In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Reviewed by:
  • Democracy in Iran: Why It Failed and How It Might Succeed by Misagh Parsa
  • Mahmoud Sadri
Democracy in Iran: Why It Failed and How It Might Succeed By Misagh Parsa, Harvard University Press. 416 pages. $45 hardcover.

The title of Misagh Parsa's Democracy in Iran: Why It Failed and How It Might Succeed promises an explanatory analysis in historical sociology, but it delivers a descriptive account in historiography. The work unfolds in four parts. It starts with the premise that Iran, the only "officially recognized theocracy in the world," is a historically unique case. How might one read the tea leaves of political change for such an idiosyncratic antimodern hybrid regime? The author suggests a binary choice: reform or revolution. He proposes comparing Iran to Indonesia, the Philippines, and Egypt (similar cases) and contrasting it with South Korea, which succeeded in attaining democracy and prosperity. Whereas Iran and South Korea's GDP were similar in 1979 (the year of the Iranian revolution), South Korea's GDP is now three times that of Iran. What went wrong? Parsa identifies a number of culprits: regime exclusivism, non-democratic ideology, elite intervention in the economy, state interference in cultural affairs, mounting social inequality, and lack of exit options for elites.

The second part of the book, entitled "Revolution and the Political Economy of Theocracy," argues that the Islamic Republic of Iran, far from being the result of a cohesive radical Shi'a movement, was a catalyst for the creation of such a movement (p. 61). The author demonstrates that the pre-revolutionary constituencies such as students, Bazaar merchants, and religious seminarians were divergent in their sensibilities and divided in their demands. It was the politicization of mosques, the suppression of moderate political opposition, and the ability of Khomeini to lead the movement from exile that led to the success of the Islamic revolution of Iran. Once in power, Khomeini shifted the revolution's slogan from independence and freedom to "protection of the oppressed," which he introduced on the day of referendum for the Islamic Republic (March 30, 1979). Khomeini then utilized this nebulous and populist slogan to push back against liberals and leftists alike. Several vigilante and militia organizations that enjoyed official sanction helped suppress the opposition. The regime subsequently proceeded to stifle ethnic movements, conservative clerics, and erstwhile allies. The hostage crisis and the protracted eight-year war with Iraq, while degrading Iran's economy and political standing in the world, consolidated Khomeini's [End Page 1] hold on power. Today, the author points out, the real GDP of the country is markedly below its pre-revolutionary days. In short, massive state and army intervention in the economy helped erode the state's legitimacy and increase the pace of capital flight and brain drain. Centrist policies of the Islamic Republic harmed small business, intensified rural exodus, spawned stagflation, caused working-class poverty, weakened the middle classes, and boosted conspicuous consumption among the super-rich. (pp. 121–31). Two major opposition movements failed to change the trajectory of the regime. The "Reform movement" of 1997–2005 faltered with the election of Ahmadinejad, and the Green Movement of 2009–2010 was violently suppressed by the regime.

Part 3, entitled "Challenges against the Islamic Regime," starts with an assessment of the role of college students in recent Iranian history, due to their superior ability to mobilize against state repression, a role they fulfilled in the Islamic revolution as well. Khomeini lionized them for their help but soon after the revolution turned against them. When measures such as vetting the applicants and disciplinary action didn't work, a "Cultural Revolution" shut down universities for 32 months. Still, new student political formations with the old political aims thrived under such deceptive names as "Union of Students and Seminaries" and "Student Islamic Committees." This time they helped elect the reformist president Khatami. The July 7, 1999, student demonstrations led to a violent vigilante reprisal in their dormitories at the University of Tehran. These deadly attacks triggered six days of widespread demonstrations that shook the very foundations of the regime (pp. 190, 199). Radicalized by the events, student organizations asked for a referendum and an end...

pdf

Share