Nationalism and Language Policies: An Alternative View

Review article Nationalism andLanguage Policies: An Alternative View FRAN<;OIS VAILLANCOURT The goal of this paper is to attempt an examination of the forces that explain the inferior socio-economic status of francophones vis-a-vis anglophones in Quebec, still prevalent as recently as 1970 (Vaillancourt, 1980). This is done since in our view Breton's recent explanation of this fact, which relies mostly upon a study of the consequences of the Church's purported language policies for the 1760-1960 period in Quebec, does not examine all the relevant economic forces and neglects part of the available historical evidence (Breton, 1978). The first part of the paper is given over to a presentation of Breton's explanatory framework and of our competing framework. The second part of the paper presents the relevant historical evidence. I. Quebec 1760-1960: Church or Conquest? Breton summarizes his views on the c·auses of the inferior socio-economic status of francophones in Quebec as follows: ''one should seek an explanation in the two-hundred-year-old nationalistic language policies effectively pursued by church and state and not, as has usually been done, to look at such variables as the attitudes of francophones towards commerce and industry , the influence of family background or the effect of the conquest on francophone character and society" (1978, p. 667). The chain of arguments that leads Breton to these views appears to be as follows. After the Conquest, and presumably because of it, although Breton states that the Conquest is not part of the explanation, there appears a demand for English-speaking individuals in Quebec in both the private and public sector. In the private sector British merchants need to hire local agents who in turn must hire employees; in the public sector English-speaking civil servants are sought by the British government. In other words the Conquest leads to a partial expropriation of the French language. While before 1760 it was used in farming and in fur-gathering, in internal and external trade, and in government activities, both civil and military, after the Conquest, and as a result of it, it is used only in the first three activities. This demand for English-speaking individuals should, in Breton's views, lead to investment by francophones in the English language, a particular type of human capital. Breton does not specify the exact mechanism 112 that determines the appropriate proportion of francophones that would become bilingual but, presumably, it depends on the average ability to learn English and on its distribution; on the foregone earnings of doing so, a function of the returns to other investment or to work; and on the out-of-pocket expenses of English tuition. Presumably, since English was not used in all occupations after 1760, not all francophones would learn English. The exact number would be a function of the demand and supply curves. Breton argues, however, that the Church reduced the supply of bilingual francophones because it feared that, if francophones became bilingual, they would eventually abandon the French language and, as a result , the Catholic faith. In other words "Qui perd sa langue, perd sa foi.'' Breton appears to imply that the Church reduced the supply of bilingual francophones through both persuasion and coercion. Presumably it attempted to persuade them that learning English was dangerous to their salvation. More pragmatically it also attempted "to discourage, or even prevent, francophones from entering such activities as commerce, finance , industry..." (1978, p. 664), thus leading to a decrease in the number of individuals wanting to learn English. Breton also appears to hint that it must have used its control of the school system to reduce the amount of English instruction available through it. Hence, in Breton's view there was, presumably throughout the entire 1760-1960 period, an undersupply of bilingual francophones in Quebec brought about by the Church's language policies. This meant that francophones "did not claim access" to managerial jobs in that period and this explains their lower socio-economic status in Quebec. To summarize, Breton treats the 1760-1960 period as one and argues that throughout there was an excess demand for bilingual francophone managers but that the Church's language policies prevented supply adjustments . In the alternative explanatory framework offered below, two other possible explanations are pointed out. The first accepts the hypothesis of an excess demand for bilingual francophones but argues that the returns to knowing English and not the Church explain this excess demand. The second suggests that thete was no excess demand for bilingual francophone managers in Quebec in the period but rather a demand for anglophones and a demand for bilingual francophones. Breton argues that if more bilingual francophones had been available they would have occupied the managerial jobs: as a result the proportion of anglophones in those jobs would have, at the limit, tended toward their share of the population. This implies that the returns to francophones learning English were such as to make demand equal supply. It may have been, however, that the difference in earnings between English-speaking managerial jobs and other occupations, such as those Revue d'etudes canadiennes Vol. 15, No.3(Automne1980Fa/I) of doctors or lawyers, was not sufficient to attract enough francophones in those jobs. This could be particularly the case if the ability to learn English is correlated amongst francophones with other intellectual abilities useful in acquiring other types of human capital. But why, in the situation described above, would the relative earnings of francophone managers not increase until they were no longer in short supply? Because the absolute earnings level is set by the available supply of anglophone managers who can easily be brought into Canada should it become too onerous to hire local manpower, that is bilingual francophones. This is especially true since bilingual francophones are not hired because of their knowledge of two languages but because they are surrogate anglophones. Hence the anglophone managers need not acquire French human capital to become local agents of