Abstract

This paper does four things: (1) It provides an analysis of the concept ‘fake news.’ (2) It identifies distinctive epistemic features of social media testimony. (3) It argues that partisanship-in-testimony-reception is not always epistemically vicious; in fact some forms of partisanship are consistent with individual epistemic virtue. (4) It argues that a solution to the problem of fake news will require changes to institutions, such as social media platforms, not just to individual epistemic practices.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1086-3249
Print ISSN
1054-6863
Pages
pp. E-43-E-64
Launched on MUSE
2017-09-21
Open Access
No
Archive Status
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