Tommy Stone and Psychological Warfare in World War Two: Transforming a POW Liability into an Asset

Tommy Stone and Psychological Warfare in World War Two: Trans!orming a POW Liability into an Asset DON PAGE Canada had no responsibility for prisoners of war during the First World War and expected none during the second. But late in 1941 Britain realized that with Hitler at her doorstep it would be folly to keep enemy POWs in operational zones any longer. Canada was a logical place for the beseiged British to send them as it would require no diversion of shipping and Canada was presumed to have plenty of space and guards. I The arrival in Canada of large numbers of POWs in 1942 was the beginning of countless bureaucratic headaches for officials in the Department of External Affairs and the three service departments charged with handling them. To start with, there never developed any means for sorting out allied jurisdictions that flowed from the Geneva and POW Conventions that External Affairs were required to implement. Initially when the majority of POWs were in Britain, a Prisoner of War Committee representing various British Government Departments and Dominion representatives managed things quite well. When the United States entered the war, it insisted on a Washington-based committee that too often sought to undo what the London group had just done.2 This left the Canadian custodian to bear the brunt of the rivalry and the frustration of having to implement sometimes conflicting decisions when there was supposed to be a consistency of treatment of those held in all Allied countries. A further complication was the British Embassy in Washington which handled liaison with the Americans but refused to involve Canadian officials in the discussions. British officials found it difficult to reconcile themselves to the fact that Canada, which had custody of the prisoners and 110 claimed international responsibility for them, had not actually captured them nor was it directly supervising or paying for their upkeep. Therefore the British Embassy would make decisions that Canada was expected to implement.3 The British War Office had an understandable reason for wanting Canadians to implement these decisions since, regardless of actual location, the Germans held the British alone accountable for all POWs held in the Dominions.4 The worst problem in coordinating policy occurred over the shackling of POWs. In October 1942 the Germans, who were angered by the binding of prisoners taken in the Dieppe and other raids, decided to shackle the POWs. Without any consultation with Canadian officials the British government proceeded to announce that reprisals involving an equal number of German POWs would be forthcoming. Yet almost all the German POWs against whom the reprisals would be taken were in Canada. The Canadian Cabinet War Committee was understandably furious at the lack of consultation because most of the menaced Allied prisoners were Canadians. Nevertheless, to avoid a public split with its Ally, the Cabinet agreed to handcuff some 1,100 German POWs the following day. But not without a protest to London and the warning: "We fear a futile contest may follow in an attempt to match with the Germans an eye for an eye. In such a contest in the application of harshness to prisoners the Germans are certain to win."5 Cabinet was right. The next day the Germans were proposing the manacling of three times the number manacled by Canada and the British were asking Canada to follow suit. To this request Cabinet said no. There were already problems of resistance in the inadequately guarded camps and the United States was refusing to provide the necessary handcuffs. Those who had been handcuffed remained so for two months, which caused External Affairs no end of work investigating and presenting defences against the alleged injustices. By international convention every POW and internee was entitled to address complaints and enquiries to the Swiss Protecting Power. Thus it was External Affairs' responsibility to investigate thousands of complaints about such things as Revue d'etudes canadiennes Vol. 16, Nos. 3&4(Automne-Hiver1981 Fall-Winter) damaged parcels and the amount of soap that POWs were allowed to purchase in the canteens, in order to defend before the Protecting Power the conditions prevailing in Canadian camps. Because every camp directive was subject to appeal...