Revisionist Nationalism’s Consolidation, Republicanism’s Marginalization, and the Peace Process

REVISIONIST NATIONALISM’S CONSOLIDATION, REPUBLICANISM’S MARGINALIZATION, AND THE PEACE PROCESS PAUL F. POWER this article has two main purposes. The first is to explain how, and for what ends, revisionist nationalism consolidated its earlier victory over orthodox nationalism during the early 1990s, though not so as to become ultrarevisionist or partitionist. The solidification further marginalized republicanism in both its constitutional form, represented traditionally mainly by the deValéra-established Fianna Fáil, the island’s largest political party, and in its physical force current, expressed since the 1970s chiefly by the Provisional IRA, having its only political apologist in Provisional Sinn Féin. The second task is to show how the heavily imbalanced orthodox-revisionist condition furthered the peace process in this decade. The constitutional principals engaged in the process, including Northern Ireland’s Unionists, optimally seeking termination of nationalist irredentism and the IRA, goals for which they wish to pay no concessions, believe in the desirability or necessity of achieving a settlement covering internal northern, North-South and Anglo-Irish issues. There are unresolved problems as to how Sinn Féin can be included in three-strand negotiations which revolve around preconditions focusing on a durable cessation of paramilitary violence , and on IRA and loyalist arms decommissioning. This exercise is attentive to the record of the quest for an end to political violence and of the search for all-party talks, and also to longterm trends in the Anglo-Irish triangle. An estimate is offered of the chances for a general settlement, and for peace in the isles absent such an agreement. CONSOLIDATION, MARGINALIZATION, AND THE PEACE PROCESS 89 I A sketch of background developments before the 1990s may be helpful. The mainsprings of revisionist nationalism’s triumph and orthodox nationalism ’s decline outside of hard-core precincts in Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin may be located in three main sources. These were the Republic of Ireland ’s absorption in key social segments of cultural, intellectual and political influences in the 1950s; the rise and broad diffusion of demythologizing studies of modern Irish history; and the impact of the resurgent northern conflict starting in the late 1960s. In the 1950s, the Republic experienced transnational and home-grown liberal, materialist and secularist influences, which diminished, but did not end Catholic communalism, cultural insularity, a distinct Irish identity , and received political wisdom. Avoiding NATO membership, the Irish state readily joined new European and global organizations, thereby superficially reducing Anglocentricity in foreign relations. In these bodies Dublin concentrated on arms control, peace-keeping and economic development . The last named had special resonance for one of the West’s poorest countries. The post-deValéran Lemass phase (1959–66) saw much needed innovations and pragmatism. The North and South exchanged prime ministerial visits; an Anglo-Irish free-trade treaty emerged. The new climate supported an all-party parliamentary committee on the constitution which Seán Lemass joined when he left office. The group addressed the hitherto undiscussed “irredentist” Articles 2 and 3 which Unionists had condemned as a challenge to Northern Ireland’s United Kingdom status and encouragement to terrorism.1 The deValéran provisions had vexed, but not angered the London regime. Advising no change in the crucial Article 2, drawing on the legacy of six centuries of pre-modern, Celtic cultural unity throughout the island CONSOLIDATION, MARGINALIZATION, AND THE PEACE PROCESS 90 1 The 1937 charter’s Article 2 defined the nation as covering the whole island, ruled for centuries by Britain as a single unit. Referring to the eventual “reintegration of the national territory,” and to the right of the sovereign Dublin regime to exercise jurisdiction over the insular nation, Article 3 limited the application of the regime’s laws to the 26counties . The articles expressed consensual opinion among nationalists of the time. More prudent than republican, as Sinn Féin and independent republicans pointed out in 1937 and later, Articles 2 and 3 were meant as an ideological retort to the 1921 Treaty and the 1925 Border Agreement which the Dublin regime had accepted under duress; but the deValéran government and its successors did not renounce the pacts embedding partition in international law. on which...