Abstract

In this article I offer a new interpretation of Nietzsche’s doctrine of will to power by treating its relation to an often neglected conceptual distinction in Nietzsche’s philosophy: the distinction between (a) parasitism and (b) overflow. I show that Nietzsche treats (a) and (b) as two different ways of willing power, but with an important qualification: (a) is always a means to (b), which is the real aim of power. Because (b) is conceived of as the real aim of power, it serves as Nietzsche’s standard for evaluating the degree of power attained by beings and their actions. The more that a being or activity attains (b), the greater is its power and rank according to Nietzsche.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1538-4594
Print ISSN
0968-8005
Pages
pp. 190-218
Launched on MUSE
2017-07-10
Open Access
No
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