has been obliged to become more responsive to the Commons. The Legislative Role of the House of Commons It is a fairly accurate, if trite, perception that the role of the House of Commons in the legisla67 tive process is normally that of a rubber-stamp. The government backbencher or opposition member , for all intents and purposes, is unable to initiate and have approved any of his own legislation . The very rare occasions when significant private members' bills are passed by the Commons...

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