The Meech Lake Fiasco

The Meech Lake Fiasco As thedays and weeks ofthe endless Canadian winterunfold, it becomes increasingly less likely that the Meech Lake accord will be ratified in its present form. An eleventh hour miracle or a parallel accord notwithstanding, theMeech Lake episode will leave a bitter political legacy. What was intended to unite Canada by returningQuebec totheconstitutionalfold has led to renewedconstitutional squabbling, divisive languagepolitics, and fractiousness. The mood ofthe day is characterized by political alienation, elements of racism, and a sense of resignation by many Canadians that the separation of Quebec from Canada is inevitable. Why has this happened? The present stage in Canadian constitution-making was destined to be difficult. Given the constitutional inheritance of 1981-82, the goal of getting Quebec to sign a constitutional agreement required that a minimum level of inducements be offered to that province. Realizing that such inducements could easily be represented as favouritism or 'special status,' the architects ofMeech Lake proposed to deal with this challenge in two ways. First, most of the inducements offered to Quebec were also offered to the other nine provinces. Second, the constitutional process was tightly controlled to minimize squabbles and disagreements and to maximize the possibility ofgetting Quebec to sign the constitution. These tactics are chickens which havecome home to roost. By limitingconstitutional participation and benefits to governments, consensus-buildingaround the constitutional deal was inherently limited and constrained. It is no wonder, then, that a majority ofCanadians neither understand nor support Meech Lake and that it has been possible to represent theaccord as unduly favouring Quebec. The closed, elitist quality ofCanadian constitution-making has beendefiantly crude in the caseofMeech Lake.* None ofthe eleven first ministers was elected onthe basis ofcreating thisconstitutional package(only theBourassagovernment was elected after specifying a constitutional proposal). The lead up to Meech Lake was tightlycontrolledand invisible; documents and discussions weresecret. The marathon meetings at Meech Lakeand in the Langevin Building were held behind closed doors and restricted to the first ministers and a few non-elected advisers. After the Meech Lake meeting itself, only Quebec held public hearings (but itdid not have ratification hearings). In the ratification process after the Langevin meeting, only Ontario and Prince Edward Island of the signing provinces had public hearings (subsequently elected governments in Manitoba and New Brunswick had hearings). The federal government's hearings were compressed into one month in the middle of the summer with the clear understanding that amendments orchanges were not to be tolerated. Caught unprepared by the Meech * For an elaboration of the political process surrounding Meech Lake, see Robert M. Campbell and Leslie A. Pal, 171e Real Worlds ofCanadian Politics (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1989), chapter 5. Journal of Canadian Studies Vol. 24. No. 4 (Hfrer 1989-90 W imer) 3 Lake deal, the Liberal and NDP parties were compromised into supporting the accord lest they appearto be anti-Quebec. As a result, there was little to no debate at the national level. Ifthe ends justify the means, this process made tremendous political sense for the architects of the accord, for it maximized the probability of getting agreement amongst the eleven governments. Moreover, a process limited to governments favours governments, especially those in the vast majority. Not surprisingly, the ten provincial governments dealt themselves increased powers. However, there are constitutional interests other than governmental ones. Women's groups, multicultural associations, trade unions, public servants, fish and farm associations, anti-poverty groups, minority language groups, natives, theterritories, supporters ofnationalprograms, and others raised a multitudeof issues and concerns - but too late.Thesegroups had not beengiven access to the constitutional process, so their objectives were not part of the Meech Lake package. Instead, in elitist and paternalistic style, they were told not to worry, and to wait for the next round ofconstitutional change. This minimized the public support which a constitutional package might have had. In the five elections since June 1987, three provinces have elected governments which do not support the Meech Lake deal - New Brunswick, Manitoba, and Newfoundland. This has opened up the ratification process to considerably more discussion and debate, as non-governmental groups pressure the renegade provincial governments to hold out for changes. Butthe architects ofMeech Lake continue to focus theirattention ongovernments and...