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Theories ofParliament and Parliamentary Reform PAUL. G. THOMAS Public disenchantment with government is widespread. Since the 1960s there has been an apparently sharp decline in the public's confidence in the ability of governments to formulate and implement successful policies and programs. The hostility is not directed exclusively at any particular political party, but rather at the processes of government in general. Secretive and unresponsive governments, ineffective programs, uncontrollable bureaucracies, excessive regulation, runaway spending and widespread waste of public funds are widely denounced as major problems by popular, academic and official commentators. There is a questioning of the "governability of democracies," talk of "political overload" and predictions of the potential demise of responsible government. 1 The imprecision and hyperbole of such charges undoubtedly contributes to the strong, favourable response they evoke. Zealous reformers, crusading under such banners as zerobased budgeting, sunset laws, deregulation, public service reform and accountable management, find a receptive environment for their ideas. The antigovernment and anti-bureaucratic mood is so strong and so pervasive that slogans and simplistic solutions replace serious analysis and a realistic recognition of the inherent difficulties of modern government. An interesting aspect of the current malaise is the revival of interest in Parliament and in reform of that institution as an antidote to the perceived problems of big government. Apparently one no longer risks being labelled a romantic, constitutional antiquarian if an interest is shown in the role of the House of Commons. Indeed, hard-headed businessmen now call for a revitalization of Parliament as a check on governments and the bureaucracy, a royal commission devotes Journal ofCanadian Studies Vol. 14, No. 2 (Ete 1979 Summer) a full section of its report to the role of Parliament in closing the accountability loop, and conferences on the status of legislatures in the policy process abound.2 Some of the pessimism expressed towards governments in general undoubtedly has rubbed off on Parliament, but there is a surprising and somewhat ironic belief that a more vigorous legislature would help to correct some of the perceived problems of modern government. While many reformers recognize the ineffectuality of Parliament under current circumstances, they also believe that it can be made to play a potent and valuable role. The irony is, of course, that for most of its existence the Canadian Parliament has been largely unpraised and unloved. Laudatory statements about its performance are rare. Politicians, journalists and academics have seldom been hard pressed to find fault with the institution. Stephen Leacock once described it as "a place where men come together merely to hear the latest legislation and indulge in cheers, sighs, groans, votes and other expressions of vitality.'' In addition to the now standard charge that Parliament has lost power and influence, there are the perennial complaints about procedural shenanigans, interminable debates, muckraking sessions and personality conflicts, all of which are said to detract from the effectiveness of the institution. Indeed, if all the criticisms were added up, one might easily conclude that the Commons ought to be abolished. Such a drastic response would ignore the fact that the criticisms, while numerous, are also often contradictory and are frequently based upon misperceptions about what the actual role of the Commons is or could be, or upon the commentator 's strong reactions to events in the Commons at the time of writing. Sweeping denunciations of the Commons must, therefore, be greeted with a healthy measure of skepticism. At the same time, there is a danger today that in our search for solutions to complicated problems, we will succumb to a naive faith in institutional tinkering. The purpose of this paper is to argue that we should approach reforms with a realistic appreciation of the limits imposed by the wider political context in which the Commons operates. Within the Canadian political system 57 the House of Commons is assigned the contradictory function of supporting the government while criticising and controlling it, and there is no simple formula by which this contradiction can be resolved in practice. Most of the procedural reforms in this century have sought to strengthen the government without improving the Commons' capacity for control. Even now at the end of a decade which has witnessed...

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