Woodrow Wilson's Use of the Non-Recognition Policy in Costa Rica

Of all Woodrow Wilson's foreign policies, none is more deserving of criticism than his non-recognition policy. This policy, initiated by the President within a week after his accession to office on March 4, 1913, in response to the news of violent revolutionary disturbances in Mexico and Nicaragua, was primarily predicated on Wilson's assumption that the best way to prevent the recurrence of revolutions in Caribbean nations would be to warn all would-be revolutionists that they could expect no political or financial support from the United States. Ultimately he hoped that he could end the threat of revolution and induce all Latin American nations to abide by constitutional and democratic forms of government. Hence, in a press statement on March 11, 1913, he proclaimed:

Cooperation is possible only when supported at every turn by the orderly processes of just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force. We hold, as I am sure all thoughtful leaders of republican government everywhere hold, that just government rests always upon the consent of the governed, and that there can be no freedom without order based upon law and upon the public conscience and approval. We shall look to make these principles the basis of mutual intercourse, respect and helpfulness between our sister republics and ourselves.¹

Wilson's non-recognition policy thus grew out of his belief that all nations could in time be prepared to take part in a brotherhood of democratic nations which could bring peace to the world. His idealistic dream was doomed to failure; too many obstacles stood in the way of such a utopian world. Not least among these barriers was Wilson's presumption that the Anglo-American systems of democratic government were the best possible bases for his brotherhood of nations and that all nations were ready for or desired them. Just as important an obstacle was Wilson's duty to provide for the defence of the United States in a world largely governed by national self-interest. It was this latter fact that placed Wilson, when he learned of the revolutionary disorder in Nicaragua and Mexico, two nations dangerously near both the United States and the soon-to-be completed Panama Canal, on the horns of a dilemma: either he would have to await the voluntary cooperation of each nation to preserve internal stability or else he would have to intervene by force of arms. As a solution, he chose a middle course by promulgating a non-recognition policy to apply non-violent pressure on revolutionary leaders. This policy, however, was contrary to the general international principle that de facto recognition of a relatively stable government was the only effective way to deal with revolutionary regimes.

Nevertheless, despite admonitions against the use of this policy from his advisers in the State Department, Wilson proceeded to implement the non-recognition policy not just in Mexico but in Costa Rica. His use of the policy in Mexico is well known, but his effort in Costa Rica is not. In Costa Rica, as in Mexico, his policy, though formulated on what he considered as a moralistic and beneficial basis, was to rebound with harmful effects on both that country and the United States.

When Wilson came to power in 1913, he probably gave little or no thought to Costa Rica. Nor did he have to. His predecessors, Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, had secured a large measure of peace and stability in the Caribbean region by their various power policies. They had instituted financial protectorates to insure the payment of foreign debts and to remove the financial incentive to revolutionaries. When this failed, they had sent battleships to trouble-spots to show that American power was present and also to make available friendly offices when necessary.

Costa Rica had been unique among its Caribbean neighbors in that it had generally been able to stand on its own feet. Many explanations have been offered as to why Costa Rica was relatively stable; the jnost convincing is that Costa Ricans were economically more favored...