When Russian Values Go Abroad: The Clash Between Populism and Foreign Policy

Straddling the line between East and West both geographically and ideologically, the Russian Federation has a unique relation with populism. Vladimir Putin and his allies have been able to garner populist support for their increasingly centralized government and its active, interventionist foreign policy by relying upon traditional Russian cultural values, as well as a populist desire to see Russia return to the world stage as an economic and military superpower. Russian traditions have led to populist support for Putin for nearly eighteen years; however, his refusal to fully support ethnic Russians in Ukraine is now changing that relationship. The Russian government overnment must now answer to the people regarding its goals in backing the Assad regime in Syria and supporting—overtly or otherwise—separatists in the Donbass, rather than assuming the Russian people will naturally understand how those goals advance their interests.¹

The Western perception is that Russians believe that Russia deserves to be a regional power in Eurasia because the Soviet Union encompassed many of the states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Within Russia, the opposite perception is true. Russians in the Soviet Union did not feel as though they enjoyed a privileged position within the Union; rather, Russia was the only republic that lacked its own capital, and the Soviet government spent less time encouraging Russians to embrace their nationality than they did encouraging other nationalities to embrace theirs.² Every Soviet passport, for example, included a citizen's nationality, which ranged from current sovereign states to substate nationalities like Tatar or Chechnyan. The break between citizenship and nationality still exists today, and Russian nationalists believe that one of the government's primary concerns should be to promote the interests of ethnic Russians, both within the Russian Federation and outside of it. Then-President Dmitry Medvedev endorsed this belief in 2008, when he outlined Russia's five foreign policy principles, including the "unquestionable priority … to protect the life and dignity of [Russian] citizens, wherever they are."³ Although Medvedev is now prime minister, he and Putin still constitute the core of Russian leadership, and neither has indicated that this principle has changed.

Religion also plays a part in Russian populism's effect on foreign policy. During the Soviet Union, Russian Orthodoxy was heavily restricted both as a religious entity and as a cultural organization.⁴ St. Isaac's Cathedral in central St. Petersburg was transformed into the "Museum of the History of Religion and Atheism," while the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow was demolished. Nevertheless, many Russians continued to follow the faith privately, and resumed open worship as soon as it was permitted. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian government rebuilt the Cathedral of Christ the Savior and has funded the restoration of many Russian cathedrals, which have gradually been transferred to the control of the Russian Orthodox Church. By restoring the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church, the Russian government maintains a symbiotic relationship with religious leadership and positions itself as a champion of Orthodox values in the region. The Russian people view the relationship between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian government, as well as the latter's protection of Orthodox Christians in Syria, as a sharp and welcome departure from the Soviet era. Instead of neglecting this pillar of Russian culture, the Russian government is championing it both at home and abroad.

While the common Western perspective criticizes the Russian Orthodox Church for enabling the Putin administration's backlash against "globalization, multiculturalism, and women's and gay rights," for the 71 percent of Russians who identify as Russian Orthodox, the sense of tradition and community that the Russian Orthodox Church offers is far more appealing than Western progressive values.⁵ A May 2017 report from the Pew Research Center highlights that while these 71 percent of Russians consider themselves to be Russian Orthodox, this number does not correlate with the percentage of Russianswho regularly attend church services. The Russian Orthodox Church is as much a cultural institution as it is a religious one, and...