Abstract

What sort of thing is judgment? Considering the sense of a human capacity, not the result of exercising it, I offer a definition proposal: "the human capacity to make good decisions about matters for which no calculus yields a definitive or highly probable answer." I discuss how judgment operates, what constitutes good judgment, whether it can be cultivated, and, if so, how. My example is Benedick's deciding to love Beatrice in Shakespeare's Much Ado About Nothing. I argue that Benedick exercises good judgment, thus illuminating the concept of judgment and demonstrating that it is a valuable tool for understanding him.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1086-329X
Print ISSN
0190-0013
Pages
pp. 142-154
Launched on MUSE
2017-10-20
Open Access
No
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