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FIANNA FÁIL, CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLICANISM, AND THE ISSUE OF CONSENT: 1980–19961 GARETH IVORY in “Revisionist ‘Consent’, Hillsborough, and the Decline of Constitutional Republicanism” (1990),2 Paul Power suggested that the last stand of constitutional republicanism in its de Valeran form was Haughey’s contribution to the Dáil debate on the Hillsborough agreement. Although the de Valeran form may have seen its day, constitutional republicanism per se has not been eclipsed. Rather, particularly in the last six years, Fianna Fáil’s interpretation of constitutional republicanism has so evolved that the party has engaged meaningfully with the “real” world of Anglo-Irish relations. In doing so, Fianna Fáil has joined the other Dáil parties in endorsing the “principle of consent” and has argued for a more refined understanding of this concept. More importantly, Fianna Fáil has reasserted the importance of constitutional republicanism, a position that eluded the party throughout much of the 1970s and 1980s, as a revisionist nationalism challenged party orthodoxy. During that period, despite considerable backbench resistance the Fianna Fáil leadership had opted for moderate revisionist nationalism. In this article, which focuses exclusively on the Anglo-Irish process, I will FIANNA FÁIL, CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLICANISM, AND CONSENT 93 1 I would like to thank Dr. Martin Mansergh, Head of Research, Fianna Fáil, for providing me with copies of several relevant unpublished papers and for positive comments on an earlier draft of this article. However, the overall interpretation and analysis contained herein are the author’s alone. 2 Paul F. Power, “Revisionist ‘Consent’, Hillsborough, and the Decline of Constitutional Republicanism,” ÉIRE-IRELAND xxv (Spring 1990): 20–39. In a later article, Power accepts that Fianna Fáil policy on Northern Ireland post-1990 reflected a “centrist strategy,” while statements by Albert Reynolds were “laced with modern republicanism.” Nonetheless, insularity is still regarded as central to Fianna Fáil thinking. Moreover, a rigid interpretation of constitutional republicanism persists (see Paul F. Power, “Revisionist Nationalism’s Consolidation , Republicanism’s Marginalization, and the Peace Process,” ÉIRE-IRELAND xxxi (Spring/Summer 1996): 89–122). outline the evolution of Fianna Fáil’s understanding of the consent issue throughout the 1980s; its conversion to the “principle of consent” as generally understood by the other Dáil parties by the early 1990s; and, finally, its substantive development of the principle and ramifications for Irish nationalism in general and Irish republicanism in particular. The evolution of constitutional republican thought on the issue of consent can be divided into three separate stages: until Hillsborough (1985), from Hillsborough to the McGimpsey Supreme Court ruling (1990), and post-McGimpsey, although a degree of overlap exists from time to time. Further, Power asserts that the orthodox constitutional republican doctrine requires that all-Ireland majority opinion should determine the only legitimate expression of Irish self-determination and that Britain has a responsibility to rectify the injustice of partition even if that requires overruling Northern Unionist objections. Republicanism, he argues, envisions an insular Irish unity and is incapable of compromise. However, the defining characteristics of constitutional republicanism are not “immutable”—a watchword for an isolationist arcadia. On the contrary, constitutional republicanism can be both modernist and outward-looking ; moreover, it is capable of compromise if its political distinctiveness is acknowledged and accepted. In his most recent work, Tom Garvin advances an alternative definition of Irish republicanism, asserting that it has developed a local significance as a shorthand term for insurrectionist anti-British nationalism, usually, but not invariably, combined with a rather vaguely expressed preference for political democracy, representative institutions and human rights.3 To this definition, I would add that a concern for the protection of the rights of its citizens both internally and abroad is also crucial. The adjective “constitutional” limits the term “republicanism” and flags a rejection of violence, coercion, and intimidation to achieve political ends. This article aims to challenge a prevalent international understanding that Irish republicanism is synonymous with militancy—and therefore beyond consideration in a civilized society. On the contrary, the term and mantle of Irish “republicanism” appears to have been stolen from its true inheritor, Dáil Éireann. The Anglo-Irish process was officially launched in May 1980 by Charles...

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