The Critique of Psychologism and the Conception of Subjectivity in Frege

I. Introduction: The Standard Reading of Frege¹

1. There is something like a standard reading of Frege regarding his interest in questions concerning subjectivity.² This reading is defended by representatives from two diametrically opposed parties, that is, by orthodox analytic philosophers and by defenders of phenomenology. Each party's rationale is, however, completely different. The former want to see in Frege the hero of the semantic turn and, perhaps, a pure philosopher of mathematics; by posing a legitimate question that Frege neither understood nor was sensitive to and then fully answering it, the latter wish to show the superiority of Husserl's way of proceeding over Frege's.

2. The standard reading can be summed up in two theses, to which two more are duly added.

Ta. Frege consigned the problem of the grasping of thoughts to psychology.

Tb. From the latter it is inferred that Frege had no interest whatsoever in subjectivity.

On the basis of these two theses, one can now choose to take different paths, that is, either one can continue to defend Tb and simply affirm that Frege said nothing at all about the subjectivity or one can note that:

Tc. Frege identified psychology and naturalistic psychology.

As a consequence of the latter, one can advance toward the following thesis:

Td. Precisely because Frege had no interest in subjectivity, he uncritically assumed the conception of the subjectivity of naturalistic psychology, so that he may indeed have had a conception of subjectivity, but one that is in fact naturalistic and nonintentional, that is, Frege shares with the same psychologism he attacks its conception of subjectivity.

3. In the following I intend to show that what I have called the standard conception is false and to present elements that aim to bring to light that Frege's criticism of psychologism has as its counterpart the sketch of a conception of subjectivity that is original in the context of German philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth century. It is clear that for this goal a shift of attention toward the context is an essential step.

II. The Anti-Psychologistic Struggle within the Context of Post-Hegelian German Philosophy

1. The origins of psychologism have their roots in the state of post-Kantian idealism or, more concretely, in the massive reaction to every sort of metaphysics and speculative philosophy that led to a reorientation of thinking about the "given" (Gegebenheit). This reorientation would have to take two absolutely different forms. On the one hand, it would have to reestablish the relation between philosophy and science, turning the former into a reflection upon the latter, and, on the other, it would have to identify philosophy with a certain science that enjoyed a particular dominance at the time, that is, psychology. In other words, psychologism was the consequence of a strong immanentism that came about as one reaction to post-Kantian idealism.

2. The "immanence principle" (IP) was the major source of psychologism in nineteenth- century German philosophy. Because I will have to refer to this principle a number of times, it is important to define it from the start. By this principle, I shall mean the fundamental Cartesian conviction,³ made explicit in its classical form by Locke,⁴ that the only possible objects of my knowledge are contents of my mind (Bewusstseinsinhalte). From this very definition, one can clearly see that IP was not a particular trait of post-Kantian idealism but had its origins in modern philosophy. Notwithstanding, it is important to note that within the context of post-Hegelian German philosophy, this principle acquired a central role, turning into one of the truly undisputed axioms of the time. This means, on the one hand, that IP pertains to the foundations of psychologism and motivates it and,⁵ on the other, however, that it is pervasive also among the anti-psychologists.⁶

3. I was saying that the birth of psychologism came about at the same time as...