British merchants or employees of these merchants. These investment choices which may have been correct when they were made in the early part of the period (1760-1840) may have meant that the francophones did not have the foresight to realize that the industrialist of tomorrow needed a merchant for grandfather and that they should have accepted lower returns on their human capital investment in exchange for higher returns for their descendants. Of course, even if they had foreseen this, their lifestyle and values might still have led them to make the same choice. If we assume that bilingual francophones can master English as well as anglophones, the other possible explanation is that part of the government and private sector jobs could be obtained only if the candidate not only spoke English but also was an anglophone. Such a situation could be explained by one or several of the following factors: 1) discrimination in the purest sense of the word (to the victors, the spoils); 2) statistical discrimination , since British merchants, bankers and government administrators may have found it useful to use ethnicity as a screen; 3) strategic and security reasons, with anglophones being inherently more trustworthy in some jobs. Whatever the cause this would mean that part of the managerial elite in Quebec would have to be made up of anglophones. If the supply of bilingual francophones is equal to the remaining demand then the market clears. If it is higher, then presumably queuing or some other form of rationing must operate, with rejected francophones going on to their second choice occupation. Finally, it is possible that there still could be an undersupply of francophones with the result that anglophones would occupy some of the jobs open to francophones. Once more, francophones could not be merchants in the first part of the 1760-1960 period and, therefore, could not accumulate sufficient capital to become industrialists. To summarize, we argue that one need not call upon the Church's purported language policies to explain the relative absence of francophones from manaJournal ofCanadian Studies gerial jobs in Quebec in the 1760-1960 period. One can argue that the supply of bilingual francophone managers was correct given the relative rate of return to that skill or that there was a demand for anglophones, distinct from the demand for English-speaking individuals, or both. To attempt to sort out the relative merits of the three explanations offered above, let us turn to the historical evidence. II. The Historical Evidence We do not have enough historical evidence on the supply and demand for English-speaking individuals and for anglophones in Quebec for the 1760-1960 period or on the returns to knowing English to reject unequivocally one or the other explanations offered above. Still we can use the available evidence to show that Breton's contention as to the Church's language policy is not easily backed up by the facts, that there was investment by francophones in other forms of human capital during the 1760-1840 period and that there appears to have been some discrimination, particularly in government jobs, against francophones. Breton's contention that the Church did not want francophones to learn English does not appear to be supported by the facts. Audet, in his complete review of the teaching system for the 1760-1840 period, points out that English may have occupied too prominent a place in the second half of the primary school teaching and that in classical colleges, which in those days often were responsible for commercial education, English occupied "une place d'honneur" (Audet, 1971, p. 375). In other words English was included in the advanced schooling sought in those days by individuals who did not plan on becoming farmers and it was church-controlled institutions which offered those courses. Both Groulx (1937) and Brunet (1968) provide evidence that support Audet's statement. One can also show that at least part of the Church hierarchy agreed that francophones had to learn English if they were involved in commerce or industry (Bouthillier and Meynaud, 1972, pp. 172-4 and 190-2) but did not believe that other francophones needed to. As to the reluctance of the Church to support commerce and industry it has been argued that, at least for the 1896-1914 period, the Church (through its bishops and parish priests) did not oppose economic development and that "contrary to a widespread opinion held by English Canadians the Church never directly opposed commercial and technical education as such'' (Ryan, 1966, p. 240). On this point let us note that the piece of historical evidence offered by Breton, which is that the French-language commerce school in Montreal was open " ...as late as 1910...under the aegis of the Church...," is in part misleading and in part incorrect. That the school opened in 1910 is correct but that this was late remains to be shown since very few business schools opened in North America before 1900; that it 113 was open under the aegis of the Church is incorrect since it opened as an independent school and affiliated itself with a catholic university, Laval, only in 1914. Finally and to set the record straight, to argue that the Church did not view the migration of francophones to the United States as a loss is to hold a view contrary to that held by Faucher (1964), Ouellet (1971), and Hamelin and Roby (1971), among others. Ouellet summarizes this best by stating that this migration was perceived by the Church as " ...une immense tragedie, une aventure desastreuse,...(Ouellet, 1971, p. 477). A study of the Church's attitude and actions throughout the period of heavy migration would back up their view. Indeed it is interesting to note that Hamelin and Roby write that the ideal of the migration of francophones to the United States as an instrument of God in making America catholic emerged only when the Church realized it could not stem the tide of out-migration from Quebec. The historical evidence, on the other hand, indicates that from about 1774 until 1840 francophones acquired the required skills to carry out liberal professions (doctors, lawyers) so much so that the returns declined after 1800. Indeed one interpretation of the 1837 rebellion could be that the francophone elite realized that it needed political power to gain access to government jobs, and possibly some private sector managerial jobs. With its failure, part of that elite had no choice but to join the migration to the United States of farmers leaving behind impoverished land. It is possible that those francophones who could learn English at a reasonably low cost realized that while the returns to doing so were not sufficient in Quebec they were high enough if they linked learning English to the decision to migrate to the United States where job opportunities were better. After 1840 the language requirements remained the same for most commercial jobs until 1960 and this may explain why the influence of the Church in Quebec rose to unprecedented heights. This, however, as "l'ecole historique de Montreal" (Fregault, Seguin, Brunet) would argue, was, and we agree, the result of the Conquest. As Brunet puts it, "the ecclesiastical preeminence noted in French-Canada, at }he end of the nineteenth century, was one of the results of the British conquest and occupation" (1959, p. 87). Indeed Wallot (1966) shows that the presence of the Church in Quebec at the beginning of the nineteenth century was relatively small. The evidence available does not permit us, unfortunately , to examine whether the behaviour of francophone elites was the result of choosing not to learn English or of being excluded from managerial jobs. It would appear, however, that British merchants preferred working with their compatriots when they were available. For example, in 1767 when anglophones made up 1 per cent of the population, they put up more 114 than half the cash bonds required to carry out the fur trade, but 85 per cent of the canoes engaged in that trade were operated by francophone entrepreneurs. However, in 1790 anglophones made up 10 to 15 per cent of the population and francophones operated less than 20 per cent of the canoes engaged in the fur trade. Hence it would appear that British capitalists worked with francophones when anglophones were not available, but preferred working with their compatriots . One notices a similar progression in the importance of anglophones as merchants in Quebec during that period. The absence of francophones in the fur trade may explain why they were not able to enter the wood trade that developed from 1800 in Quebec: Hamelin and Roby show that at least 90 per cent of that trade was in the hands of anglophones (1971, p. 9). Did British merchants prefer hiring anglophones because they were more efficient or less costly, or were they practicing discrimination? Historians disagree on this with Brunet arguing that " ...en general la discrimination se pratiquait avec...discretion. Elle n'en etait pas moins efficace" (Brunet, 1968, p. 194), and Ouellet pointing out that those living in that period believed there was discrimination but stating that he disagrees with that view (1971, p. 369). Those studying Quebec's society in the 1800-1850 period believed that there was some discrimination. Lord Durham pointed out that the educated youth of Quebec could not become soldiers or sailors and that this lead them to enter liberal professions. Also, one had to take into account '' ...the ascendency which an unjust favoritism has contributed to give to the English race in the government and the legal profession...'' (1839, p. 2). In 1849 the legislative committee investigating the emigration of francophones to the United States pointed out that''...young men of education belonging to respectable but poor families" left in part because of"...the unjust preference which has until now been given to young men of one origin over those of another ...in the various public departments...'' and of ''the difficulty which young Canadians find in obtaining situations in commercial houses as almost all these establishments send for their clerks from Scotland and England" (Select Committee, 1849, p. 4). This could indicate that both discrimination and easily available employees in Britain may explain the absence of francophones from managerial positions in Quebec. To summarize, it has been argued that Breton's explanation of the relative absence of francophones in managerial jobs in Quebec is not a convincing one and that competing explanations can be offered that appear to fit better with the available historical evidence. This does not mean that the Church did not have an impact on the economic development of Quebec; it means, however, that it is not the sole relevant factor in explaining the socio-economic status of francophones, particularly when one breaks down the 1760-1960 Revue d'etudes canadiennes period in relevant sub-periods. The state of the discussion will not progress much in our view until we can trace with some certainty the evolution of the returns to knowing English for francophones in both Quebec and the United States. This would open interesting avenues of research, particularly so for the 1840-1960 period, where English was used not only in commerce and government by a small proportion of the population , but also in industrial establishments where unilingual francophones, who until then could farm using French only, now needed to know some English, the language of the entrepreneur and of technology. This may have had some impact on the importance of the out-migration from Quebec; it may also explain why the aphorism "Qui perd sa langue, perd sa foi,, became a reflection of the Church,s concerns in that period , much more than in the first hundred years after the Conquest. *My thanks to Marvin Mcinnis, Michael Percy, Michel Brunet, JeanMichel Cousineau and Daniel Racette for helpful comments. BIBLIOGRAPHY Audet, Louis Philippe. Histoire de l'enseignement du Quebec. Montreal : HRW, 1971. 2 vol. Journal ofCanadian Studies Bouthillier, Guy and Meynaud, Jean. Le choc des tongues au Quebec 1760-1970. Montreal: P.U.Q. 1972 Readings. Breton, Albert. "Nationalism and Language Policies." Canadian Journal ofEconomics, 11 November 1978, pp. 656-69. Brunet, Michel. "The British Conquest: Canadian Social Scientist and the Fate of the Canadiens." Canadian Historical Review 40 (June 1959). Reprinted in Approaches to Canadian History. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1967. Brunet, Michel. 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